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NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 



AND 



THE SIEGE OF TOULON 



INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION 

ZUR 

ERLANGUNG DER DOKTORWURDE 

DER 

HOHEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN FHKULTJiT 

DER 

RUPRECBT=KARLS=UNIVERSITAT ZU HEIDELBERG 

VORGELEGT VON 

CHARLES JAMES FOX 

AUS 
BOSTON, MASS., U. S. A. 



H. 




WASHINGTON, D. C. 

LAW REPORTER COMPANY, PRINTERS. 
1902. 






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CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS AND 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

A. Contemporary Accounts. 

Reports in : ^ Archives de la Guerre a Paris ; Archives 
Natioiiales a Paris: Manuscript Department, British 

Museum : Public Record Office London. 
Periodicals: Moniteur; The London Gazette; Gazeta 

de Madrid. 

B. Bibliography. 

The Naval Chronicle, July to Dec. 1793. London, 

1799. 
Speeches of the Hon. W. Pitt 4 vols. London, 1806. 
Speeches of the Hon. C. J. Fox 6 vols. London, 1815. 
Precis historique sur les evenements de Toulon, d'lm- 

bert, Paris, 1814. 
Notes et pieces officielles relatives aux evenements de 

Marseilles et de Toulon, Abeille, Paris, 1815, 
Revolution royaliste de Toulon, de Brecy, Paris, 1816. 
Parliamentary History of England Vol 30. London, 

1817. 
Memoires pour servir a I'histoire de France sous Na- 
poleon ecrits a St. Helenepar Montholon 5 vols; par 

Gourgard 2 vols. Paris, 1823. 
Memoires politiques et militaires du General Doppet 1 

vol. Paris, 1824. 
Memoires de Freron Paris, 1824. 
Memoires pour servir a I'histoire de la ville de Toulon 

en 1793, Pons, Paris, 1825. 
Historic de la Revolution frangaise Tome sixieme 

Thiers, Paris, 1834. 
Memoires du Prince de la Paix Don Manuel Godoy 4 

vols. Paris, 1836. 
Biographic de Napoleon Bonaparte, Coston, Paris, 1840. 

1 Many of the reports, especially in the Archives de la Guerre, are full 
of orthographical errors. I have copied them exactly as I found them. 



IV CONTEMPORANRY ACCOUNTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Extraits de Memoires inedites du due de Bellune, Paris, 

1846. 
Memoires de Claude Victor Perrin due de Bellune 

Paris, 1847. 
Life and correspondence of Admiral Sir W. Sidney 

Smith, Barrow 2 vols. London, 1848. 
Memorials and correspondence of C. J. Fox, Russell 

London, 1853. 
Correspondance de Napoleon Vol. 1. Paris, 1853. 
Journal and correspondence of William Lord Auck- 
land 4 vols. London, 1862. 
Oestreich und Preussen gegeniiber der Franzoesischen 

Revolution bis zum Abschluss des Friedens von 

Campio Formio, H. Hueffer, Bonn, 1868. 
Memoires sur la guerre des Alpes tires des papiers du 

Comte Ignas Tbaon de Revel, Turin, Rom, Florence 

1871. 
Vertrauliche Briefe des Freiherren von Thugut, von 

Vivenot, Band I Vienna, 1872. 
Life and Letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot first Earl of Minto, 

1751 to 1806 3 vols. London, 1874. 
Life of Thomas Graham Lord Lynedoch A. M. Dela- 

voye London, 1880. 
Bonaparte et son temps, 1769-99. 3 vols. Jung Paris, 

1880-81. 
Campaignes dans les Alpes pendant la Revolution 

1792-93 Krebs et Morris, Paris, 1891. 
Recueil des actes du Comite de Salut Public avec la 

correspondance officielle des representants en mission. 

F. A. Aulard Paris, 1894. 
Memoires de Barras 4 vols. Duruy Paris, 1895-6. 
The manuscripts of J. B. Fortesque Esq. Vol. 2 London, 

1894. 
Napoleon Bonaparte et les Generaux Du Teil, Baron 

Joseph du Teil, Paris, 1897. 
Toulon et les Anglais en 1793. Paul Cottin Paris, 1898. 
La Jeunesse de Napoleon, Chuquet Paris, 1899. 



PREFACE. 

The siege of Toulon in 1793 is interesting and important, 
as a military event in the War of the First Coalition ; as a 
political combination of the European Powers during the early 
part of the same war; and as a personal incident in the life 
of Napoleon Bonaparte. The following pages are the result 
of a study of the siege in which I have tried to give special 
attention to the second and third phases of the question. I 
have come to the conclusion that the political importance of 
the siege was considerable and that the English entered 
Toulon unexpectedl}' and intended to hold it simpl}^ as a 
pledge of indemnification ; and secondly that the role of 
Bonaparte was very important and that he by directing 
the course of this siege, had here for the first time an influ- 
ence upon the events of his time and consequently enters 
history. As the last point has been much disputed and as 
the others have not yet been brought out, I have in attempt- 
ing to demonstrate each, given as much as possible of the 
material used, together with frequent references, allowing 
him whom the subject may interest to draw his ow^n conclu- 
sions, hoping however that they will coincide with those 
which in my opinion are the logical and just ones. 

The first accounts of Napoleon's actions were written dur- 
ing, and under the influence of, the grandeur of the Consul- 
ate and First Empire. The part he played at Toulon was 
generally considered great'and brilliant; but this prevalent 
opinion was based principally upon more or less inexact rem- 
iniscences of those who took part in the siege with him. 
Everybody accepted without going into particulars that the 
First Consul, or Emperor, began his career at Toulon, where 
his genius first attracted attention. At the Restau ration ro}^- 
alists who had served at Toulon published accounts of the 
siege, which with regard to the role of Bonaparte, had rather 
the opposite tendenc3^ But as their principal aim was to 



VI PREFACE. 

bring forward their own actions and thereby win the favor 
of Louis XVIII, and as anti-Bonapartist statements needed 
then no foundation on fact, these writings are of no ob- 
jective value. They reflect but the anti-Bonapartist and 
pro-English sentiment of the Court at this time. Thiers 
throws some light on Bonaparte's role at Toulon, attributing 
principally to him the fall of the city; but Thiers' Work was 
to vast to permit him to make any special study of the af- 
fair of Toulon. His account of it is filled with errors. Tlie 
Memoirs of Barras (not published until 1895) furnish ample 
but quite untrustworthy material to those who wish to les- 
sen the role of Bonaparte at this siege. This same spirit of 
hostility to Napoleon prevails in Jung's "Bonaparte et son 
temps" He too denies the importance of the role of Bona- 
parte at Toulon but he does not go much into particulars, 
nor did he study the question without prejudice. The eager- 
ness with which he seeks an opportunity of defaming the 
name of Bonaparte is shown where he himself speaks of 
Napoleon (page 372 vol. I) as an officer of 25 years when he 
wrote the "Souper de Beaucaire", and then again deliber- 
ately accuses him (page 396) of giving a false age in stating 
that he was 25 after the siege of Toulon. Krebs and Morris 
in their work on Campagnes in the Alpes give a good gen- 
eral account of the siege, but the role of Bonaparte is passed 
b}' with the mere assertion that in the official records noth- 
ing is found to prove its importance. It is true that in the 
documents of the Archives de la Guerre at Paris, no direct 
statement can be found that Napoleon Bonaparte took a 
very important part in the entire affair; but indirect proofs 
are by no means wanting, either here or in the English offi- 
cial reports. The two latest works on Toulon are those of 
Cottin and Chuquet. Cottin leaves the role of Bonaparte 
rather aside and using the English sources, writes on their 
action at Toulon. His work has the value of publishing im- 
portant documents hitherto inaccessible in printed form; 
but with the same he has combined much doubtful detail 



PREFACE. VII 

derived from rather untrustworthy and contradictory 
sources. His book has an anti-English tendency and fails to 
bring out the political importance of the affair of Toulon. 
Chuquet's work, an enlargement of two articles published in 
Cosmopolis, is of rather a popular character but it publishes 
for the first time some letters of Bonaparte and other impor- 
tant pieces. He goes into detail which is very difficult to 
control and the sources of which he has not always care- 
fully considered. The role of Bonaparte is emphasized, but 
not in a manner convincing enough for a question so much 
in dispute. 

In publishing this small volume I wish to take advan- 
tage of the opportunit}^ to express my sincere gratitude to 
all my Professors at Heidelberg, and to mention my appre- 
ciation of the kindness of the late Professor Erdmannsdorf- 
fer and Professor Schafer, whose generous aid and hospitality 
to foreigners I shall always try to emulate. 



PART I. 

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH TOULON SUR- 
RENDERED TO THE ENGLISH AND 
SIEGE OF TOULON. 



Si 



CHAPTER I. 

France in 1793 — Topographical description op Tou- 
lon — Negotiations preceeding Surrender — Proc- 
lamation OF Hood — Hood's Entrance — Arrival of 
News in London — Political situation op Allies at 
TIME OF Siege — Opinions on Hood's Declaration — 
English idea as to Retention op Toulon. 

Ill 1793 the French Revolution had advanced far in its 
impetuous course. In its commenceraent ill defined, its 
course hard to foresee, and uncertain, it had at its culmina- 
tion formed itself into a definite, cruel and reckless system, 
the Terror. Power had passed from the right to the extreme 
left of the National Assembly, and there into hands which 
were capable of holding and using it. The execution of 
Louis XVI, the crowning act of the Revolution took place 
at the beginning of this year; shortly after followed the re- 
volt in the Vendee : the first attempt at military rule was de- 
feated as Dumouriez went over to the Austrians: the Giron- 
dists were overthrown by their more reckless and energetic 
rivals : then followed the uprising of two-th,irds of the de- 
partments and of many large cities, Lyons, Marseilles, Tou- 
lon and Bordeaux. The situation in the interior of France 
was very uncertain, and the dangers from without were 
great. After Neerwinden Belgium was lost and the Austrians 
advanced victoriously into Northern France. The Prussians 
retook Mayence and put an end to its revolutionary exces- 
ses. The Piedrngntese forced their way over the Alps, the 
Spaniards came over the Pyrenees. The English were every- 
where on the seas. It was under these conditions that France, 
or more strictly Revolutionary France, stood alone against 
the nations of Europe uniter] in the pursuit of their differ- 
ent political ambitions, and in the hope of future advan- 
tages. For whatever may have been the origin of the Revo- 

2192—1 



2 

lutionary Wars, the European nations, once united against 
France, were striving after their own interests, and these 
at the expense of France, who at this time seemed inevita- 
bly lost. This however was not the case. Everyone knows 
the Peace of Campio Formio which followed that of Basel 
and others, yet it is by no means easy to explain clearly how 
the Republicans performed the seemingly impossible and 
forced upon the entire Continent such advantageous terms. 
The history of the Siege of Toulon gives an insight into 
these conditions, for one might almost say that here the 
War of the First Coalition took place on a smaller scale. 
The same forces stood opposing each other. On the one side, 
\ the European powers, England, Spain, Sardinia, Naples 
i even Austria, as well as the French Royalists and Emigres; 
on the other the enthusiastic, almost fanatical, self-sacrific- 
ing, but uncertain Republican army, directed by a few in- 
genious leaders, among them Bonaparte and Victor, and 
supported at home b}-^ an active energetic government under 
the organizing genius of Carnot. Everything was sacrificed 
to the object of the war. On the one side w^as discord, dis- 
trust, jealousy, and ill-directed egotism. The best energy of 
the European nations exhausted itself over the division of 
spoils which were still to be won. On the other side was 
geographic and political unity, together with a fanatical de- 
votion to the one object. All passions, the ambition of the 
demagogue and of the soldier, even the fear of the Repub- 
licans, lead to the same end ; namely, the liberating of 
France from the foreign invader. On the one hand it was a 
question of obtaining certain advantages, in the distribution 
of which lay the cause of future disagreement ; on the other, 
it was a question of life and death ; and this struggle for 
existence was carried on by energetic reckless men who had 
risen by their own force and ability, and who in the choice 
of thier means were unhampered by any traditional, relig- 
ious or even human considerations. 

To understand a siege it is necessary, first to have an idea 



of the topographical and other military conditions of the 
place in which it is carried on. In the year 1793 Toulon, 
a city of some 28,000 inhabitants, was enclosed by a circle 
of fortifications which dated from the time of Vauban, but 
which"~'lm3^ been continually improved and were now in 
fairly good condition. It was reputed one of the strongest 
fortifications in Europe. On the land side Toulon is sur- 
rounded by high mountains especially the massive ridge of 
Mount Faron on the north. From the city one road leads to 
Marseilles and another eastward toward Italy. The Riviere 
Neuve flows from the north past the western side of the 
city, into the inner of the two harbors, which are called the 
Grande and Petite Rade. This river is dry in the summer. 
The fortifications on the north-west were Fort Pomets and 
the Redoute St. Andre (completed but not armed); on the 
north-east, Fort Rouge, Fort Blanc, and the intrenched 
camp, Ste. Anne. Mont Faron also protected the city on the 
north. On the east, to defend the road to Italy was Fort La 
Malgue. According to Napoleon, this fort was very carefully 
built. It protected also the Grande Rade. Fort Ste. Catherine 
and Fort L'Artigues, likewise on the east, were supported 
by Mont Faron. On the west was Fort Malbousquet. It 
was merely a temporary fortification, but important through 
its position. Fort Missiessy was also on the west, on the 
north shore of the Petite Rade. The entrance to the Grande 
Rade was covered by Fort La Malgue, that of the Petite 
Rade by Fort Grosse Tour, on the eastern side, and by the 
coast batteries, Balaguier and Eguillette, on the western 
side. In general, more importance had been placed on the 
fortifications on the east of the city than on those on the 
west. It was supposed that all attacks were to come from 
the Italian side. 

In Toulon, as in most of the cities and many of the De- 
partments, there was a revolutionary and a Royalist party, 
each striving to obtain power. In Toulon the Republicans 
found support in the Kepublican army under Carteaux. 



The Royalists, in accordance with their policy at that time, 
sought heli3 from outside. ^ The English squadron had 
been seen for weeks before Toulon, where h3r Admiral, 
Lord Hood, stood watching the large French fleet in the 
harbor. To destroy this formed part of his plan; which was 
to win and hold for England the supremacy of the Mediter- 
ranean. The Royalists of Marseilles and Toulon were in con- 
stant communication, and were secretly forming plans. A 
certain undecided portion of the population was to be won 
over to their side. For some time they cherished the plan of 
inviting the English to enter. In some manner the Englisli 
representative in Turin, John Trevor, who was well in- 
formed on the affairs of Italy and the Mediterranean, got 
news of tliis intention and wrote as earl}' as July 21 to Hood, 
informing him of the possibility of an appeal for help from 
the people of Toulon. Hood seemed, however, to have given 
the matter but little attention. His object was still the 
French fleet. A few days before, on July 19, he had sent a 
Lieutenant Cook into Toulon to negotiate an exchange of 
prisoners; permitting him to wait twenty-four hours for a 
reply. 

Cook returned bringing with him a list of the French 
ships in Toulon, and other useful information. It is possi- 
ble, although all evidence is wanting, that Cook, who was 
Hood's nephew, entered even at this time, into communica- 
tion with the Royalists. The Royalists resorted to a trick 
to win over the still undecided portion of the inhabitants. 
The fear of a bread famine was held out before the people; 
although there were provisions for three months at hand. 
Thaon de Revel, the commander of the Piedmontese troops 
wrote : " L'apprehension de la famine fut la consideration 
qui decida les habitans. Les chefs avaient persuade a la 
multitude que bientot elle manquerait de pain si 1' on ne 

^ de Br€cy. " Un sentiment presque unanime inspira le projet d'en- 
voyer un parlementaire au commandant anglais pour lui demander son 
concours et son assistance." 



traitait avec les Anglais ; quoique dans le fait il y eut du 
grain pour plus de trois mois." ^ Nelson, who at the time of 
the siege, was sailing in and out of the harbor of Toulon, 
wrote " Famine had done what force could not have done." ^ 
In this manner the people were deceived and won over. 
Negotiations with Hood commenced first from Marseille, 
then from Toulon, the latter being of much more interest 
to the English. At first one spoke of an importation of 
grain into Marseille, finally of the conditional surrender of 
Toulon to the English. 

After holding a Council of War Hood gave out, on August 
23, a preliminary declaration, which was soon followed by 
a proclamation. Both were sent to Marseille and Toulon. 
The declaration said : That if the people of Toulon and Mar- 
seille declare openly for monarchy ; if the vessels are dis- 
armed and the harbor and forts put provisionally in Hood's 
charge, the people of Provence may count upon the assist- 
ance of the British fleet: the rights of property and of 
the individual shall be protected : further, that Hood's only 
object is the restoration of pe^ace and that then all will be 
returned " conformement a I'inventaire qui en sera fait ". 
In the Proclamation Hood gives a "tableau fiddle" of the 
"malheureuse condition" of the French nation during the 
last four years, and declares that the European nations see 
no remedy to such evils other than reestablishment of mon- 
archy in France. He offers his protection and aid to estab- 
lish ''un gouvernment regulier et de maintainir lapaix et la 
tranquillity dans I'Europe." Hood's proclamation arrived 
too late in Marseilles; the approaching Republican army 
made it impossible to continue the negociations. In Toulon 
the most stormy debates took place in the Sections when 
Lieutenant Cook announced Hood's offer. The Royalists 
carried off" the victory, in spite of all opposition of the other 
party, and of the hostile attitude of the French ships in 

1 Memoirs. 

2 IvCtters Sept. 14tii. Nelson dispatches. 



6 

the harbor. The Sections decided for the entrance of the 
EngUsh, but under several conditions. Among others; the 
present constitution was to be replaced b}'^ the monarchical 
government, under the Constitution of 1791;^ civil and 
military officers were to retain their places. The provis- 
ioning of the city was to be assured ; an inventory was to 
be made of the vessels and of all material in the port. These 
conditions were carried back by Cook to Hood, who ac- 
cepted them. His present fleet was however not strong 
enough to risk entering alone. He therefore asked assist- 
ance from the Spanish Admiral Langara who at first re- 
fused, but consented on a second invitation from Hood, who 
accompanied this invitation with a cop}'^ of liis intended 
proclamation. In the meantime Hood published his second 
proclamation to the inhabitants of Toulon. It was dated 
August 28th and declared : ' as the Sections of Toulon have 
declared Louis XVII as their legitimate sovereign and for 
monarchy according to the constitution of 1791, he takes 
possession of Toulon and will guard it "en depot pour 
Louis XVII jusqu' au retablissementde la paixen France". 
The next day as the Spanish fleet appeared in sight Hood 
sailed into the harbor, the Spanish following. ^ The sea- 
men of the French fleet were divided into two parties, the 
Jacobins and the Royalists. The first showed in the begin- 
ning a determination to oppose the landing of the English, 
but were held in check by the Royalists and the land bat- 
teries. Finally, threatened by the English and Spanish, they 
found it better to take advantage of a cliance to escape, than 
to offer resistance. The crew of seven ships succeeded in 
getting away. Hood and Langara received a most_£nthus- 
iastic reception from the inhabitants and officials of Toulon. 
An excellent understanding existed between the two ad- 

1 This constitution was always referred to, and is spoken of in the 
following pages, as the constitution of 1789- 

2 Journal of Samuel lyord Hood. Admiralty Records. Public Record 
Office. 



mirals. A thousand marines and about 300 sailors from each 
fleet were landed immediately at Fort LaMalgue.^ 

On September 12tli the news of the fall of Toulon reached 
London by way of Turin. It caused in government circles 
quite as much surprise as satisfaction. It was decided to col- 
lect troops and send them to Hood without deranging the 
plans of campaign in general. The first intention was to 
send 5000 British troops, raised in Ireland, and 5000 Hes- 
sians.^ A's early as September 14th, and at Pitt's sugges- 
tion,'^ instructions were sent to Sir Morton Eden, the English 
ambassador at Vienna to ask for Austrian troops. These 
were promised, but never arrived. More about the negocia- 
"tions concerning the will be given later. 

Here it might be well to insert an account of the political 
situation of Europe at this time. Three important questions 
preoccupied more or less, the different cabinets. The war 
against the Republic, affairs in Poland and Austria's re- 
sumed plan of exchanging the Netherlands for Bavaria. 
Nearly all the nations were joined in the struggle with 
France but the attention of several of them Austria, Prussia, 
Russia, an others was much diverted by the other two ques- 
tions. The news of the second division of Poland -brought 
Thugut, whose anti-Prussian policy was well known, into 
power in Vienna. An understanding between Austria and 
England was the result. This power, (England) as well as 
the other European nations, now taking for granted, (and 
under existing conditions it was almost pardonable) that 
France would fall, directed its best thoughts and energy to 
her future dismemberment, and to its share of the "Indem- 
nification." The plans of the English government, having 
taken rather a definite form, full instructions were sent to 

1 Letter from Graham to Sir William Hamilton. Correspondence. 
British Museum. Manuscript Department. Bgerton 2638. 

2 Letter Dundas to Sir James Murray. Sept. 14. War Office. British 
Army on Continent. 1793. Record Office. 

^ L/etter Pitt to Grenville. Sept 7. Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue. 



8 

Eden in Vienna. They were dated Whitehall. Sept. 7. ^ 
and contained, first, an account of Austria's plans, as they 
have been stated in England, namely " the making perma- 
nent acquisitions, to as large an extent as they are practi- 
cable, in the Low Countries, in Alsace and Loraine, and in 
the intermediate parts of the frontier of France. No similar 
communication has as yet been made on the part of His 
Majesty, but the circumstances and situation of affairs have 
made it sufficiently evident that whatever indemnification 
is to be acquired by this country must be looked for in the 
foreign settlements and colonies of France. In these ob- 
jects the interest of the two Courts are so far from clashing 
that His Majesty has an interest in seeing the House of 
Austria strengthen itself by acquisition on the French fron- 
tier, and the very circumstance of that interest sliould make 
tlie Emperor see with pleasure the relative increase of the 
naval and commercial resources of this country beyond 
those of France As to the Powers who are al- 
ready engaged in the war it does not appear that much can 
be done by Austria, at least in the present moment towards 
securing the co-operation of Spain. But no endeavours will 
be omitted by His Majesty for that purpose ". . . . In 
speaking of the coolness between Austria and Sardinia, 
" the idea once entertained by the Court of Vienna of ex- 
tending the frontier of the Milanese at the expense of the 
King of Sardinia is, I trust, abandoned, but if brought for- 
ward again, must be strongly discouraged by you " . . . . 
As regards Prussia, "it is obvious that the interest of the 
Emperor is as much concerned as that of His Majesty in 
securing even at the expense of some sacrifice the co-opera- 
tion and assistance of the King of Prussia. If no step is 
taken to remove the increasing jealousy between those two 
courts the worst consequences may be expected from them" 
. . . . Then follows advice to Austria to renounce her 

1 Foreign OflBce. Austria. Sir Morton Eden. Aug. to Oct. 93. Public 
Record Office. 



claim on Bavaria in order to avoid Prussia's jealousy. The 
Elector might then take an active part in the war, might 
send troops to His Majesty " who would not be unwilling 
to incur a considerable expense for an object of so much im- 
portance to the common cause." .... As to Russia, 
" His Majesty's endeavours to obtain the active co-operation 
of that power have proved ineffective. The assistance of a 
body of troops having ultimately been refused to His Maj- 
esty except on terms which, independant of other objections, 
would have committed this country with respect to the in- 
terior of France beyond what His Majesty judged to be 
advisable or prudent." . ..." In the Mediterranean 
the interests of this country are, that our naval superiority 
over France should be maintained and there is no reason 
to doubt of this point being sufficiently secured" .... 
Here Grenville mentions the necessity of the assistance of 
12 or 15,000 Austrian troops for affairs in the Mediterranean. 
. . . " I have mentioned to you His Majesty's disposi- 
tion to connect himself by a defensive alliance with the Em- 
peror, and I have stated that you are at liberty to give the 
strongest assurances on this head. The basis of such an 
alliance would naturally be, as I have explained to Count 
Starhenberg the same with of the ancient system by which 
the two countries were formally united : the securing a bar- 
rier against France, the retaining the Netherlands under 
the lawful sovereignty of Austria, the securing and aug- 
mentation of the commerce of the Maritime Powers, and 
the Mutual guaranty of all possessions antecedent to the 
war." 

The foregoing instructions give an insight into political 
relations at this moment. The following extract from a let- 
ter to Grenville, from Lord St. Helens, the EngHsh Ambas- 
sador at Madrid, completes it to some extent. ^It was dated 
Madrid, August 28. "I understand that the Duke of Alcudia 

^ Foreign Office. Spain. Lord St. Helens and Consuls' dispatches Aug. 
to Dec. 1793. Public Record Office. 



10 

has testified a great deal of Pique and Dissatisfaction to the 
Prussian and Austrian Ministers on account of the late 
capitulations of Mentz and Valanciennes concerning that 
from the vague and indefinite terms they were drawn the 
French government will consider themselves as at libert}^ to 
employ these garrisons in their armies on this Frontier. 
There appears great reason to hope that tliese alarms may 
prove groundless. However this seeming want of attention 
to the interests of this crown on the part of the Emperor 
and the King of Prussia has increased the sentiments of 
jealousy against those sovereigns, which have been so long 
entertained here, and which I observe to be studiously kept 
up and inflamed by the agents of the French Princes. 
With regard to England, the Spanish Minister's language 
is still friendly and cordial, however, I am told that some 
ill-intentioned Persons have been endeavouring to persuade 
bin] that we have acted un-candidly by this Court in con- 
cluding a Treaty with Naples without their knowledge, and 
I therefore take the liberty of submitting to your Lordship 
whether if that Treaty contained nothing of a secret nature 
it might not be advisable to communicate it here without 
loss of time " . . . . 

Here is the political situation in a few words. England 
looked for indemnification outside of Europe; an increase 
of her commerce and supremacy over France in the Medi- 
terranean. Her object was to bring the war to a fortunate 
termination and for that reason to hold the European nations 
together. She was willing to make financial sacrifices for 
the common cause. She would not commit herself as to the 
future government in France. Austria vvislied_ to increase 
her possessions in the Netherlands and in Alsace; she was 
jealous of Prussia. She hoped also to extend her Milanese 
territory, and there was jealousy between her and Sardinia. 
She was not quite so decided about continuing her plan of 
obtaining Bavaria. Spain had cause of ill-will against 
Austria and Prussia. Russia continued her policy of refrain- 



11 

_jng from any active part in the war against France. Eng- 
land had signed treaties with Sardinia, ^ Naples, Hesse and 
Baden, by which they agreed to furnish her troops. Prus- 
sia's attention was turned toward Poland and she was already 
wavering in her policy of war against the Republic. 

The English government was not quite satisfied with 
Lord Hood's declaration. Grenville wrote to Eden Sept. 14. 
^ "Lord Hood has been induced by circumstances and by the 
great advantage which was in view, to go further with re- 
spect to the Interior state of France and to the Futur Gov- 
ernment to be established there, than was in contemplation 
according to the ideas stated to you in my late dispatch. 
You will explain the circumstances to the Austrian Minis- 

. ter and you will add that on this account as well as from 
the Change which the event of Toulon produced in our sit- 
uation it may perhaps be advisable that some public meas- 
ure should be taken on this subject by this court, and that 
of Vienna jointly. The ideas on this subject which are enter- 
tained by His Majesty's Ministers will be transmitted to you 
with as little delay as possible." In Spain the news of Tou- 
lon's surrender was well received. St. Helens wrote to Gren- 
ville, Sep 6. ^"I need not say that this court are highly 
satisfied with these advices, and above all with Lord Hood's 
invitation to Admiral Langara to partake in his success, and 
that they profess the utmost readiness to co-operate with us 
cordially in every step of the business." The news of Hood's 
entrance was also welcomed by the Royalists and Emigrants, 
and for a time it was supposed that other cities would follow 
the example of Toulon. In the information sent to the For- 

^ Letter Dundas to O'Hara. iStii Dec. Letters from Secry. Dundas to 
Lieut. Gen. Dundas. 1793-94. British Museum. Mss. Dept. Additional 
27,594. 

" By treaty 26. ApriL Sardinian Majesty in consequence of payment 
of subsidy has bound himself to furnish his majesty 20,000 troops free of 
any further expense." 

2 Public Record OflEice. 

3 St. Helens. Public Record Office. 



12 

eign Office; dated Sept 20. ^one reads "On croit que les 
Royalistes a Brest dont il y a grand norabre feront en 
sorte que la flotte renterra sous peu de jours et qu'on y 
proclamera comme a Toulon Louis 17 " . , . . De Saint 
Croix, one of the Emigrants in London, wrote to Grenville, 
dated London, Sept. 15. ^ " Lorsque j'eus avant liier I'hon- 
neur d'ecrire a, Votre Excellence je ne connaissais point les 
deux proclamations de M. L'Amiral Hood. Perraettez-moi 
mi-lord de vous en exprimer et comme frangais et comme 
individu toute ma reconnaissance. Puissent tons les cabi- 
nets adopter ce language : il y a plus de gloire a parler 
ainsi qu'a vaiucre. . . . Vous nous rendez Mylord quel- 
que confience et quelque securite: vous commandez I'estime 
de I'Europe et vous lui donnez un grand exemple." 

The opinion in England was somewhat divided as to the 
advisability of retaining Toulon, even temporarily, but all 
were united in rejoicing that the Frencii fleet was in English 
hands. It was even suggested that upon a good opportunity 
it might be burned and the town given up. As the seige 
went on it was not hard to see that the question of what was 
to be done with the French fleet became a most delicate one. 
It was partly upon this point that the difference arose be- 
tween the English and Spanish Admirals, and later their 
respective Governments. Lord Sheffield wrote September 
15th to Auckland - " I see no use of encumbering ourselves 
with Toulon unless we carry home the French fleet. I 
should certainly have taken advantage of the kind of resist- 
ance made by the French fleet, by hauling into the inner 
road and would have burnt them all to save further em- 
barrassment." Pitt speaks of the taking of Toulon as 
a " most fortunate event." ^ The Marquis of Buckingham 
wrote to Grenville Sept 15. " We have only to pray that the 

1 Foreign Office. Domestic Papers. March to Dec. 1793. Public Record 
Office. 

2 Auckland Papers. British Museum. Mss. vol 12. Additional 34,452. 
1 3 Letter to Grenville. Sept 7. Manuscripts of Fortescue. 



13 

patriots may besiege Toulon and that the issue of the con- 
test may be the conflagration of the docks and fleet." ^ And 
on Sept 29th. " You must be prepared to meet much 
opposition to the idea of indemnification which the emi- 
grants now in London are loud in reprobating. At the same 
time the people of Brest and Toulon can not be very anxious 
for the slices which may be required from France on the side 
of the Pays Bas and of Lorain, or even of Piedmont; and 
whether they are or no it is good to habituate people early 
to the sound of such a proposition" ^ .... on Oct. 4th. 
"I conclude that our fleet winters at Toulon and refits with 
French stores taken upon a valuation ; but at all events, I hope 
that you will retain the superiority in those seas even over 
the Spaniards, whose operations except those of Langara do 
not please me"^ Nelson wrote Oct. 7th. "Whether we shall 
be able to maintain~o'ur most extraordinary acquisition time 
only can determine, however one hour will burn the French 

_fleet"^ .... The plan of D' Alcudia, the Spanish min- 
ister was ^that the combined squadrons should seize the first 
opportunity of forcibly removing all the Toulon ships to 
some place of greater security, as Port Mahon or Carthagena. 
When the Comite du Salut Public heard of the surrender 
of Toulon they sent off the following laconic note to the " Rep- 
resentants du Peuple" with the Republican army at Toulon. 
" Citoyens collegues . . Nous avons appris avec indigna- 

..-tioii, la perfide trahison de Toulon dont vous nous informez 
par votre depeche du 29 (sic) Aovlt: du courage, de la fer- 
mete de la Constance: nous vaincrons les royalists, les des- 
pots et les traitres." * 

1 Letter to Grenville. Sept. 7. Manuscripts of Fortescue. 

2 Nelson Dispatches. 

3 St. Helens, to Grenville Oct. 2. Record Office. 

4 Reponse du Comite. Aug. 28. Re cueil Aulard. 



CHAPTER II. 

Arrival of Carteaux in Marseilles — First Engage- 
ment — Arrival of Bonaparte — Representants du 
Peuple — Effect of First Batteries — Attack on 
Heights of Grasse — Attack on Mount Faron — Mis- 
understanding between Carteaux and Lapoype — 
Attack on Sablettes — Attack on Cap Brun — De- 
parture OF Carteaux — Bonaparte during absence 
of Generals — Arrival of Doppet — Engagements 
ON Nov. 15. 

Carteaux, the Republican General, entered Marseilles on 
August 25. ' He did not march directly on Toulon as he 
was waiting for reinforcements from the army of Italy, which 
were approaching from the east, nor did he dare leave Mar- 
seilles unprotected. Toulon was threatened from the east and 
west by two armies, just as the allies arrived. The English 
especially were ill prepared in a military way, having no 
soldier of a higher rank than captain. "It was impossible to 
do much towards fortifying the town, which, especially on 
the western side, where the French had never expected an 
attack, was rather exposed. One feared somewhat a "coup 
de main" by Carteaux, aided by the discontented in the 
town, of which there were a large number. From the begin- 
ning the Republicans were Jiot idle. "Nous avons donne 
I'ordre de faire sonner le tocsin dans toutes les communes 
du department du Var et de faire marcher tons les citoyens 
depuis I'age de 16 ans jusqu'a 60". This shows a praise- 
worthy activity, but to allow such crowds to be hurled by 
incompetant generals against a fortified city was worse than 
foolish. 

^ Lettre de Salicetti. Aug 25. R. A. 

2 Letter. T. Graham to Sir William Hamilton. British Museum. Mss. 
Egerton. 2638. (14) 



15 

Carteaux's advance guard occupied the passes of Ollioules 
on the 29th of August. The English and Spanish hearing 
of it, promptly drove the Republicans back. This was the 
first action and there were but a few casualties. This position 
however, was important, as it commanded the road to Mar- 
seilles, and also the communications with La Seyne, a vil- 
lage on the south-west corner of the Petite Rade ; but it 
was too far from Toulon for the Allies to hold it in their 
present condition. Carteaux who had just (Sept 4.) been 
appointed to the command of the beseiging army, ^ which 
was to be indepen'dant of the army of Italy, made prepara- 
tions to retake it. On September 7. the attack took place 
and was successful. ^ The Allies retreated to the town with 
a small loss: the Republicans lost but one man, and Don- 
martin, who commanded the artillery was severely wounded. 
This slight success of the Republicans caused a somewhat bad 
impression in the town. The Republicans now closed in from 
the east and west. Carteaux, who commanded the western di- 
vision in person, established his head-quarters at Ollioules 
and extended his position from Faubregas to Baon-de-Qua- 
trfes-Heures. Lopoype, who had come from the Italian Army, 
commanded on the east. His head-quarters were at Solli^s- 
Farlede. Lapoype was an ex-marquis whose Jacobinisme 
was much less to questioned than his ability as a general. 
He was not much inferior to Carteaux however, especiall}'^ 
in this kind of military work. His wife was a prisoner in 
Toulon and this fact hampered him in his movements.^ The 
Republicans were very weak in artillery, and some of it had 
to be left in Marseille " pour foudroyer cette ville s'il s'y 
manifestait quelque mouveraent." Now they w'ere even de- 
prived of their chief of artillery, Donmartin. With the ma- 
terial at hand however, Carteaux had erected abattery on the 

^ Armee du Siege de Toulon. Archives de la guerre. 
2 Lettre de Carteaux a I^apoype. Sept 8. Archives de la guerre. Lettre 
Capt. Cook to Gen. Ed. Smith. Sept 7. Barrow's life of Sidney Smith. 
^ Lapoype a Bouchotte. Sept 11. Archives de la Guerre. 



16 

west side, to burn the fleet: but its position, far out of range 
of either the fleet or town, was laughable.^ Reinforcements 
continued to arrive on each side and both parties pre- 
pared themselves for the struggle. Spain was especially 
prompt in sending reinforcements." By returns taken on 
Sep 12. ^ there were over 5000 troops and sailors on shore: 
of these 3400 were Spanish and about 1600 English. This 
force quite exceeded that of Carteaux inefficiency and proba- 
bly in numbers. Hood wrote on Sept 14 the "Enemy not 
yet provided with artillery." The hopes of the Allies might 
well rise, for who could have suspected, unless it was the 
young Corsican himself, and at this ver}'- moment the be- 
sieging army had received a most formidable reinforcement? 
On September 16 or 17 * the direction of the principal 

1 Carteaux a Lopoype. Sept 8. 

- Letters from St. Helens. Sept 18. Record Office 

•' Letter from St. Helens Sept 25. R. O. 

Graham to Hamilton. vSept 14. 

Correspondence. British Museum. ]\Iss. 
Egerton. 263S. 

4 The exact date when Napoleon arrived in Toulon is difficult to place. 
He says in his Memoires the t2th. of Sept. Chuquet believes he has 
proved that he arrived on the l6th. of Sept, (Page 171 — note) "On 
ignorait jusqu'ici le jour oil Bonaparte arriva devant Toulon. Ses mem- 
oires disent tantot le 12 vSept. tantot douze a quinze jours apres la prise 
d'Ollioules, du 19 an 22 vSeptembre. Mais il est siirement le 15 a Mar- 
seille (cf. piece LXIX ; a letter from Marseille, dated vSept 15) et, suivant 
line lettre de Salicetti, il fait le 17 a Ollioules les preparatifs d'une attaqiie ; 
il est done arrive le 16 au quartier general du Beausset. N' ecrit-il pas 
d'ailleurs pendant les siege " les batteries furent etablies trois jours apres 
son arrivee?" Or la batterie de la Montagne date du 19 Septembre." In 
the first place the contradiction in Napoleon's Memoirs can be explained. 
There are accounts of Toulon in two volumes w-ritten by different Generals. 
According to the First volume Napoleon arrived 12 or 15 da3-s after the 
taking of Ollioules, which according to this volume took place on Sept 
10 The arrival of Bonaparte would therefore have taken place between 
the 22nd and 25th of Sept, and not the 19th and 22nd as Chuquet puts 
it. This volume was corrected by Napoleon, but he probably gave no 
great attention to such details. The third volume was dictated by Napot 
leon and contains a twice as lengthy account of Toulon. Here he says 
expressly that he arrived on the 12th of Sept. 

As to the date of the battery La Montagne, Chuquet gives it (page 



17 

arm of Carteaux's army was put under the control of Napo- 
leon Bonaparte, then 24 years of age, and a captain of Artil- 
lery. A new period in Napoleon's life began here. In after 
years when he was preoccupied about his own history, he 
wished that it should begin with the siege of Toulon. This 
is seen especially in his Memoirs from St. Helena. It is 
usually said that in so doing his object was to pass over the 
preceding period in Corsica, which would not tend to make 
him popular in France. This may no doubt be partially 
true, but it is none the less so that these three months, be- 
fore the walls of Toulon, were three of the most important 
in his life. Here his entire career was changed. Others be- 
sides himself were convinced of his abihty, even of his genius. 
He was thrown into close contact with the French people; 
and became at last one of them. His ambition was freed 
from the little island of Corsica, and bound itself to the des- 
tinies of the French nation; soon afterwards to control them. 

172) as Sept. 9., then (page 179) as Sept 12, and finally (page 206) Sep- 
18. The evening of the 17th is the proper date, as on the morning of the 
18th the battery fires on the ships. (Hood's Journal) On the l6th Dom- 
martin was still, at least nominally, head of the artillery (Carteaux a 
Lapoype, Archives de la Guerre) and on the 17th Napoleon directs it 
(Lettre Salicetti-Sept 26. R. A.) Salicetti writes "nous arretames le 
citoyen Buonaparte et nous lue ordonnames de remplacer Dommartin ". 
It is quite possible that Napoleon was employed for a few days about 
Toulon before he received Dommartin 's position. He must have first 
proved his ability to the Representants ; or have influenced them in some 
way (he knew Salicetti) before receiving the position which should other- 
wise have fallen to Lieut-colonel Sugney, who commanded the artillery 
under Lapoype. It is a significant fact that on Sept 16, Carteaux writes 
to Lapoype, " c'est I'artillerie qui fait toute la besogne", as if it were a 
fact of which he has just become convinced : also in direct contradiction 
to his previous ideas. Napoleon may have arrived on the 12th and yet 
have returned to Marseilles on the 1 5th. If he did not arrive until the l6th 
then his statement that he found almost no artillery, is incorrect, be- 
cause just at this time some artillery at least begins to arrive. ( Carteaux a 
Lapoype, Sept 16. A. G.) Napoleon probably forwarded it himself from 
Marseille where he was employed at the arsenal. By the September 19 Car- 
teaux is aiding him as he writes to Bonaparte (Letter, A. G.) "Je viens 
de recevoir votre lettre et je vais envoyer a la Municipalite pour vous 
procurer tons les objets que vous me demandez ". 
2192—2 



18 

At the end ol" these three mouthy he was no longer a ne- 
glected captain but a young general with a career behind 
him, as well as a far greater and more definite one befoi'e 
him. He had had an insight into the world of that day, and 
understood the political situation of his time. The means 
by which he was to satisfy his ambition were no longer 
vague dreams of the imagination but definite and deep-laid 
plans founded on an experience of men and a knowledge of 
conditions. His actions in Corsica must have now appeared 
to him as youthful. Feeling that he had matured in these 
three months it was no wonder that he should have believed 
that his career commenced at Toulon. 

When Napoleon arrived he found the army in a most 
pitiable state; very little artillery ' and what there was placed 
in a position harmless to the enemy;- the Generals without 
a plan, or rather with a new one each day, but most of them 
useless.'* The staff did not even have a map^of the town and 
surrounding country.' Napoleon saw what any other in- 
structed officer would have seen, that the first object was to 
attack the fleet in the harbor, and soon selected the best po- 
sition for doing so. Pie set to work immediately but before 
long he had a misunderstanding with Carteaux, who knew 
little about artillery. However, Bonaparte had very wisely as- 
sured himself of the all-powerful Representants du Peuple; 
with one of these, Salicetti, a Corsican, he had been in per- 
sonal connection before. In fact, in September Salicetti had 
caused Napoleon's brother Joseph to be appointed Commis- 
saire de Guerre with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. 

These representants du peuple were characteristic of this 
period of the Revolution. Sent out to the armies and into 

1 Letter from Barras, 6 Sept. R. A. 

" " Lapoype to Carteaux Sept. 14, A. G. 

2 Letter from Albitte 9 Sept. R. A. 

^ Letter from Lapoype to Bouchotte, 11 Sept. A. G. 

" " Carteaux to Lapoype — 14 Sept. A. G. 

" " " to Mtre. de la Guerre— 15 Sept. A. G. 

* Carteaux au Ministere de la Guerre, Sept 12 and Sept 15. A. G. 



19 

the cities by the Central Government, their duty was to 
watch the Generals, spur them on, and excite the patriotism 
of the people ; also to send frequent information to the Gov- 
ernment in Paris. Thej were all powerful, and at the same 
time quite independent. All mistakes were attributed to the 
Generals, for whom the guillotine was not an unusual pen- 
alty; the represeutants simply appointed new ones in their 
places. They incorporated the idea of the absolute suprem- 
acy of the civil power over military and all other. No other 
instances of a similar character are found in history. Sali- 
cetti, Barras, Gasparin, Albitte and others were at Toulon; 
Salicetti during the entire siege. Little they suspected that 
the young artillery officer, who courted their favor, flattered 
their pride, and won their confidence, would in a few years 
change the face of things, overturn the despotism of the 
demagogue, and erect in its place a quite as despotic mili- 
tary power but less unjust, creative and lawgiving. The 
beginning of this transition was seen in the Italian cam- 
paign of 1796-97, when General Clark sent out to watch 
the young General Bonaparte, decided to cast in his lot with 
Napoleon rather than with the Directory. Napoleon got 
an excellent insight into the ways of these representatives 
at Toulon, which no doubt aided him much in winning 
over Clark. 

On September 17 ^ Napoleon erected his first battery. The 
next day it began to take effect, and the first serious attack 
commenced. On the 18th and 19th the ships of the Allies 
and this battery had a tremendous engagement.^ On the 
20th, the second battery was erected and "fired with more 
effect on the ships"; "Gunboats suffered considerably and 
the St. George had 21 men killed and wounded by the 
bursting of one of her lower deck guns, the land batteries 
were silenced before two o'clock, but altogether we had lost 

1 Lettre Salicetti, Sept. 26. R. A. 
Letter Mulgrave-Gazette. 

2 Hood's journal, September iStli. 



20 

about 70 iiicii wounded or killed. Lord Hood beeaine 
anxious about the shipping and that evening it was deter- 
mined to occupy the heights of Grasse".' On September 20 
the following was inserted in Lord Hood's journal. " The 
floating battery No. 1 hauled off, having received much 
damage." This is the official record of Napoleon's first hos- 
tile act against the British. On September 21st "Cannonade 
still in the northwest arm". "Mr. Gourly and peo})le re- 
turned from the Floating battery No. 3, it being sunk by the 
Enemy's shot in the N. W. arm". 

Napoleon's first batteries had been firing but a day or so 
when the possibility of being forced to leave the harbor was 
brought forcibly home to the two Admirals. The question 
immediately arose what was, in such a case, to be done with 
the French fieet. From now on this question remained a source 
of contention between the Admirals, and also between their 
respective courts. This difference had disastrous results and 
Napoleon's cleverly placed batteries were the cause of it. It 
was his first act that had any inlluence upon the events of 
his time, and it took place within the first few days of his 
arrival before Toulon. On October 3rd the Duke of Alcudia 
wrote to St. Helens. "As the case tho' remote may possibly 
occur in which the Spanish and English squadrons may be 
obliged to abandon the anchorage of Toulon from there 
being so much molested by bombs and red hot shells, as not 
to be able to remain there. His Majesty's pleasure upon this 
point has been signified to Admiral Langara by the Minis- 
ter of Marine on the 1st instant, leaving, however, to the 
prudent discretion of the admiral, to settle and resolve in 
concert with Lord Hood whatever may according to existing 
circumstances, be found most advisable."^ This is an official 
record of Napoleon's work during the first few days at Tou- 
lon. In the same letter the Spanish Minister proposed that 
in case it became necessary to leave the port, "Admiral 

^ Letter from Thomas Graham, September 25th. Life of Graham. 
2 St. Helens. R. O. Published by Cottin. 



21 

Langara shall sail, with all french ships that can be put to 
sea to the islands of Hieres, or whatever other place he may- 
appoint in concert with Lord Hood, as most convenient, 
carrying in them all the artillery, ammunition, arms and 
stores which they can bring ; leaving a manifest or protest 
to the government of Toulon, if the latter should not 
abandon the place that all ships of the french navy shall 
be kept and taken care of, to be delivered, at a proper op- 
portunity, to their lawful sovereign". "This instruction" 
writes St. Helens " was prepared in consequence of the in- 
formation that had been received from thence stating that 
the enemy had succeeded in establishing a battery which in 
some sort commanded the harbors and roads".^ It will be 
seen that the " manifest or protest" referred to by Alcudia 
was apparently all that was to be left to the people of Tou- 
lon who had confided themselves to the English and Span- 
iards. Alcudia further proposed that such ships as could not 
be removed should be sunk or set on fire. x\s this was later 
on actually done, it will be seen how the Spanish regarded 
their own proposal, (see part II). I do not mean to imply 
in the least that the English were any more sincere in their 
dealings with the people of Toulon or that they had any 
more scruples in disposing of the French fleet. Hood wrote 
to London that he used the French ships against the bat- 
teries thinking it better that they should be sunk than his 
own.^ 

To prevent the enemy's batteries from being placed in a 
still more dangerous position, on the heights of Grasse, 
Admiral Gravina and Lord Mulgrave, the English com- 
mander landed at midnight Sept. 21st with about 500 men 
at Balaguier, and gained the wooded heights above without 
seeing any of the enemy. A post was established before day- 
break on the most commanding point: in the afternoon it 

1 St. Helens to Grenville. Oct. 9th. R. O. 

^Hood to Philip Stephens. Oct. 7. Admirals dispatches Mediterranean 
1793. R. O. 



22 

was attacked by 600 men who approached under cover of 
the wood. They were repulsed. The next day more troops 
were sent out, woods were cut down in abatis, and the post 
was well supj)lied with cannon. Tiiere were now 800 men 
on the S[)ot. Here the Allies gained a most deceided advan- 
tage ; they had seized and fortified the most vulnerable 
point surrounding Toulon, and the harbor. Napoleon on 
his arrival had recognized the importance of this position 
and went to Carteaux " pour lui offrir de le faire entrer dans 
Toulon avant huit jours, s'il voulait faire occuper en force 
la position du Caire (the Heights of Grasse) de maniere que 
I'artillerie put sur-le-champ placer dcs batteries -X I'ex- 
tremite des caps de I'Eguillette et de Balaguier".' Carteaux 
whose favorite tactics were the use of the arme blanc failed 
to see the importance of this position and allowed the allies 
to proceed hini.^ Finally when he did make the attack, it 
was done in such a half-s{)irited manner as to be easily 
repulsed. Napoleon took no part in this attack, but on the 
very same day his battery sunk one of the floating batteries 
of the enemy. lie as well as the Re{)resantants du peuple 
were loud in accusing Carteaux and lamenting his fiiilure 
to take the position. "Pourquoi no I'avons-nous pas fait? 
Parceque le general que nous avions cru comprendre et 
adopter notre plan n'y avait aucune confiance quoique celui 
que vous aviez envoy6 de Paris fiit exactement le meme: 
parce ceux qui I'entourent sont encore plus ignorants et 
plus entetes que lui : parceque ni les uns, ni les autres n'ont 
aucune connaissauce ni des hommes qu'ils menent ni des 
machines militaires, ni de leurs effets : parce que toute 
I'armee n'ayant trouve jusqu'a present aucune resistance 
dans son expedition est toute decouragee de celle que lui 
presente Toulon — si I'absence de Carteaux (it was supposed 
that he was going to the Army of Italy) nous donne un 

1 Memoires de Napoleon. 

2 Attack on Hauteurs de Grasse. Hood's Journal. Letter of Mulgrave 
in Gazette. Letter from Graham, Life of Graham. Memoires and Cor- 
respondence of Napoleon. Salicetti to Comite Sept. 26 R. A. 



23 

general et des officiers superieurs qui seiitent mieux I'ira- 
portance de la point des Vallons nous tenterons encore d'en 
chasser les Anglais"/ Napoleon wrote on Nov. 14th to the 
Minister of War, referring to this attack :^ " Dans ce moment 
la (while his batteries were fighting the enemy's ships) les 
ennemis comprenant Tinsuffisance de leur artillerie navale 
risquerent le tout pour le tout et debarquerent a I'Eguillette ; 
ils ussent du etre ecrase dans leur descent ; la fatalite ou 
notre ineptie voulut qu'elle leur reussit. Pen de jours apres 
ils y eurent des pieces de 24, un chemin convert et des palis- 
sades, quelques jours apres, des secours considerables leur 
arriverent de Naples et d'Espagne. Je compris que I'aflfaire 
de Toulon etait manquee et qu'il fallait se resoudre 'd un 
siege ". 

From here up to the first of October nothing of great im- 
portance happened. The fleet and land batteries continued 
an artillery duel; reinforcements arrived gradually for each 
side. Part of the French squadron was put in commission 
under the French Admiral TrogofF. Toulon was declared a 
free port and well supplied with provisions, chiefly from 
Spain and the Spanish islands. On Sept 23 the Republicans 
heard the fire of 21 guns from each ship of the fleet. It was 
in honor of the coronation of Louis XVII.^ 

On Oct. 1 Carteaux received the following note. "Les 
troupes de la Republique viennent d'enlever la montague 
du Faron, ses retranchements et sa redoute. Signe La 
Poype".* The commanding position of Faron was of great 
importance and La Poype decided to attack it. From the 
northern side it was considered inaccessible, except at Pas de 
la Masque, where one might reach the top by a narrow zig- 
■ zag path ; the English considered a strong post of sixty men 
sufficient to hold this pass. On the night of Sept. 30 La 

1 Lettre de Salicetti, Sept. 26th. R. A. 

^ Correspondance de Napoleon. 

^ Hood's Journal. 

4 Lettre de Salicetti. Oct. 1. R. O. 



24 

Poype formed his three attacking columns. The one on the 
right was to ascend the northwest end; it was under the 
command of Victor. La Po^'pe commanded the center col- 
umn, which was to attack at Pas de la Masque; the column 
on the left was to make a false attack. Victor led his column 
up the hill, along the ridge of the mountain eastward to 
Pas de la Masque; he drove the picket back into the re- 
doute of Faron, assailed this on all sides at once, and cleared 
it out just as the enem}^ had run up their signal for help. 
While La Poypes triumphant note was on its way to Car- 
teaux the alarming news of the taking of Faron reached 
the town. Reinforcements, of the best troops and in large 
numbers, as well as field pieces should have been hurried 
to Victor and his men. But this was not done. A few men 
did arrive before the end of the day, but they were such as 
did more harm than good. The ridge of Faron is formed by 
several lieights running east and west. A deep ravine run- 
ning northward from Toulon cuts deep into Mount Faron 
perpendicularly; it runs almost through to the northern side 
leaving only a narrow ridge connecting tlie heiglits on the east 
and west of this valle3% wliich is called Valbourdin. On the 
south-western side of the ascent was Fort St. Antoine and on 
the south-eastern Fort Faron. The Allies, in contrast to the Re- 
publicans, showed the greatest activity and determination. 
At 7 o'clock the news reached the town: a council of war 
was held and the immediate attack determined upon. At 8 
o'clock the troops started. English, Spanish Piedmontese 
and Neapolitans, good troops and of four nationalities, 
started forward to attack Victor and his small force. The 
result would not have been at all certain, had Victor been 
able to rely upon his troops; they were new, of inferior 
qualit}'^ and such as are easily panic-stricken. Lord Mul- 
grave and Colonel de Revel lead the English and Pied- 
montese column up the south-west side of the mountain. 
On the most western ridge they met about 200 of the enemy, 
whom they drove back, aided by the guns of Fort St. 



25 

Antoine. The Republicans retreated eastward leaving a few 
prisoners in the hands of the English. As they discovered 
the Spanish column under Gravina, supported on the right 
by tlie Neapolitans who approached up the Valbourdin, they 
saw the possibility of their being cut off and quickened their 
march eastward. The English learned from the prisoners 
that the French, about 1500 strong were drawn up on the 
eastern end of Faron. They continued along the ridge to 
Valbourdin, and found Victor's force arranged in the form 
of a triangle one side facing west, the other south. The re- 
doute of Faron lined with men, was in his rear, and be- 
tween this redoute and his lines was placed the reserve. The 
valley Valbourdin widens off to the south-east in descend- 
ing and thus protected Victor's left flank. Mulgrave got his 
men under cover before the narrow ridge, about 15 yards 
wide, which connects the height east and west of Valbourdin. 
To attack the French he had to cross this valley. It was de- 
cided to send Gravina, who had been approaching on the 
west side of Valbourdin, accross to the east to attack the left 
of the enemy. He turned off to the right, but in starting to 
cross he received a heavy fire from the French. This forced 
him to cross further down. The English waited for him to 
take up his position against the left of the enemy. This he 
did, following his advanced guard which was led by a Span- 
ish sergeant who greatly distinguished himself. At first the 
left of Victor's force was exposed to a flank fire from the 
English and he moved part of it around to the right. As 
Gravina's column came up Victor's left had to be protected 
again and reinforced. When Gravina engaged it, it began to 
waver, and by doing so gave the English and Piedmontese 
the signal to advance over the narrow pass. This double at- 
tack by a superior force was too much for the French. They 
broke and retreated in the wildest disorder. The two attack- 
ing columns entered the redoute of Faron at the same mo- 
ment. The French were persued and many of them were 
dashed to pieces in falling over the cliffs. The small English 



2G 

force in Fort Faron seized this chance to fall upon the 
flank of the retreating Frenchmen. Victor with the few 
men he was able to keep around him, retreated in good 
order. In spite of his defeat he was the hero of the day. 
"Le chef de bataillon Victor, a qui on avait confio ce poste 
s'est conduit a mcrveille et dans I'occupation et dans la 
resistance qu'il a faite ; il aete nomme chef de brigade, une 
voix unanime s'est levee pour lui." One of the English 
officers wrote "A M. Victor is said to have been killed. He 
was reckoned a good officer and all liis dispositions thatdaj^ 
were in the st^'le of a man who understood his business." 
Victor distinguislied himself later on during the siege. 
The Republican loss on this day is very hard to give. The 
Allies lost about 100 men, Gravina was wounded " in tlie 
course of his able and spirited exertions at the head of the 
Neapolitans grenadiers". All the troops fought well, writes 
Mulgrave, " I should do injustice, should I particularize any 
corps or any nation." The retaking of Mount Fafon was 
very important to the Allies. " Hood was glad it was as it 
gave an opportunity of recovering it so handsomel}'.'" 

This failure on the part of La Poype increased the ill- 
feeling between him and Carteauxl Carteaux relieved him 
of his command. La Po3^2^e however was the brother-in- 
law of Freron, the Representant du peuple, and for this 
reason he was soon reinstated. From now up to the end of 
October the Republican army was in the most pitiable state^; 
there was jealousy between the commanding generals, and 
ill-will between Carteaux and the Representants. On Oct. 
12 Salicetti wrote "Carteaux a besoin, outre la bonne 

volonte, des moyens personnels, et nous ne lui connaissons 

— t 

1 For the attack on Faron. Memoires de Thaon ; de Victor. Letters 
from Graham. Mulgrave in Gazette. Letter from Hood, in Admirals' 
Dispatches, Mediterranean 1793, R. O. Lettre de Gasparin et Salicetti 
Oct. 4. R. A. 

2 Lettre Carteaux a La Poj'pe. Oct. 3. A. G. 

^ Lettres de Ricord, Oct. 8 : de Salicetti, Oct. 10, 12, 23, 27 : de Freron- 
Oct. 20. R. A. 



27 

pas d'autres que sa reputation." On Oct. 6th Carteaux wrote ^ 
"Mais elites au Ministre, vous qui connaissez ma franchise 
que si I'on croit quelqu'un plus capable que moi pour rem- 
plir cette mission, que c'est avec reconnaissance que je ced- 
erai un fardeaux que la trahison la plus noire m'a rendu 
insupportable, car quel nom voules vous que je donne a 
une Phrase qui dit tout simplement que je I'eusse voulu les 
Anglais ne seraient plus a Toulon et que pent penser de 
moi le comite de Salut Public, a qui Ton fait entendre que 
c'est pour avoir rejette son plan que les Anglais ne sont 
pas chasses." 

The Republican soldiers were raw recruits, uncertain, 
undisciplined and poorly armed ; many ofthe troops who ar- 
rived had no arms at all.^ Salicetti and Gasparin went them- 
selves to Marseilles and with great difficulty obtained 3000 
guns. The one redeeming feature of the Republican army 
was the artillery.^ Napoleon showed the greatest activity, col- 
lecting cannon, powder, and material of every kind. He was 
untiring in his efforts and definite in his purpose. His first 
two batteries have already been spoken of. La Montagne 
opened fire on Sept 18; Les Sans Calottes, on the the 20th. 
" Situee au bord de la mer a la poinle du Bregaillon ; elle a 
fait son efi'et, elle a chassse tons les pontons, les bombardes 
et les fregates qui se tenaient sur la gauche de I'Eguillette". 
These two batteries cleared the petite rade north of L'Eguil- 
lette. The village La Seyne was thus protected. The next 
battery, Les Sahlettes was erected against Fort Mulgrave, 
which continued to be Napoleon's object of attack. Les 
Sahlettes opened fire on Oct. 7 

The Allies decided to attack it. They had learned from a 

1 Lettre de Carteaux a I'adjoint du Mtre de la Guerre, Archives de la 
Guerre. 

2 Ivettre de Veyrenne a Carteaux Oct. 6. Lettre de Carteaux au Min 
istre de la Guerre. Oct. 7. Proclamation de Carteaux. Oct. 8. Archives 
de la Guerre. 

3 Lettres de Carteaux. Sept. 29. Oct. 18. A. G. lyCttre de Salicetti 
Sept. 25. A. G. 



28 

deserter who knew the watchword, that it was defended by 
troops of the last conscription. At half past two in the morn- 
ing of Oct 9, 400 English and Spanish left Fort Mulgrave 
to attack the battery. Led on by a French deserter, who 
answered the sentinels, they entered the battery; the first 
sentinel was killed, all who resisted were bayoneted. The 
enemy was completely routed, after making a short stand. 
They numbered about 300. The English spiked the guns, 
sawed the gun-carriages and destroyed the ammunition 
which was found in quantities At 4 o'clock they marched 
back, having lost but 4 men killed and 7 wounded. The 
Republicans lost 7 men killed and 10 wounded; also a few 
prisoners among them 3 officers and the lieutenant of artil- 
lery who commanded the battery. The damage was not very 
great. " A trois heures apres raidi la batterie se trouve par- 
faitement retablie et en etat de jour. Vous avez ci. joint des 
proclamations que les enemis ont laissees en profusion en 
abandonnant la batterie. nos soldats ne croient pas au ten- 
dre interet des puissances coalisees pour la dynastie que 
nous avons culbute due trone." 

' Napoleon's activity contiimed, new batteries were con- 
stantly being erected. Hood's record for these days is full 
of " heavy cannonading between tlie ships and batteries." 
" The enemy's gun and mortar Batteries are constantly 
playing upon our posts and shipping without our having 
the means of driving them to a greater distance."^ At this 
time the Allied forces amounted to about twice the number 
of the besieging arm}': their troops were undoubtedly better. 
Why they did not make some successful sallies is hard to 
explain. In the meantime however the number of con- 
scripts raised in the Var amounted to about 13,000 young 
men ; and fresh battalions arrived daily. Were they all 

^ Attack of Sablettes. Gasparin. Oct 7. R. A. Memoires de Napoleon 
Mulgrave in Gazette. Hood in Gazette. 

2 Letter from Hood to John Trevor. Public Record Office. Foreign 
Office. Sardinia. 1793. Oct to Dec. Letters from Trevor to Grenville. 



29 

armed, it would perhaps have been possible to have made 
an attack one of the posts. As it was, the artillery was the 
only arm which annoyed the Allies in the least. The Petite 
Rade was gradually cleared of the ships, which were taken 
back to a safer position. 

On Oct. 13th. news arrived of the fall of Lyons. The 
besieging army celebrated it in true republican style. Extra 
rations of eau-de-vie were distributed. There was dancing, 
music and singing. Whole battalions danced around in 
rings. The news was announced to the town by the shot and 
shell from a new battery which Napoleon had just com- 
pleted : Breguart, about 300 yards south of Les Sahlettes 
"elle balaye les rives de la droite de I'Eguillette et toute 
cette partie de la Grande Rade."^ The Allies decided to stop 
this rejoicing and tiie next day, they made a sortie. Thaon 
de Revel termed it "une etourdie railitaire". At 11 o'clock 
in the morning 3000 of the Allies took up a defensive posi- 
tion behind the Riviere Neuve. 100 men were sent out to 
Hauteur des Arennes to discover the movements of the 
enemy. A patrol of 800 men was sent out on the left. 
These advance bodies got too far forward and in protecting 
their retreat a general action came on. The Allies retired to 
their position, and awaited the attack of the Republicans, 
but as night came on they retired to Fort Malbousquet. In 
giving an account of this engagement Carteaux praised 
Almeras highly. ^"L'intelligence et les talents du citoyen 
Almeras ont force nos ennemis a se reployer". He did not 
mention Bonaparte, nor can I find anywhere a justification 
for Chuquet's saying that he led the troops on this day. 
^Carteaux praised the work of the batteries in the same 
letter, however "Tant qu'a nos Batteries elles font le meil- 
leur effet possible surtout la batterie des Sans-culottes . . . 
elle coupe de temps en temps quelques mats et maltraite les 
freegates ". 

^ Cor respon dance de Napoleon. 
2 " Carteaux au M. de la Guerre, Oct. 18, A. G. 
^ Chuquet — page 188. 



30 

The next day, October 15, it was the Republican's turn to 
take the offensive. Lapoype made an attack on Ca[) Brun,' 
but after a stubborn fight was driven back. The post was 
supposed to be in safety, but before long a second and mucli 
stronger column advanced, covered by the artillery. This 
time the Allies were soon driven from the post ; four English 
officers fell in defending it. Once more a hurried Council of 
War was held at Toulon 0)i the news of the loss of the post. 
" On delibera a Toulon si Ton attaquerait le Cap Brun de 
vive force, ou si Ton obligerait Tennemi a I'evacuer par un 
mouvement qui menaca de les envelopper". It was decided 
to outflank the Republicans. The position of the enemy was 
reconnoitred and it was found that they had abandoned 
Cap Brun, forming their whole line on a height further to 
the east, their left covered by Castle Ste Marguerite, which 
had two twelve pounders turned toward the laud. Field 
pieces could be seen well distributed, along the front of the 
enemy's line. The Allies marched under the protection of 
the guns of Fort Faron to La Vallette, leaving behind them 
140 men with two 18 pounders, who Avitb the guns from 
Fort Faron were to block the Vallon Favieres and prevent 
the enemy from sending reinforcements by this pass from 
their post at Tourris and Revest. From La Vallette, they 
started for the Hauteurs de Thouars, a position commanding 
La Garde, and which would have given the allies control of 
the entire plain and of all the roads to tlie east of Toulon. 
From this position the Republicans might have been forced 
miles away from the east side of the city. The Republicans 
saw their danger and moved in all haste from their position 
toward La Garde. Owing to tlje ujistake of the guide, and 
to the rather slow manoeuvres of the Sjjanish and Neapoli- 
tan infantry which headed the column, the Republicans 
reached La Garde at the same time as the Allies gained the 
heights of Thouars. The battle now resolved itself into a 
heavy cannonade from each side. " Les Fran^ais firent un 

1 Attack on Cap Brun. Thaon. Elphinstone in Gazette. 



31 

mouvemeiit comme poar couper aux allies le cliemin de 
Toulon mais leur cavalerie mise en desordre par le canon,' 
se retire bientot. Les dragons de la Reine espagnole manoeuv- 
rirent avec audace et succes". 160 of these cavalrymen 
had just arrived three days before. When night came on 
the noise of the artillery and wagons leaving La Garde was 
distinctly heard, and as the Republicans did not answer the 
heavy guns of the allies, it was supposed that they had 
evacuated the place. A few men were sent ahead " pour s'en 
assurer, mais le feu violent qui en partit, fit connaitre qu'il 
etait encore occupe". The object of the allies had been ac- 
complished and they returned to Toulon. This was the only 
fight around Toulon of skillful manoeuvring where all three 
arras were employed. 

The operations dragged on slowly, but the outlook for the 
Republicans was not briglit. Freron and Barras wrote from 
Marseilles : " A present les ennemis se sont renforces et se 
renforcent tous les jours. Carteaux n'a aucune des connais- 
sances militaires propres a s'emparer d'une des places les 
mieux fortifiees de la Republique" — Reinforcements were 
looked for from Toulon. In these days of depression Bona- 
parte was the only one who was active. On October 18th he 
opened a new battery, Des 4 Moulins, situee a 700 toises de 
la redoute anglaise."^ For the same day, can be read in 
Hood's Journal : " A heavy fire commenced from Hauteur 
de Grasse and ships in the N. W. Arm." The garrison of Fort 
Mulgrave began to see the danger of their position. For 
three days they kept up a continual fire on Napoleon's bat- 
teries, but failed to destroy any of them. And on October 22 
they were attacked by still another; La Grande Rade, "elle 
fait le meme eff'et que celle du Breguart ". Hood's attention 
was continually called to Fort Mulgrave, On October 23 he 
wrote in his Journal; "Made the General signal to assist 
Camel with boats". This short sentence is proof that the 
Camel approached too close to Bonaparte's battery. About 

1 Correspondance de Napoleon. 



32 

this time tlie powder became rather scarce and the batteries 
were not so noisy. In the meantime Napoleon was busily 
employed on four or five new ones; all in different stages 
of completion. 

The constant yet somewhat unjust complaints against Car- 
teaux had at last taken effect, and on October 21 he received 
notice that he was to be re[)laced at Toulon by General 
Doppet, who had commanded at Lyons. From now on until 
the departure of Carteaux on November 7 the siege rather 
dragged, although the monotony was broken now and then 
by a day of "heavy cannonading", as it was termed in 
Hood's Journal. No great harm seems to have been done. 
On October 30th the Terrible " signalled for assistance," 
but in general tlie ships keep at a safe distance. The last 
week in October troops and cannon began to arrive from 
Lyons and Grenoble, as well as many troops from the new 
levies; for the Representants were quite busy dis[)atcliing 
raw and useless recruits to the walls of Toulon.^ On Octo- 
ber 25 Salicetti and Gasparin received news from Doppet 
informing them that he had sent off 3,000 troops. As the}' 
had expected 20,000 this information gave them a good deal 
of alarm, which they quickly made known to the Comite 
de Salut public. The Allies also received reinforcements, 
which added to the discouragement of the Republicans. 
Discipline in the Republican army was still bad and deser- 
tion frequent. At last on November 5 some good troops ar- 
rived from Lyons. Two days afterwards Carteau.^ left, com- 
plaining bitterly against Doppet " qui n'a point de talents 
militaires," "and against Lapoype "qui s'est conduit de 
maniere a faire soupgonner safidelite"^ He accused even 
the Representants ; something which was very dangerous to 
do in that day. "Quel role me fait-on jouer? Les forces de 
Lyons devoient sans retard marcher sur Toulon, il semble 

1 Letters under date of November 2. A. G. 

Letters from Oct. 22 to Nov. 5 from Representants. R. A. 
2Lettre de Carteaux an Ministre de la Guerre. Nov. 5th. A. G. 



33 

qu'uiie main les retienne et je suis oblig6 de surveiller jour 
et nuit une troupe fatigue de trois mois de Bivouac, et lors- 
que les moyens d'agir avec efficacite arriveront ceux qui 
m'ont lies les bras viendront pour que je leur cede la place,' 
ils se sont bien gardes de hater les secours — ils n'ont ecoute 
que leur ambition et la chose publique ne pouvant etre 
sauve par eux, ils n'ont pas voulu qu'un brave homme la 
sauve "} Carteaux was quite right in saying that he was 
being removed just at the moment when things were taking 
a brighter turn.^ 

On Nov 5th. the Minister of War sent word to Doppet that 
he was to go to the Pyrenees : Carteaux was to be put in com- 
mand of the Army of the Alpes to hold the Piedmontese in 
check : and General Dugommier was to take command at 
Toulon. ^ Doppet did not arrive until the 13th. From the 
6th until this time Lapoype held the command. The real 
head of the army however was Salicetti, with whom at this 
time Napoleon had the greatest influence. He therefore 
practically had his hands free and if he felt that he was him- 
self capable of directing an attack on Toulon he might 
through the influence of Salicetti attempt it ; in spite of the 
fact that Doppet had given Lapoype instructions to remain 
on the defensive. ■'It seems in reality as if such an attack was 
made altho it is impossible to get positive proof of it. The 
following is found in Pon's Memoires. It is said to have 
happened on Nov. 9 ; " La matinee I'ennemi attaquait le 
camp Balaguier mais sans succes. L'apres-midi il feignait 
de marcher sur Malbousquet et Saint-Antoine dans le temps 
que le General Lapoype simulait une attaque contre le Cap 
Brun. puis tout ^ coup se porta de nouveau sur Belaguier 
avec 12 a 1500 hommes et fit encore une fois contraint de 
se retirer. II revint a la charge ver les sept heures du soir 
avec 2 tb 3000 hommes. Le camp menace venait de recevoir 

iLettre de Carteaux a 1' Adjoint au Ministre de la Guerre. Nov. 4. A. 

2 Lettre de Salicetti. Nov 9. R. A. 

3 Mtre. de la Guerre au Gen. Doppet. Nov. 5- A. G. 

4 Lettre Salicetti. Nov. 9. R. A. 
2192-3 



34 

des troupes fratches et des munitions. On laissa les repub- 
licans s'approcher des retranchements et au moment ou ils 
croyaient se rendre maitres un feu trus vif de mousqueterie 
et une decharge ti raitraille de I'artillerie les forcerent a 
abandonner precipitamment le champ de bataille qui resta 
convert de morts et de blesses". This is rather a circum- 
stantial account and is strengthened by the following which 
Salicetti wrote on Nov. 9th.^ " II nous arrive enfin des muni- 
tions, des pieces d'artillerie de I'armee de Lyon. . . . 
nous sommes maitres d'une position on nous sommes occu- 
per a nous fortifier, d'ou nous pourrons incendier les ede- 
fices de I'infame Toulon, en les designant au doigt . . . 
on se prepare a attaquer les ennemis en meme temps dans 
la rade, dans la ville et dans plusieurs forts". In other 
words Salicetti said they had just received more munitions 
and artillery, that they occupied a strong position ; (he must 
have referred to the heighs upon which the Battery, tlie 
Convention, was situated, and that they were planing the 
very kind of an attack which according to Pons was made. 
In Hood's Journal- Nov 9. " Terrible made signal for as- 
sistance, made Royal and Robust signals for their boats to 
go to the assistance of the Terrible ". Here at least is proof 
that the attack upon the Rade was made. It seems quite 
probable that this was the work of Bonaparte who had in- 
duced Salicetti to risk an attack. As Lopoype and probabl}'^ 
all the officers were involved in it ; as it was a failure ; and 
as it was carried out against orders, it is not surprising that 
there should be no official account of it. The affairs of the 
Republican Army were carried on in such a loose manner, 
that even such an attack might be passed over without being 
noticed. The attack was, according to Pons' description, a 
spirited one, but it proved somewhat premature and at all 
events a failure. During this period before the arrival of 
Doppet, Napoleon had been especially active in the erec- 
tion of batteries : the material for these was furnished by 
1 Recueil Aulard. 



35 

Lyons and Grenoble. On Nov. 9th. Salicetti wrote "On 
terminera la nuit prochaine une batterie qui produira dans 
la Grande Rade le meme effet que les Sans-Culottes dans la 
Petite". Nov 12.^ " le 22 au 23 Brumaire la batterie des 
Sablettes a fait une feu terrible sur la redoute des Anglais, 
a fait sauter un magazin a poudre et tue beaucoup de monde 
par I'eclat des bombes qui ont pris feu. Demain une nou- 
velle batterie, dite les hommes-sans-peur fera feu sur la Bat- 
terie ennemi. une autre dite la convention nationale battera 
Malbousquet ". Nov 13th ^"On travaille avec ardeur a la 
construction de nouvelles batteries. A I'arrivee du general 
nous ^sperons de frapper de grands coups et d'avoir des 
nouvelles importantes a vous communiquer". Hood wrote 
on Nov 13th. ^" their batteries approach by degrees both 
toward the town and the fleet and it is of the highest im- 
portance that the garrison should be made strong enough 
to go out and destroy their works ". As is seen, by the arrival 
of Doppet Bonaparte's branch of the army had made the 
greatest progress : Napoleon had selected the position of, and 
started to erect, every battery which was used up to the fall 
of Toulon.* Therefore to him and to him alone belongs the 
credit of the principal arm of the besieging army at Toulon. 
Doppet arrived on November 13th. He saw at once that 
he did not possess the necessary qualifications for carrying 
on a seige such as that of Toulon and ^consented to stay 
only if it would be under the orders of Dugommier. Luck 
would have it however that the few days in which he was 
in command were rather exciting ones. 
• On November 15 an engagement took place. The follow- 
ing is Napoleon's account of it. ^ The soldiers of the battalion 

1 Ivettre Salicetti. Nov 12tli. Archives de la Guerre. (Not published 
in Recueil Aulard. ) 

2 Lettre Salicetti. R. A. 

3 Ivetter to John Trevor. Record Office. Sardinia. 

4 I^etter Nov 14th. Correspondance de Napoleon. Here the future posi- 
tion of every battery afterwards erected is mentioned. 

•5 Salicetti. November 17th. R. A. 
'6 Memoires de Napoldon. 



36 

Cote d' Or stationed opposite Fort Mulgrave, seeing the Span- 
iards ill-treat a French prisoner, seize their arms and rush 
to his assistance. Other battalions follow and soon a whole 
division is engaged. Doppet and Bonaparte rush to the 
Scene. " Le vin est tire, il faut le boire " says Napoleon in 
advising Doppet rather to continue the action than to with- 
draw the troops. Doppet allows him to direct the attack. 
Bonaparte places himself at the head of the tirailleurs who 
cover the hill, and forming two columns tries to penetrate 
into the Fort at its gorge. O'Hara, the Governor of Toulon, 
sees the action and hastens to Fort Mulgrave to urge on his 
troops, he makes a sortie which is vigorously supported by a 
cannonade from the ships and Fort. Doppet, seeing one of 
his aids killed at his side, gives the signal for retreat. Na- 
poleon is furious and galloping toward Doppet exclaims, 
"Toulon est manque, et un . j . f . . . . a fait battre la re- 
traite." Such is Napoleon's account which Cottin 'puts aside, 
and then relates how it was "en realite." In the War Ar- 
chives a contempory and detailed report of this engagement 
exists and I shall give it about in full. It will be seen that 
it is quite reconcilable with Napoleon's account. 

2 "Rapport du Citoyen Brule, Chef du 2'^ Bon de la Cote 
d'Or, commandant la division ditte de la Plaine A I'armee 
Revolutionnaire pres Toulon. 

1 Cottin. page 266. 

2 Cottin's authorities are Thaon de Revel: BouUement de Lachenaye. 
Journal de Vernes. Raports Napolitains. (He admits that the Journal de 
Vemes is inexact: Thaon de Revel's account does not conflict with Na- 
poleon's: I found the Raports Napolitains in London, but put them aside 
as scanty and containing nothing of value). With these Cottin relates 
how it was "en realite." Napoleon's account is corroberated by the 
report of Brul6, the account of Doppet (letter Nov 17th. Archives de la 
Guerre) and a letter from O'Hara under date of Nov 15th. in the 
Gazette. Attacks on this day were frequent. Doppet writes, "L'ennemi 
voyant commencer des travaux trop pres de lui et s'elever des batteries 
qui rendroient la prise des siennes moines difficiles a pris le parti de faire 
a chaque instant des sorties du cote de nos travailleurs " . . . " Le meme 
jour (15th Nov.) nous avons 6te attaque a notre droite du cote des Sab- 
lettes au centre du cote de Malbousquet, et a la gauche du cote du fort 
St. Antoine. non contentes de les repousser, nos troupes ont a la gauche 
et a la droite poursuivi I'ennemi jusque dans ses retrenchements, cepen- 
dant cette affaire 6tant g^nerale n'ayant eu ni donne aucune plan d'at- 



37 

Le 25e jour du 2^ Mois de la de annee 2 de la Republique 
fraii9aise une patrouille ennemie s'etant presentee devant la 
Seine nos postes avanc6es furent a sa rencontre. Le combat 
s'engage entre elles. Ces patrouilles se grossirent de Part et 
d'autre de maniere qu'au bout de trois quarts d'heures on 
eut dit que c'etait deux armees au lieu de Patrouilles. Moi 
sousigne m'etant trausporte sur les lieux je ralliai les troupes 
de la Republique et ordonnai la charge. Alors nos troupes 
fonderent sur I'ennemi avec un tel acharnement que je ne 
pus les empecher d'aller jusqu'a la redoute ennemie. M'y 
etant trausporte raoi-merne je jugeai qu'il aurait ete impru- 
dent de tenter un assaut puisque ce poste ne nous aurait 
ete d'aucune utilite pour le moment attendu I'impossibilite de 
pouvoir le conserver. En consequence je ordonnai la retraite 
qui s'effectua dans le meilleur ordre possible. Nous avons 
perdus dans cette affaire qu'a dure 5 heures 10 a 12 hommes 
qui sont morts sur le champ de bataille et environ 15 
blesses. . . . L'ennemi a eu environ 60 ou 70 hommes tues 
dont la pluspart ont ete tues dont leur redoute, nous leur 
avons fait aussi un prisonnier." Here the chief of the Bat- 
talion Cote d'Or admits that his men got away from him, 
and it is quite possible that while he was sounding the 
retreat, Napoleon was trying to form the scattered, but still 
advancing troops into column to enter the fort. It is also 
not surprising that Napoleon thought Doppet had given 
orders to sound the retreat ; which lie may also have done, 

taque, les forces etant de plus trop divis£es pour en esperer en avanfant 
des avantages reels et durables chaque chef de colonne fit engager ses 
postes a sa troupe ". This shows that Doppet had no plan of attack, that 
each r/^^ directed his own affair, and that regarding the engagements in 
such a light, it is quite possible that Doppet sounded the retreat when 
he found his soldiers too far advanced. Cottin says the "I'objectif r^el 
des republicains etait toujours Balaguier, contre lequel Doppet lan^a 
d'abord 50, puis 500, enfin 1500 hommes". The attack on Balaguier was 
the all important one, but it was not Doppet who directed it, nor were 
the other attacks false ones, made by Doppet, as Cottin puts it. Napoleon 
took part in the attack of Balaguier, and nothing can be found to dis- 
prove his account of it. 

O'Hara writes, " Mulgrave vigorously and repeatedly attacked by a 
large corps of the enemy." 



38 



CHAPTER III. 

DUGOMMIER MaRESCOT COUNCIL OF WaR BoNAPARTE's 

Plan — Marescot's influence upon the Siege — At- 
tack ON Convention — Artillery before Final At- 
tack — Attack on Eguillette — Council of War — 
Departure of Allies — Destruction of the ships — 
Entrance of Republicans — Bonaparte and the 
Massacres. 
On Nov. 17 Dugommier arrived. He was far a better gen- 
eral than Carteaux, Lapoype, or Doppet. Fift^'-five 3'ears 
old, he had seen some service. He was formally an officer 
m a marine battery; he took part with some distinction in 
the Seven Years War, and also in the American War of 
Independence. Then he retired to his estate in tlie West 
Indies, from whence he had been sent as a deputy to Paris ; 
later he re-entered the army, was made brigadier general in 
Oct. 1792. In the Italian army he likewise distinguished 
himself, became general of division : in short he was a good 
soldier. 

An old artillery general, Du Theil, arrived two hours 
after Dugommier. Doppet and Albitte had brought him to 
take charge of the artillery, but he was forced to remain a 
few days in Marseilles, and consequently did not arrive with 
Doppet. About this time a decided and continual improve- 
ment took place in the condition of the besieging army. 
Reinforcements, artillery and ammunition arrived in great 
quantity: these came principally from Lyons. The taking 
of this cit}' had a great effect upon the attack of Toulon, as 
it permitted about all the forces employed there to be turned 
against the Allies in Toulon. There was however difficulty 
in finding provisions for the Republican army, and toward 
the end of the siege this question became one of great im- 
portance.^ 

On Nov. 24 the chef de bataillon, Marescot, a friend of 
Carnot's arrived, " pour diriger le genie ". The next day he 
1 Ivettres de Salicetti. Nov. 9 to 13. R. A. 



39 

wrote to Carnot; " J'ai ete visiter les attaques qui ne sont autre 
chose que quelques batteries provisoires dressees par les of- 
ficiers d'artillerie destinees a combattre les batteries avancees 
des rebelles et a favoriser les premieres operations qui 
doivent avoir lieu le plus tot possible "} This was his first 
impression, a little later he wrote somewhat differently. On 
Jan 9th. 1794 in a Relation de la prise de Toulon he wrote 
" nos dispositions d'attaque n'etaient autre chose que des 
batteries provisoires placees avantageucement par le chef de 
bataillon Bonaparte, commandant en second de I'artillerie ".^ 
Here he admitted that the batteries were placed " avantag- 
eusement" and by Bonaparte. His terming them " batteries 
provisoires" was quite wrong; he probably meant that in 
their construction they had not all the complete details such 
as would appeal to the eyes of an engineer. This was the 
case, but under the circumstances (dirth of workmen etc.) 
was quite unavoidable. It will be seen what success the 
engineers had in trying to complete these batteries. Their 
positions were their strong points and, as it has been seen, 
the course of the siege proved this to Marescott. 

On Nov 25th. Dugommier held a council of war: the Rep- 
resentants, the generals, Bonaparte, Marescot and others 
were present There has been a good deal written about the 
plan of attack followed at Toulon ; attempts made to prove 
that Napoleon was its originator, as well as to prove the con- 
trary ; yet no one seems to have laid stress upon the fact 
that on Nov 14, therefore 10 days before the council of war, 
Bonaparte in a letter to the Minister of War,^ proposed a 
plan of attack which corresponded in almost every detail 
with that decided upon in the Council : As Napoleon drew 
up the proces verbal of the council, both the plans are pub- 
lished in his Correspondance. The war council decided: to 
make the principal attack on. Eguillette:* to attack Mal- 

1 Letter from Marescot. Nov 25tli. R. A. 

2 Relation de la prise de Toulon, ^crit le 9 Janvier 1794. par le General 
Marescot, Arcliives de la Guerre. 

3 Correspondance de Napoldon. 

4 Lettre 25 Novembre. Correspondance de Napoleon. 



40 

bousquet with the batteries la Convention and la Poudriere, 
so to deceive the enemy as to the point of attack, and to pre- 
pare the way for the infantry " si les evenements en permet- 
tent I'attaque": to establish a battery against Cap Brun to 
deceive the enemy as to the point of attack ; to take Faron: 
all attacks were to be made at the same time : the " division 
de droite" was to attack Eguillette and to make a false 
attack on Malbousquet (this " false " attack was to be carried 
out if possible) the "division de gauche" was to make the 
attack on Faron and a false attack on Cap Brun. Much of 
the plan related to the batteries. It was decided ; to erect 
batteries "a I'extremite du promontoire de I'Eguillette, afin 
d'obliger I'escadre a evacuer la rade et meme de la briiler, 
si un vent contraire s' oppose a sa sortie": to erect one against 
Cap Brun; another " de 6 mortiers a grande portee contre 
Toulon " between la Convention and Malbousquet : to estab- 
lish a " redoute de protection sur la gauche de la montagne 
de la Convention pour empecher que I'ennemi favorise par 
le feu des redoutes de Sainte Antoine ne tourne et n'eleve 
la batterie de la Convention ". Napoleon wrote in his above 
mentioned letter of Nov 14th, " Chasser les ennemis de la 
rade est le point preliminaire .... pour se rendre 
maitre de la rade il faut se rendre maitre de la pointe de 
I'Eguillette. Au meme moment que nous serious maltres de 
la pointe de I'Eguillette, il faudrait bombarder Toulon avec 
8 ou 10 mortiers. Nous sommes maitres de la hauteur des 
Arenes qui n'en est pas a 900 toises et nous pourrons facile- 
men t nous approcher a 800 toises sans passer la riviere 
neuve : dans le meme temps I'on placerait deux batteries 
devant le fort Malbousquet, et une contre le fort I'Artigues. 
. . . Aujourd'hui il serait possible que quoique la 
flotte fut oblige d'evacuer la rade la garnison tint encore et 
soutint le siege. Alors les 2 batteries que nous aurions Hsib- 
lis contre Malbousquet seraient promptement renforcees par 
une troisieme : les mortiers qui pendant 3 jours auraient 
bombards Toulon se tourneraient pour ruiner les defenses 



41 

de Malbousquet. Le fort ne r^sistera pas 48 heures et rien 
lie nous arrete alors jusqu'au front de Toulon. Nous atta- 
quons le front compose par le bastion du Marais et le bas- 
tion de I'arsenal par une attaque brusqu^e qui nous conduit 
tout de suite a la deuxi^me parallele favoris^s par les batteries 
plac6es au Malbousquet et par celles plac^es sur le revers 
des Arenes. Nous serious g^nes dans cette operation par le 
fort I'Artigues mais 4 mortiers et les 6 pieces de canon qui 
y aurait 6te places au premier moment de I'attaque, y res- 
teraient et feraient alors un feu plus vif " . . . . Then 
he continued "La prise de I'Eguillette, I'expulsion des An- 
glais des rades et le bombardement et dans le meme temps 
attaquer le Faron". From carefully comparing these two 
plans, it will be seen that Napoleon's was practically the 
same as the one decided upon in the council of war. Napo- 
leon did not speak of the false attack against Cap Brun, and 
proposed batteries to be erected against Fort Artigues and 
not against the redoute Sainte Antoine, as it is mentioned 
in the final plan. With thesp two exceptions they are about 
identical. This shows conclusively that Napoleon was quite 
decided as to the proper plan of attack before the arrival of 
Dugommier. It is wrong however to say that Bonaparte was 
the sole originator of this plan, or to attribute any great 
merit to him if he had been. There were at least three vital 
points around Toulon ; the most vital was certainly Fort La 
Malgue ; this the Republicans could not well attack as it was 
strong for two reasons : the English had first landed there, 
and used it as a point of protection for their fleet; again all 
the Forts on the east side of Toulon had been better built, 
as it was from the east that any possible land attack on 
Toulon was supposed to come. Faron was also a position of 
great importance. This had been recognized at once by the 
Republicans, but their attack upon it had failed in the end. 
Lastly the Eguillette : this was also a splendid point of at- 
tack and the easiest to approach. Napoleon had recognized 
this immediately; but any well instructed officer would have 



42 

done so. That Carteaux, who understood nothing about the 
use of artillery and whose tactics consisted in using the Bay- 
onette, had not seen this, is not so surprising. 

Someone had however sent this advice, the attacking of 
Eguillette, from Paris. Salicetti wrote on Sept 26th. to the 
Comitc du Salut Public, ^ accusing Carteaux for having 
allowed the English to get possession of Eguillette. " Le 
general que nous avions cru comprendre et adopter notre 
plan n'y avait aucune confiance quoique celui que vous 
avez envoye de Paris fut exactement le meme ". On Sept 
25th. he wrote to the Minister of War. " Nous I'aurions 
force de quitter la rade, si ce general avait voulu executer 
le plan que nous lui avons propose et qui etait celui du 
comite de Salut Public"." The idea of attacking the Eguil- 
lette came therefore from Paris. Bonaparte, as was natural 
had seen that it was the best point to attack and his bat- 
teries were erected against it, and did the greatest part to- 
ward taking it. The Republican Army had however, after the 
council of war, a plan which was agreed upon by all ; it 
was no longer Bonaparte's idea only. Every one went to 
work to carry it out. The condition of the army was how- 
ever far from satisfactory in many ways. Barras wrote from 
Marseilles on Nov 19th. " La situation de I'armee n'est pas 
satisfaisant " Victor said in his Memoires " Notre arm^e 
6tait jeune, pleine d'ardeur, mais il n'etait point facile de la 
soumettre aux lois d'une exacte discipline". Marescot le 
chef du genie, had the greatest difficulty in trying to carry 
out his elaborate plans of a "siege en regie ". The workmen 
were wanting, implements were hard to obtain, and he met 
with little encouragement on all sides. Finally however he 
became convinced that one must proceed in the most prac- 
tical manner, and get along without that which it was im- 
possible to obtain: but when at last, he was convinced of 
this fact the siege was about over ; consequently Marescot, 

1 Recueil Aulard. 

2 Archives de la Guerre. 



43 



even as chef du g6nie, had no influence upon the direction 
of the siege. Dec 10 he wrote " je vois que chacun ici est 
persuade qu'il ne sera pas necessaire de devellopper des 
attaques r6guli6res pour reduire Toulon, j' aime a le croire 
et m^me je le presume " ; and after frequent complaints to 
his friend Carnot of the insufficiency of the material neces- 
sary for his branch of the army he ended by admitting that 
up to Dec. 10 he had done nothing.^ Those who strive to 
deminish the role of Bonaparte at Toulon lay stress upon 
the fact that Marescot arrived at the same time as Dugom- 
mier ; and to direct the siege. 

One branch of the army continually and regularly in. 
creased, and that was the artillery. From now on to the end 
it will be seen how the Repubhcan artillery kept up a con- 
stant and effective fire upon the entire western side of 
Toulon, until the Allied fleet sailed from the harbor m 
haste. Nelson wrote on Dec Ist.^ "shot and shells are very 
plentiful all over the harbor. I wonder more damage has 
not yet been done". General O'Hara I hope will be able 
to drive the French from the heights near the harbour or 
we shall be unpleasantly situated, not that I think Toulon 
is in the slightest danger. At all events we can destroy the 
French fleet and Arsenal in a very short time". 

On Nov 28th the battery La Convention was opened 
upon FortMalbousquet; it apparently did no very great 
damage; but its commanding position worried the Allies a 
great deal, and it was decided to make a sortie and try to 
destroy it.^ About 3000 troops, British, Spanish, Neapoli- 
tan Piedmontese and French refugies left the garrison about 

1 Marescot a Carnot. Dec. 10th. Archives de la Guerre. 

2 Nelson's Dispatches. 

3 Attack on Convention. 

Lettre du General Gamier. Nov 30th. Archives de la Guerre. 

Lettre de Salicetti. Nov. 30th. Letter from Elliot. 

Thaon. Letter to Sir W. Hamilton, Correspondence. British Museum 

Mss. Egerton 2638. 

Relation de Marescot. Lettre de Dugommier, Archives Nationales 
A. E. 1,281. Letters from Hood and Dundas in Gazette. 



44 

four in the morning, and supported by field artillery and 
the guns of Malbousquet, marched upon the Hauteur des 
Ar6nes. The Republicans were taken more or less by sur- 
prise and driven back in great confusion. The Allies how- 
ever instead of forming on the height and preparing 
themselves for a counter attack which was certain to come, 
pursued the French along the road towards Ollioules, or 
stopped to plunder. Even the spiking of the guns was car- 
ried out slowly and imperfectly. The news of the success of 
the Allies was soon spread through tho camp. General Gar- 
nier, who commanded in this division, was making a stub- 
born retreat tvith the few reliable men which he could 
gather around him, when Dugommier, Bonaparte and others 
soon came on the scene with reinforcements. The Allies 
were attacked with decision by superior forces, in the flank, 
and at a moment when they were in confusion. Threatened 
to be cut off from the town they retreated in great liaste 
and disorder, the Republicans following close on their heels. 
The Pied montese went back in less disorder than tho others,and 
they were also about the only ones prepared to make a stand 
on the Heights : alone, however, they could do nothing. The 
Allies brought their field pieces back from the Riviere Neuve 
with great difficulty, as the Republicans followed them so 
closely, and with such determination right up to the works 
of Malbousquet, which they tried to enter by repeated at- 
tacks. The guns of this fort and those of the Redoute Ste. 
Antoine forced them to retire. " Le combat a et6 bien 
cliaude " wrote Salicetti ; and Napoleon "La matine a et6 
belle". The fight was clearly to the advantage of the Re- 
publicans, as the Convention and three other batteries were 
blazing away harder than ever in a day or so; and the 
Allies in their attempt lost about 700 of their' best troops 
killed, wounded, or taken prisoners : among the latter was 
General O'Hara and about 17 officers. O'Hara was at first 
with the reserve on the Riviere Neuve, but after the Allies 
had taken the Convention, he advanced for some unknown 



45 

reason to the battery, received a wound in the arm and as 
the Allies fell back he was left behind and a few Republican 
soldiers from the bataillon d'Isere made him prisoner. It 
was not only around the Hauteur des Arenes but on the 
entire western side that the fight took place. The Republican 
batteries hurled shot at Fort Mulgrave and at the fleet, both 
of which answered in the most spirited manner. The artil- 
lery played an important part in driving the Allies back 
from the Convention, as well as in protecting Garnier's re- 
treat at the beginning of the engagement. Just what part 
Napoleon took in this affair is hard to say, as accounts are 
so conflicting. But at all events there is absolute proof that 
he distinguished himself. ^ " Parmi ceux qui se sont le plus 
distingues et qui m'ont le plus aid6 a rallier et a pousser en 
avant, ce sont le citoyens Buonaparte commandant I'artil- 
lerie, Arena et Cervoni, adjudants g^neraux ". Salicetti wrote 
on this day, " Le general Mouret, Garnier et Buonaparte se 
sont dans cette occasion conduits d'une maniere distin- 
gu^e ".^ It will be noticed that he was mentioned by Dugomier 
first among those who aided him, and that by Salicetti he 
was mentioned with two of the generals, and lastly, that he 
is the only one who is named in both reports. 

The next two weeks were spent in preparing the batteries 
and in frequent artillery duels. This arm had at last as- 
sumed most formidable proportions ^ thanks to the activity 
of Bonaparte in procuring material of ever}'- description from 
Marseilles, Lyons, Grenoble, Biancon, etc., and to his judge- 
ment in selecting the positions of his batteries. Victor wrote 
that by Dec. 6. 194 bouches a feu were turned against Tou- 
lon; " orcespuissantsmoyeus etaient dirigespar Bonaparte; 
car le G^n^ral Dutheil ^merville de la justesse et de la su- 
periority de ses vues s'etait compl6tementeffac6 devant lui ". 
*Some idea of the amount of work required in the artillery 

1 Ivettre de Dugommier. Nov. 30. Archives de la Guerre. 

2 Lettre de Salicetti Nov. 30 R. A. 

3 Letter from O'Hara. Archives Nationales AF II 9- 

4 Memoires de Victor. 



46 

may be gathered frim the following report of Dutheil to the 
Minister of War, on December 2n(]. • " Personnel de I'artil- 
lerie — il faudrait 6 oflficierssuperieurs, autants d'adjutants 
majors, undirecteur du Pare, un sous directeur, un commis- 
saire des guerres un propose du pa^'eur general, 20 conduc- 
teurs des charrios il n'y a pas le quart de cannoniers 
necessaires. , . . il faudrait au moins 8 commissairesde 
plus. Les cannoniers auxiHaires n'ayant que de la valeur et 
aucune instruction. . . . Poudrede la Guerre — Gassendi 
chef de Bataillon envoy6 par les representans du peuple dans 
toutes les places jusqu'sx Metz et Strasbourg pour notre appro- 
visionnement de siege anonce que c'est la partie qui nous 
mauquera le plus, quelque soit ses efforts pour nous en pro- 
curer " The question of infantry cartridges was a most 

vital one. Bonaparte, and later Duteuil were loud in de- 
nouncing the wasteful expenditure here, especially in the 
affair of November 30. At last Salicetti took most severe 
measures for stopping this. Even as late as December 10 
Dugommier wi-ote to the Minister of War " La i)oudre et 
les autres munitions de guerre exigent encore ta sollicitude. 
Je t'ai mand^ que nous etions bien loin de la quantity cal- 
culee rais.onablement et n^cessaire a notre but." A day or so 
before the attack of the Convention three new batteries were 
opened. The Convention ; the Homnie-sans^Jeur, " situee sur 
un mamelon domine par le camp anglais (Fort Mulgrave) 
Le general en a arrele la construction par ce qu'il croyait 
I'infanterie trop faible pour s'y soutenir". ; and the Petite 
Rade, destinee a eloigner les batiments de la cote et des 
voisinages de la poudriere ".^ On December 1 the Poudriere 
opened fire on Malbousquet. "Observed a great deal of can- 
nonading and musketry at the different Posts & more es- 
pecially near Fort Malbousquet ", Such was the account of 
it in Hood's Journal. 

Dugommier became more and more enthusiastic over the 

1 Archives de la gnerre. 

2 Correspondance de Napoleon. 



47 

artillery. On November 30 he wrote to the Minister of War 
"J'attends la perfection de deux batteries qui doivent jouer 
un beau role dans cette journ^e". ^ Dec. 4, "Les batteries 
necessaires a I'execution du dernier plan sont presque entiere- 
ment achevees - - - Noussommes pauvresenartilleurs." 
Dec. 10 — "Chaque jour notre position s'ameliore par la per- 
fection des batteries necessaires h I'attaque des postes exte- 
rieures qu'occupe I'ennemi et indiqu^s dans mon plan 
d'attaque. Je voudrais pouvoir t'en dire autant des autres 
moyens qui doivent contribuer a nos succes." About this 
time the batteries La Fariniere, to tlie right of the Convention, 
and Jacobins to the left of Hommes-sans-Peur, and directed 
against Fort Mulgrave, were opened on the enemy. On Dec. 
13, Lord Hood wrote that there was nothing of importance 
since the 30th of November, but that new batteries were going 
up on all sides, and that two of them " did us some mischief, 
on the 9th and 10th." " We shall soon have more men in 
the hospital than are fit for service".^ Dundas wrote on De- 
cember 12 "The enemy have increased number of mortars 
which have much annoyed our two posts of Cap Brun and 
Fort Mulgrave ".'^ On December 12 a new Council of War 
was held, where it was decided to continue the old plan. 
Dugommier, however, seemed to doubt its success; his views 
were too pessimistic for a good general. On December 13 
he wrote to the Comite " La moitie de cette armee est nulle, 
sans etre connaisseur il ne faut que voir pour en etre con- 

vaincu " Les officiers ne valent pas leur sub- 

ordin^s. Les trois quarts ne s'occupent que de leurs plaisirs 
et de la nouvelle existance dont ils jouissent".* Duteil 
seemed to be in the same state of uncertainty and on Decem-- 
ber 14 he wrote to the Minister of War telling of the canon- 
iers which were wanting etc.^ Napoleon was confident. And 
holding an important position in the principal arm of a 

1 Archives de la Guerre. 

2 Hood in Gazette under date of December 13. 

3 Dundas in Gazette under date of December 12. 

4 Correspondance de Napoleon. 



48 

great siege, with 64 officers and 1600 men under him, and 
but one old artillery general, with whom he was in the best 
understanding over him, seeing his many and well placed 
batteries taking a constantly increasing effect on the enemy 
he could not but feel certain of success. On December 24 
after the siege was over he wrote to Dupin" Je t'ai -annonce 
de brillants succes et tu vois que je te tiens parole"/ On 
December 14 the final cannonading commenced, "A heavy 
cannonade from and against Fort Mulgrave"as Hood wrote 
in his Journal. The principal point of attack was Fort Mul- 
grave, and it was bombarded for three days. Thaon wrote 
" Le fen etait continuel et si violent que I'on comi)tait jus- 
quTi 7 bombes en Fair a la fois — La cannonade etait vio- 
lente. Tout etait en jeu. La perte journali^re 6tait forte et 
les troupes harass6es de fatigue. Un feu continuel de 5 bat- 
teries de canon et de mortiers durait depuis 3 jours et 3 
nuits centre les ouvrages de Balaguier. On s'attendait a une 
attaque, on envoya.un renfort de 350 hommesa Balaguier.'' 
Further on he said " les defenses avaient 6te fort endomma- 
gees par le feu ennemi". Victor wrote in his memoirs " I'en- 
nemi ne restait point inactif. Apres le feu terrible et 
continuel que Ton faisait depuis plusieurs jours sur ses pos- 
tes principaux, il s'attendait a une attaque generale". Dun- 
das wrote "works (of Mulgrave) suffered much. The 
number of men killed & disabled was considerable."^ Lan- 
gara wrote that Fort Mulgrave" which they had bombarded 
and cannonaded from different quarters with the utmost 
vivacity during the three preceding da3^s•'' - - -" Smith 
wrote^ "Asa prelude to the general assault the enemy di- 
rected an uninterrupted fire of shot and shells against the 
Post of the Hauteur de Grasse for several days & nights. 
The troops being unsheltered from the shells suffered much 
and were so harrassed that it is not to be wondered at that 

^ Correspondance de Napoleon. 

2 Dundasto Henry Dundas, Dec. 20. Correspondence of Smith-Barrow. 

^Langarato Alcudia. Dec. 21. St. Helens. R. O. 

* Smith to Hamilton. Dec. 24. Correspondence of Smith-Barrow. 



49 

they were not able to resist the attack." I have quoted so 
much on the events and state of the army from the arrival 
of Dugommier up to the final attack on Fort Mulgrave, to 
show that in the siege of Toulon the artillery played by far 
the greatest part; that it was the one arm which inspired 
Dugommier with more or less confidence; that furthermore, 
it received from the corps of engineers under Marescot prac- 
tically no support, and very little from the infantry, which 
was bad from the officers down; and that in the successful 
attack on Fort Mulgrave the greatest part of the credit falls 
to the artillery which for three days preceding had gradu- 
ally destroyed the work and harrassed the garrison to such 
an extent that they were driven out by inferior infantry, 
and in spite of the fact that an attack was expected. 

The final attack on Fort Mulgrave took place on Decem- 
ber 17 ^ It had a garrison of about 700 men, made up of 
English, Spanish and Neapolitans. On the evening of 16th, 
about 7,000 of the best Republican troops were gathered at 
La Seyne. The plan was to make the attack in two columns, 
of about 2,000 men each, with a third column of about the 
same number as a reserve. Victor commanded the column 
which was to move along the coast of the promontory and 
attacking the fort on its right side, cut off all help which 
might be sent from Balaguier or Eguillette. The second 
column commanded by Brule was to march against the 
front of the redoute. The reserve column was to hold itself 
ready to come to the assistance of whichever column needed 
it. It was a very stormy night, and at the last moment 
there was some hesitation as to whether the attack should 

1 For the final attacks, and departure of the Allies ; 

Memoirs de Victor, Thaon, Napoleon. Relation de Marescot. Hood's 
Journal. Letters : Salicetti a Albitte, Archives Nationales AF II 2151 
lyangara to Alcudia, Dec. 21 . St. Helens R. O. Dugommier au M. de la 
Guerre Dec. 18. A. G. Barras Dec. 16. A. G. and Dec. 18. Recueil Aulard. 
Dundas in Gazette. Cook to Auckland Dec. 20. and Elliot to same, Dec. 
24 Correspondence Auckland. Hood to Henry Dundas Dec. 20 ; Smith 
to Hood Dec. 20 ; David Dundas to Henry Dundas Dec. 20 ; and Smith 
to Hamilton Dec. 24. Correspondence of Smith ? Barrow. 
2192—4 



50 

be dela3''ed until the next day or not. The Representants 
and Dugommier each seemed anxious to sliift the responsi- 
biUty. Bonaparte's advice was to go ahead, as bad weather 
was not at all disadvantageous for such an attack. The ex- 
citement caused by uncertainty and impatience at last seized 
them, and between one and two in the morning the signal 
was given. The plan of attack was quite forgotten. The 
fort was to be taken, and both columns, forming into one, 
rushed forward in the true Republican revolutionary 
manner straight for the fort. To the noise of the storm, the 
cannon, and the Marseillaise, was added at the first resist- 
ance the usual cries of sam»e qui pent ! ct la trahison ! In this 
way the cowardly tried to excuse their dastardly retreat. 
The others, who were fortunately the greater part, pushed 
on up to the reboute, where they were met with a deter- 
mined resistance. Victor was wounded, and already Dugom- 
mier cried "je suis perdu!" and started for the reserve 
column. It was already on its way, led on by Bonaparte 
and an artillery captain Muiron, who knowing the ground 
well, lead the advance guard. By a third and last effort 
they entered the fort, and after a few minutes deadly fight 
in the dark, the enemy retreated to Balaguier and Eguil- 
lette. At 4 o'clock the news reached Hood that Fort Mul- 
grave was taken. Bonaparte put Marmont, the future due de 
Raguse in charge of the artillery of the captured post and 
directed him to turn the guns against the ships. In the 
morning when the other troops at Balaguier and Eguillette 
discovered the enemy in possession of Mulgrave they crowded 
" to the water like the herd of swine, that ran furiously 
into the sea possessed of the devil." ^ The ships and mortar 
boats of the Allies bombarded Fort Mulgrave, but before 
long the Courageux made the signal " wanting boat to tow". 
Smith wrote, " The idea of sauve qui peut now seemed to pos- 
sess everybody, the fleets of the different nations alarmed 
at the idea of being burnt by red hot shot or shells from 
1 Account of Sir Sidney Smith, 



51 

Fort Mulgrave, Balaguier and Eguillette (now in possession 
of the enemy) weighed anchor and crowded out of the road 
in such haste as to alarm the troops on shore lest they 
should be left behind." 

This same morning Faron was attacked on three sides at 
once, east, west and north. After some resistance and the 
usual "sauve qui pent I" and "a la trahison", after which the 
cowardly no longer impeded the advance, the Republicans 
succeeded in establishing themselves there. " Lapoype tant 
calomniee s'est aussi parfaitement bien comports". Thaon de- 
scribed this success as "aussi faneste qu'incroyable". Na- 
poleon, after making his dispositions at Fort Mulgrave, 
proceeded to turn his batteries on Fort Malbosquet, for al- 
though he felt certain that the Allies would soon evacuate 
the city, he was determined that his shot and shells should 
hasten their departure. Freron wrote Dec 18 "lis ont pris 
des mesures pour mettre leur flotte a I'abri de nos canons 
et de nos bombes qui n'ont cesse de les accabl6s". This 
constant Artillery fire had a most demoralizing effect upon 
the Allies. In the night of the 17th. they abandoned Fort 
Malbousquet and Fort Pomets and very soon all the outside 
posts were in the hands of the Republicans except Fort Mul- 
grave which the Allies were forced to hold to protect the em- 
barcation. 

As soon as the news reached Hood that Mulgrave was 
taken a hurried council of war was called, on the morning 
of the 17th. Hood, Langara, Gravina, Dundas, Elliot, 
Thaon de Revel and others were present. The question was 
whether after the loss of Balaguier and Faron it was advis- 
able to hold the town. Hood and Gravina, counting upon 
the reinforcements promised from Gibraltar, and on the 5000 
Austrian troops who were on their way, voted for resistance, 
but gave in at last to the opinion of the majority; which 
was to abandon the city. It was decided ; that the garrisons 
of Malbousquet and Misiessy should hold out to the last ex- 
tremity to cover the retreat; to inform the inhabitants that 



52 

the powers would use all means to carry away those who de- 
sire to leave the city ; to embark the sick and wounded atonce; 
to carry off the French vessels which remained armed during 
the siege and to destroy the others, as well as the magasins 
de la Marine and the arsenal. Immediately afterwards prep- 
arations were made for the embarkation although it was not 
until the next morning, Dec. 18 that the time was set. At 
first the inhabitants of the town, kept in ignorance of the 
intended departure, were quiet and orderly. The next day 
things began to change. As the Republicans drew nearer 
and nearer, as the troops were seen getting ready for depart- 
ure in such large numbers, and especially as the shot and 
shell began to create havoc in the town and liarbor, it 
dawned upon the inhabitants what was taking place. Then 
the wildest confusion reigned, some rushing to the shore for 
boats, others donning the red cockade, and vowing vengeance 
upon their fellow-citizens, who still remained royalists. 
Blood was shed in the streets between the rival factions. This 
state of affairs was rendered more terrible by the fire of the 
enemy. It will be remembered that Napoleon turned his bat- 
teries against Malbousquet after the fall of Mulgrave. He had 
said, a month before, that under such conditions Malbousquet 
would not hold out 48 hours. That evening it was evacuated, 
in spite of the formal orders of the council of war, that it was 
to be held. The further work of the artillery is well de- 
scribed by Thaon de Revel. " L'ennemi travailla a. des bat- 
teries pendant tout la journee et la nuit (of the 17th) et les 
fit jour de bonne heure. (on the 18th) Les Franfais maitres 
de I'artillerie qui etait a Malbousquet canonnaient et bom- 
bardaient la ville. lis avaient de meme des encloue et tourne 
contre les Allies toutes les bouches a feu des postes aban- 
donn^s. C ^tait un feu infernal et continuel contre la ville, 
la rade et le port". It was decided on the morning of the 
18th to embark at 12 o'clock that night ; but the constant 
advance of the Republicans upset the plans of the Allies 



53 

somewhat and caused them to hasten their departure.^ It 
took place in comparatively good order ; the troops were all 
taken off without the loss of a man. This was not the case 
with the refugees ; they hurried in large and terrified crowds 
to the water's edge : the war ships and all boats in the har- 
bor were put at their disposal, but still many were lost in 
their wild flight by overcrowding the boats, and some of the 
boats were sunk by the shells of the enemy. The fact that 
90 anchors were picked up in the harbor afterwards shows 
how quickly the boats must have departed. The whole affair 
was a terrible sight. Elliot wrote to Lady Elliot Dec 20. 
"There has seldom been crammed more misery and more 
terror in a short space than we have witnessed these last 
four days" . . . Fortunately the weather was good. "Had 
the weather been such as it has been ever since that is to 
say blowing strong from the eastward we must have all, — 
fleet, army and refugees inevitably perished ". On the Eng- 
lish and Spanish fleet were about 6000 refugees, who had 
been taken from the town. Some French accounts of Toulon 
contain long literary descriptions of the horrors of this day, 
and do not hesitate to follow them with a sharp condemna- 
tion of the action of the Allies, especially the English, in 
not taking off all the inhabitants. In the first place all de- 
tailed accounts of these incidents are more or less untrust- 
worthy; to discriminate between the behavior of the Allies 
is quite wrong as no proof exists that the English were any 
less anxious to help the refugees than the Spaniards : they 
each had about an equal number on their fleets. De Br^cy, 
diredeur des douanes royales at Toulon, who was one of the 
fugitives wrote " L'Amiraux Hood, Goodal et Parker, Elliot 
et d'autres firent des offres les plus gen6reuses aux fugitifs. 
Le gouvernment anglais payait en outre tous les secours 
accordes aux fugitifs a Livourne, File d'Elbe et la Corse ". 

Hood in Gazette under date Dec 20. " It became unavoidably neces- 
sary that the retreat should not be deferred beyond that night as the 
enemy commanded the town and ships by their shot and shell ". 



54 

As to taking them all off on such short notice it was next to 
impossible. Again these writers might, with more justice 
and far greater success, criticise and condemn the cruelty of 
the Republican army which made such a measure necessary 
in a civilized country at the end of the 18th centur3^ It is 
true that Fox criticised the action of the English bitterly, 
but it was part of the plan of the opposition. "We do not 
know to w^hat number but it is certain that thousands of 
poor wretches who have been deluded by our promises are 
now left by us to the guillotine. It must be a strong case of 
necessity which can justify such a proceeding . . ." 

One thing remained still to be done before leaving the 
city, namely, to burn or destroy the ships, which could not 
be taken away, and the Arsenal. Sir Sidney Smith and the 
Adjutant of the Spanish navy were ordered to perform this 
duty. According to the agreement in the council of war it 
was to be done at the last moment, but they started either a 
little too late or the Republicans advanced a little too 
quickly. At all events Smith did not complete his work 
and the Spaniard did his stupidly. As Smith approached 
the Arsenal, preparing to burn everything, he found a num- 
ber of the inhabitants, principally prisoners who had liber- 
ated themselves, ready to dispute him. The shouts of the 
Republicans could be heard not far off and the musket balls 
of the people in the towai took effect. This delayed him 
somewhat, as did also a rather stupid act on the part of the 
Spaniards. They had been ordered to sink the ships in the 
basin, but finding it impracticable, they blew up two of the 
Frigates and in so doing sank two English gun boats, which 
were near, killing a lieutenant and several seamen. Smith 
wrote to Hood "Having now set fire to everj^thing within 
our reach, exhausted our combustible preparations and our 
strength to such a degree that the men absolutely dropped 
on the oars, we directed our course to join the fleet running 
the gauntlet under a few ill directed shot from the forts 
Balgu4 and Aiguette". Langara wrote "In like manner 



55 

were blown up two Frigates loaded with 4000 Quintals of 
Powder, on each of which a chemin de soufFre was placed 
by the Adjutant to the Squadron Don Francisco Riquelme 
who acquired in that service the most distinguished honor, 
as did likewise the other two officers who were exposed dur- 
ing a considerable time to the fire of Musquetry from the 
Insurgents belonging to the Town". 

On the morning of the 19th the Republicans entered Tou- 
lon. What the remaining inhabitants of the town had to 
expect, is well shown by what the Representants wrote the 
day preceeding. Barras wrote " L'infarae Toulon est h nous 
rien ne peut le soutraire aux vengeances nationales. De- 
main le royaume de Louis XVII n 'aura pas un pouce de 
terre". ^Picord, Freron and Robespierre jeune wrote "de- 
main nous serons dans Toulon occupes a venger la Repub- 
lique" ^The Republicans found a great deal of booty and 
many provisions in Toulon. These were increased each day by 
the ships which sailed in, thinking the city still in the hands 
of the Allies. The booty was gathered together, sold and 
the money divided among the soldiers. In the meantime 
the executions took place. In general it was a repetition of 
the punishment of Lyons ; since thousands of the citizens 
left with the Allies, those who remained behind had to take 
their place, in spite of their remonstrances and declarations 
of republicanism. The Representants wrote on Dec 20th^ 
" La vengeance nationale se deploie. L'on fusille a force. 
Deja tous les officiers de la marine sont extermin^s. La Re- 
publique sera vengee d'une mani^re digne d'elle. les m^nes 
des patriotes seront apais^es". As to the vessels which came 
in daily; "Tout ce qui est etranger sur ses batiments est 
fait prisonnier tout ce que est fran9ais est fusill6". The rep- 
resentants were in their element. Nowhere did they display 
their activity more than in " avenging the Republic ". After 

1 Barras l8th Dec. R. A. 

2 Letter iSth Dec. R. A. 

3 Recueil Aulard. 



56 

about a week they seemed to have had enough. On January 
5tli they wrote *" Hercule, dit-on, eut plus de peine h net- 
toyerles etables d'Angias qu'il dompter les Hons etlesmon- 
stres. Pour nous nous preferons niille fois de nouvelles 
redoutes a attaquer phitot que d'etre condamnes a purgerce 
sol impur et graugreno. Nous se sonimes entoures que de 
mines, de supplices, de vengeances, de pleurs et de larmes 
que la rage du desespoire et non le repentir fait repandre". 
Tiie enemies of Bonaparte, and of his name, have tried 
to connect him with these orgies of the Representants. In 
1814 the Baron d'Imbert published in a pamphlet on the 
siege of Toulon, which was notliing more than a praise of 
himself and other refugies, together with a bid for the favor 
of Louis XVIII, the following letter as written by Bona- 
parte. " Lettre de Bonaparte a la Convention. Citoyens Rep- 
resentants, C'est du champ de bataille, marchant dans le 
sang des traitres que je vous annonce avec joie que vos or- 
dres sont executes, et que la France est vengee. Ni Tage, ni 
le sexe n'ont 6te 6pargnes: ceux qui avaient seulement 6t6 
blesses par le canon republican ont ete d6peches par le 
Glaive de la liberte et par la bayonette de I'egalite. Salut et 
admiration. Signe, Bonaparte, citoyen sans-cu lottos. Others 
have said that of course Bonaparte must have taken part in 
the massacres as the artillery was used to execute the peo- 
ple "en masse". They seemed to forget that there were 160 
other artillery officers under him. The above letter is, it 
seems to me, most decidedl}^ a flilse one. Why should Bona- 
parte write to the Convention? Why should he sign himself 
simply " Bonaparte " as if he were known to all of them ? 
Again had he, adopting the plan of the Representants, de- 
cided to distinguish himself in this manner, he would surely 
have received some mention from the Representants, at least 
from his friend Salicetti. Further, there is absolutely no 

1 Recueil Aulard. 



57 

other indication that he was a party to these executions.^ 
Like most of the officers, he propably looked upon them in 
a cold half indifferent way, with some pity for the victims 
and much contempt for the patriotic murderers. It must not 
be expected that Bonaparte, brought up in the atmosphere 
of the revolution, absorbed in his own ambition, and looking 
on revolution as the means of satisfying it, should regard 
such scenes with the same amount of human compassion 
as one would expect to find in a man today. A letter which 
he wrote at this time,^ seems to indicate that he looked upon 
such measures as so much a matter of course, as not to men- 
tion them, one way or the other; but that the first few da^^s 
he spent in examining the fortifications, and the naval and 
military stores of Toulon. " Les Anglais n'ont fait que per- 
fectionne et augments les fortifications de la place, ainsi Tou- 
lon est plus dans le cas de se defendre aujourd'hui que 

jamais Je m'occupe a faire construire lesfoures 

a r^verbere. . . . nous avons trouve dans Toulon la 
meme artillerie qui y etait avant leur entree, il nous reste 
encore 15 vaisseaux." These few lines indicate that he was 
occupied with quite different things than " avenging the re- 
public ". The 15 vessels of which he spoke formed part of 
those which took him later from this very port over to 
Egypt. 

1 The Due de Raguse says in his memoires that Napoleon opposed this 
general execution of the people. 

2 Correspondance de Napoleon. ■" 



58 



PART II. 

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE 

ALLIES AND RESULTS OF THE 

FALL OF TOULON. 



CHAPTER I. 

Dispute between Hood and Langara — Commissioners 
AT Toulon — Instructions to Commissioners — Dec- 
laration PUBLISHED AT ToULON — CORRESPONDENCE 

WITH Austria as to Declaration — Correspondence 
WITH Spain as to Declaration — England's object 
in holding Toulon — Publication of Declaration. 

Toulon came into possession of the English so unexpect- 
edly that Hood and others were quite unprepared with in- 
structions relative to such an event. As Spain was much 
nearer, Langara received instructions early and the Spanish 
Court took such prompt measures as to procure them certain 
advantages which the English were afterwards unwilling to 
admit. Consequently there arose between these two powers 
disputes which lasted during the entire siege, and which 
were beginning to take dangerous proportions just as the 
fleets were forced to leave the harbor. Dundas wrote to 
O'Hara, Dec. 20 "^It must be remembered that from the 
manner in v/hich Toulon came into His Majesty's possession 
it was impossible to be prepared with a force adequate to his 
wishes or to the importance of the acquisition;" and on the 
same day to Dundas ^ "you must be aware that Toulon came 
into our hands at a moment when it was impossible for us 
to have made any preparations for such an event." That the 
English were not quite satisfied with Hood's declaration has 

1 Letters from Sec. Dundas to Lieut. Gen. Dundas 1793-4 British Mu- 
seum Mss. Addit. 27,594. 



59 

been seen. At first the English Admiral, Goodall, was ap- 
pointed governor of the town, and the Spanish admiral, Gra- 
vina, commander of the garrison. Hood wrote September 14 
^"We derive great assistance from Gravina who is the best 
sailor general imaginable ; quick, intelligent, but not pre- 
tending to much military skill ; and agreeing most cordially 
with the Enghsli." The Spanish believed that the command 
of the troops was to remain in their hands. St. Helens wrote, 
September 25; ^"They (the Spanish troops) are to be ac- 
companied by the marechal de Camp Don Rafael de Valdes 
(brother to the minister of the marine) who is to take the 
chief command of the troops on shore in the room of ad- 
miral Gravina. I heartily wish that he may succeeed equally 
well in maintaining a good understanding between the 
troops of the two nations." The English however did not 
care to have their forces (including those of their allies) un- 
der the command of a Spanish General and resorted to un- 
derhanded methods to avoid it. General O'Hara was to be sent 
as governor to Toulon, and on September 21 he was ap- 
pointed a lieutenant-general ; which rank made him supe- 
rior to the Spanish commander whom he must consequently 
supercede. ^In the meantime the dispute broke out between 
Hood and Langara. Langara wrote to Hood October 19; ^ 

"Notwithstanding that the king is very well satisfied with 
the good conduct of rear-admiral Gravina during the time 
that he has been commandant general of the combined 
Troops at Toulon His Majesty, not to deprive the fleet of a 
general of his merit has resolved to relieve him from that 
command and that he should return to his ship to be em- 
ployed in other important services, and has named Major- 
General Don Raphael Valdes to succeed him in the Com- 
mand. I communicate it to your Excellency for your due 

1 St. Helens to Grenville Sept. 25. R. O. 

2 Record Office. 

3 Dundas to O'Hara Nov. 30 Dundas to Gen. Dundas Dec. 20. British 
Museum Mss. 

4 St. Helens to Grenville No. 8 R. O, 



60 

information and I hope that you will be pleased to give the 
necessary orders as I have done for his being acknowledged". 
Hood answered ; " I return to your Excellency a thousand 
thanks for your obliging communication of the arrival of 
Don Valdes to take upon him the command of his Catholic 
Majesty's troopes in the room of our most esteemed friend 
admiral Gravina and have not a doubt but the service of 
the common cause in which Spain and England are so very 
cordially united will as cordially be carried on. 1 beg to offer 
to your Excellency my sincere congratulations that Admiral 
Gravina is going on so exceeding well". 

It will be seen that the difference lay between Langara's 
" commandant general of the combined troops " and Hood's 
" the command of his Catholic Majesty's troops " ; yet neither 
admiral approached the question directly. A few days latter 
however, Oct. 23, Langara informed Hood that Gravina had 
been promoted to the rank of lieutenant-genneral of the fleet 
and that the king had confirmed him' "the general com- 
mand of the allied forces, in the possesssion of which he has 
been by the agreement between your Excellency and me ". 
Major-general Valdes was to command the Spanish troops. 
Hood no lopger answered in an evading manner, but ex- 
pressed himself so clearly as by no means to contribute to a 
good understanding between the admirals: "No one can 
more sincerely rejoice than myself at my much esteemed 
friends promotion, but his Sardinian and Sicilian Majesty 
having been graciously pleased to confide their respective 
troops entirely to my disposal or to act under such british 
officer as I may judge fit to put them I am very much at a 
loss to conceive upon what ground Admiral Gravina can 
take upon him the title of commander in chief of the com- 
bined forces at Toulon ; more especially as the town and its 
dependant forts were yielded up to the British alone and 
taken possession of by me. I shall therefore feel it my duty 
to put the Sardinian and Sicilian troops together with the 

1 Record Ofl&ce. Letter published by Cottin. 



61 

british under the command of major general O'Hara, the 
moment he arrives (who is now off the port) eventually subject 
to such orders as I may see fit to give".' Then followed a 
long letter from each of the admirals ; Langara declared 
that from the day they went on shore together, on Sept. 2, 
it was agreed that the command should be divided. Hood 
claimed that Toulon surrendered to him alone. This was 
true, as the English officers had been on shore and had ar- 
ranged for the surrender before the arrival of the Spaniards; 
and the English fleet entered as soon as the Spanish was 
seen in the distance ; Hood did not dare enter before. It was 
also true however that the Spaniards considered themselves 
on an equal footing with the English and had exerted 
themselves from the beginning upon this understanding. 
St. Helens wrote to Grenville^ " In general tho' this Court 
certainly conceive themselves to be in strictness entitled to 
the Nomination of the commander in chief of the forces on 
shore, in virtue of the agreement to that effect, which they 
suppose to have been concluded at the outset of the business 
between the two admirals, it seems to me that they are by 
no means disposed to insist pertinaciously upon that Claim, 
being aware that it it can hardly be considered as reason- 
able now that the Spanish troops in the garrison bear so 
small a proportion to those of Great Britain and her allies, 
but their feelings are of course very deeply wounded by those 
expressions in Lord Hood's letter to Admiral Langara on 
the 25th of October which so positively assert that the rights 
which have been acquired over the town and port of Tou- 
lon with its ships belong not to the two crowns jointly but 
solely and exclusively to Great Britain, contrarary to the no- 
tions which have been hitherto entertained by this govern- 
ment, which they have so ostentatiously announced to their 
subjects and in consequence of which they have made such 
great and expensive efforts for the securing that important 

1 Record Office. Published by Cottin. 

2 St. Helens to Grenville, Nov. 8. R. O. 



62 

possession and I therefore cannot help taking the liberty of 
expressing a wish that their share in this joint right may at 
least nominally be preserved to them, since otherwise there 
is reason to fear that besides their withdrawing immediately 
from Toulon all their ships and land forces the effect of our 
late endeavors to cultivate a good understanding with them 
will be entirely lost and that they will cease to look towards 
England with any kind of cordiality or confidence." This 
was his official report; the same day he wrote to Grenville' 
" I am more anxious than I can express that for the reasons 
mentioned in my dispatch some means may be found for 
calming the very great degree of pique and ill-humor which 
this court have conceived on account of the Toulon business, 
by giving them at least nominally an equal share with us 
in the Possession or Trusteeship of that place and its apper- 
tenances. It is certainly true that at the outset of the enter- 
prise Admiral Langara had great reason to presume that it 
was upon that footing that he had been invited to concur in 
it: witness his joint proclamation with Lord Hood, the cere- 
monies of the landing etc. Besides which even supposing 
that the motives which he and his court entertained upon 
that head were founded merely upon self delusion, we cer- 
tainly were not ignorant that they acted from the impulse 
of that conception however erroneous, and therefore the de- 
ferring to undeceive them till the precise moment when 
their services were no longer needed would surely have an 
appearance, if not of ill-faith at least of Machiavelism, which 
would ill accord with the general character of the British 
Government. The Dukede la Alcudia seems to wish for some 
written agreement upon this subject but I imagine that that 
will hardly be found practical." These two letters just given 
show that even the English ambassador at Madrid saw the 
justice of the Spanish claims. This dispute continued dur- 
ing the entire time of the occupation of Toulon, but before 
following it further it is necessary to speak of the Commision 
which was sent by the English to Toulon. 
1 Helens to Greuville Nov. 8. R. O. 



63 

O'Hara had been appointed Governor of Toulon before 
the end of September; and Sir Gilbert Elliot, who was to 
have been governor of Dunkirk, was sent out also to take 
charge of the civil affairs. O'Hara and Elliot were to form 
with Hood a joint commission for the government of Tou- 
lon. Elliot left England the 11th of October, but it was not 
until the 22nd that Grenville, after consulting Pitt, informed 
the Court of Madrid, through St. Helens, of the appoint- 
ment of this commission.^ To settle on the spot such ques- 
tions as may arise. His Majesty has " in execution of the 
trust undertaken in His name by Lord Hood authorized Sir 
Gilbert Elliot to proceed to Toulon to act conjointly with 
His Majesty's officers commanding his sea and land forces 
in the execution of a Commission respecting all the points 
of a Civil nature which may present themselves in the course 
of events at Toulon. His Majesty has also in consequence of 
the surrender of that place and from the sense of the neces- 
sity of relieving Admiral Goodall from the duties of a situ- 
ation incompatible with the naval service, appointed Lieu- 
tenant-General O'Hara to succeed that officer as Governor of 
Toulon, and to take upon him the command of His Majes- 
ty's forces in that part of France. Lord Hood, Sir Gilbert 
Elliott and General O'Hara are severally directed to main- 
tain the most cordial and confidential intercourse with the 
Persons employed by his Catholic Majesty, and to endeavor 
to the utmost to continue that good understanding which 
has hitherto prevailed there so much to the advantage of 
the common cause." 

The foregoing was inserted in a letter to St. Helens on 
Pitt's advice. Pitt wrote October 17 to Grenville;^ "We 
think there ought to be a sentence inserted distinctly men- 
tioning that we have appointed a governor of Toulon in 
consequence of the place being surrendered to us; adding, 
of course, every proper assurance of our desire to cooperate 
with Spain in that question. We must take this linerespect- 

1 Grenville to St. Helens Oct. 22. R. O. 

2 Pitt to Grenville Oct. 17. Mss. of Fortesque. 



64 

ing Toulon whenever any question occurs between us and 
Spain on that subject." Pitt foreseeing tlie possible objection 
of Spain added, "The sooner this step is taken, the more 
likely to avoid disgust". Henry Dundas wrote to Grenville' 
" It occurs to Mr. Pitt and to me that it is better not to keep 
back our having appointed a governor. The grounds on 
which we obtained possession, and tlie imposslbilit}'^ of Hood 
and the officers acting under him continuing to exercise the 
office and duties of Governor, are reasons too obvious for 
adopting the measure to be concealed ". 

Buckingham wrote to Grenville, asking about the division 
of command and added refering to the French sliips at 
Toulon, "" it does not seem wise to risk the only safe deposit 
which the war has placed our hands". The foregoing, as well 
as the tardiness in informing Madrid of the measures taken 
in London, shows that the English government was not 
dealing openly with Spain in reference to Toulon. 

On Oct, 18 long and detailed instructions were sent to 
the English Commissioners at Toulon. The substance of 
these was as follows. '^The possession of Toulon and the 
prospect of its extensive consequences in the South of France 
have given occasion for the Commission. It is to have three 
principal objects ; 1st, to govern Toulon ; 2nd, (" which is 
more extensive and more important ") to induce other parts 
of France to have recourse to His Majesty's protection; to 
aid in the re-establishment of a regular government which 
is to end the internal disorders in France and open the way 
to a satisfactory termination of the war: 3rd., to take charge 
of any provinces or districts which should be occupied by 
his Majesty's arms or place themselves under his protection, 
"till some regular and general system shall liave been re- 
established and a regular and a definite pacification con- 
cluded". The Commission is also to publish immediately, 

1 Dundas to Grenville Oct. 20. Mss. of Fortesque. 

2 Buckingham to Grenville Oct. 24th. Mss. Fortesque. 
3 Record Office. Published almost in full by Cottin. 



65 

and in His Majesty's name, a declaration addressed to the 
people of Toulon, " according to the tenor of the paper 
herewith transmitted". The powers of the other members 
of the commission must not interfere with the authority of 
the militar}^ governor in any matters of military detail. As 
far as is consistent with this principle, due regulations ought 
to be framed for protecting as far as possible the persons of 
the inhabitants and for providing for the ordinary course of 
justice in civil affairs. The possibility of retaining the in- 
habitants in their civil and military employments must de- 
pend upon the dispositions they manifest and upon circum- 
stances. The suffering of public meetings, or of authorizing 
and recognizing the deliberations of any committee must be 
governed by similar circumstances. A power must be ex- 
ercised wherever it is necessary of confining, or sending 
awa}'-, suspected persons. " On all these points it is im- 
possible to form specific instructions ; the Commissioners 
will jointly exercise their discretion." The second general 
head of instructions gives the following : His Majesty's 
primary object is to terminate the war as speedily as possi- 
ble. Whatever may be the form of government in France 
His Majesty will feel himself entitled to demand such terms 
as may afford to himself and his allies reasonable indemni- 
fication for the past and security for the future. His Majesty 
is not disposed to prescribe any particular form, he is per- 
suaded it is only on the foundation of hereditary monarchy 
(subject to such limitations as may be found advisable) that 
a rational prospect at present exists of any regular govern- 
ment being reestablished. All parts of France which may 
wish to deliver themselves from the tyrany of the present 
rule and concur in the restoration of a regular government, 
on the foundation of hereditary monarchy and accept His 
Majesty's protection, shall be well governed, and restored at 
the conclusion of a definite treaty of peace, " unless by the 
terms of such treaty it shall be agreed that any such place 
or district shall, for the purpose of indemnification or secur- 

2192-5 



ity be ceded to any of the powers who are engaged in con- 
cert with His Majesty in the present war. No idea is enter- 
tained of pushing thc'i.t principle to the extent of proposing 
any plan of partition or dismemberment applicable to the in- 
terior of France ; but it can only relate to such possessions 
on the frontiers as shall appear on fair discussion to come 
within the real objects which are professed. As this consid- 
eration is naturally more applicable to Austria than to any 
other continental power it does not appear that in the south 
of France, this exception can be material with respect to 
any district but such as may be contiguous to the frontier 
either of Spain or Sardinia, or possibly Switzerland, in case 
the Cantons may be brought to take an active part in the 
war". No alarm is to be created from the idea of extensive 
projects of aggrandizement and dismemberment such as are 
not in His Majesty's contempletion. The declaration which 
you are to publish at Toulon will be circulated as speedily 
as possible in the interior of France. You will be par- 
ticularly careful to state on all occasions His Majesty's con- 
viction that the acknowledgement of a hereditary monarchy, 
affords the only probable ground for restoring regular gov- 
ernment in France. His Majesty is far from meaning to 
pledge himself to any approbation of the articles of the Con- 
stitution of 1789 and is on the contrary persuaded that 
every part of the French nation which wishes for the re- 
establishment of Monarchy will ultimately see the impos- 
sibility of retaining many parts of that constitution, yet His 
Majesty has not felt this as any reason for withholding his 
protection from the people of Toulon, under the circum- 
stances in which it was sought for. Under the third head of 
instructions is found: 'all such places as choose to put 
themselves under the protection of His Majesty will be gov- 
erned under His "general superintending power", but this 
authority must be subject to no fixed limitations, and must 
in time of war be inforced wherever it is necessary, by the 
military power. ^ " The Re -establishment of the former 
1 Following not published by Cottin. 



67 

modes of Judicature, of the former Ecclesiastical establish- 
ment and particularly of the Provincial states in the prov- 
inces where they existed in a known and established form 
previous to the late troubles seem likely if they should be found 
practicable to be productive of great advantage and to lead 
to the restoration of Order and good government. ^ But 
even in looking to these objects great caution will be neces- 
sary not to do violence to existing prejudices and it may be 
necessary unless the minds of the people at large should be 
disposed to such measures as I have stated, to postpone them 
for a time and to make no alteration in whatever may be 
the Train and order of things which you may find exist- 
ing father than is necessary for the fundamental object of 
acknowledging a monarchical government." ^ " The meas- 
ures to be taken with respect to property which has been 
confiscated, and afterwards sold under the authority of the 
Convention, as well as that which may belong to persons 
who may continue in hostility to His Majesty ; with respect 
to the circulation or suppresion of assignats, and also with 
respect to the collection and appropriation of any publi^ 
revenues, are also points of so much delicacy, and may de- 
pend so much on local circumstances, that it is not thought 
right, at present to make them the subject of positive in- 
structions." 

This resume of the instructions sent to the Commissioners 
at Toulon shows the ideas of Pitt, and the political views of 
the English at this time. 

The declaration which was published at Toulon differed 
from that of Hood in two particulars: 1st; His Majesty was 
not willing to commit himself to the constitution of 1789, 
but simply regarded the reestablishment of an hereditary 
monarchy as the necessary form of stable government with 

1 This proposal to reestablish the old provincial states as well as the 
idea that the people of the South of France would care very little what 
was taken on the frontiers or in the North shows that the new spirit which 
was awakened in the large majority of the French people was ill under- 
stood in London. 
2 Following published by Cottin. 



68 

which he hoped to make peace. He did not wish to specify 
any particular form nor to interefere with the internal af- 
fairs of France. 2nd; It was expressly stated that at the ter- 
mination of a treaty of peace His Majesty expected for 
himself and his allies a just indemnification for the costs 
and dangers of a war which was forced upon him by France. 
This declaration had been drawn up after a diplomatic cor- 
respondence with the courts of Austria, Spain and Sardinia. 
On Sept. 14 information was sent to Sir Morton Eden in 
Vienna that a public declaration would be made as to His 
Majesty's views on the war with France. On Sept. 25 Eden 
wrote to Grenville, ' that Thugut had informed him that 
Austria agreed not to take any step toward the interior ar- 
rangement of France '"without a previous and confidential 

communication with his Majesty Sentiments 

entertained here were he (Thugut) added that France should 

be so far weakened as no longer to be dangerous. 

- - - On the subject of Indemnification the acquisition for 
Great Britain being to be looked for in the Foreign settle- 
ments and Colonies of France, no jealousy, he observed, nor 
clash of interests could arise." On Sept. 27 Grenville for- 
warded a draft of the proposed declaration to Eden. Speak- 
ing of the form of govenment in France' "it is infinitely 
better that this should be left to the feelings and experiences 
of the French nation itself than that Foreign Powers should 
seek to impose ;upon that country particular points with 
respect to tlie modification of a monarchical govern- 
ment to which it may still be adverse. the 

claim for indemnification is no less carefully attended to. It 
appeared neither necessar}^ nor advisable to specify particu- 
lar objects of indemnification because these must of necessity 

depend on the events of the war. - If on the whole 

the proposed declaration should meet with the concurrence 
of that Court it will be right for you to lose no time in re- 
turning the Messenger in order that it ma}^ be published in 
His Majesty's name." 
1 Record Office. 



69 

On Oct. 12 Eden sent off his answer in which he said 
that the Austrian minister agreed with the declaration but 
speaking of the indemnification wished ^ " that the expres- 
sion ' telles que les Puissances Belligerantes ne peuvent se 
dispenser de demander' might be omitted, as it might give 
a handle to all those who are engaged either actively or 
only apparently in the war, equally to bring forward claims 
of indemnification and increase the difficulties of the paci- 
fication. The King of Prussia would, he (Thugut) said, be 
the first to found on it pretensions for the further aggran- 
dizement to which this court could never assent, till it has 
itself made acquitions equal to those of His Imperial Ma- 
jesty in Poland. In the place of these words he proposed to 
insert ' Sa Majeste ne pent se dispenser etc'. I told him that 
I would transmit his observations for your Lordship's con- 
sideration tho' I could not agree with him in the propriety 
of the change proposed, as in a declaration of this kind the 
making no mention of the other Belligerent Powers might 
give them umbrage, might make them apprehensive of a 
separate peace without any attention to their interests & 
consequently render them less inclined to cooperate heartily 
towards the termination of the war. The invitation to 
France to follow the example of the inhabitants of Toulon, 
he said he looked upon to be salutary as much as it regarded 
the towns situated at a distance from those parts to which 
his Imperial Majesty's views of indemnification were di- 
rected ; but he trusted that should Lille or any other place 
contiguous to the Belgic provinces offer to surrender to His 
Majesty on the same conditions as Toulon that His Majesty 
would look upon himself as an auxiliary Power on that 
side of France, and consider them as being to form the fu- 
ture Barrier of those provinces, would accept them for the 
Emperor & to be governed in His name till the Peace. This 
afternoon I waited again by appointment on M. de Thugut 
who delivered me a copy which I have the honor to inclose, 
of the Emperors proposed declaration. In reading over the 

1 Record office. 



70 

paper I pointed out to him the words " par les moyens que les 
lois fondamentales de sa constitution autorisent". I wished 
him to supress them as they appeared to go beyond your 
Lordship's meaning & they might be construed to imply an 
intention to interfere in tlie internal arrangement of France 
& I particularly insisted on the advantage of a perfect 
union of sentiment on this important point of the declara- 
tion. He however adhered to these words as being more 
consistent with the form of government of his Imperial 
Majesty's Dominions — I spoke again to M. de Tiuigut on 
the subject of Prussia and Sardinia. As to the former I had 
the satisfaction to find him disposed could the King of 
Prussia's effective cooperation for the conquest of Alsace and 
Loraine be absolutely secured to recommend to the Emperor 
to make a formal renunciation of any exchange whatsoever 
for Bavaria but in such a form as may save the Emperor's 
dignity. ' He seemed however to have but little hopes of 
any effective support being procured from Prussia which 
opinion he considered as sufficiently justified by the events 
of the Campaign. Offers of futher assistance may he thinks 
be made, but he expects to find them clogged with such pro- 
posals of compensation as cannot be admitted in order that 
the refusal may be seized as a pretext to withdraw from the 
war. ^ He added that his expectation would be fully grati- 
fied if it could be possible to obtain from His Prussian 
Majesty His several contingents to the King, the Emperor 
and the Empire". 

The foregoing gives one a further insight into the political 
relations at the time of the King's declaration. The English 
Court was anxious to act in consert with the Austrian in 
taking this step and had awaited her answer before publish- 
ing the declaration. It was not quite so particular about 

1 It is interesting to see how under the influence of England Thugut 
is willing to modify his policy. 

2 As early as 1 793 Thugut seemed to have foreseen the possibility of a 
"Treaty of Basel." 



71 

Spain. This is shown by the fact that the draft of the 
declaration was sent a week later to Lord St. Helens, and 
that his answer would not necessarily be waited for before 
publishing the declaration. This is another proof that Eng- 
land was less open to the Spanish Court than to the Austrian, 
even on the subject of Toulon where the two Courts were 
supposed to act in consert. The communication to St. 
Helens is dated October 4. It ran as follows : ^ " I transmit 
to your Excellency by His Majestys command the draft of 
a declaration which his Majesty proposes to publish for the 
purpose of explaining to the well disposed part of the 
French nation His Majestys views with respect to the prose- 
cution of the present war. The circumstances of the late 
transaction at Toulon and the great probability that a 
similar disposition exists in many parts of France, have in- 
duced His Majesty to believe that the present moment is 
favorable for a declaration of this nature. It is uncertain 
whether the rapid succession of events by which the present 
crisis is marked may not render it expedient not to delay 
the publication of this paper till an answer can be received 
from the Spanish government respecting its contents. But 
even in that case His Majesty has felt that an early and 
confidential communication of it to the Court of Madrid 
was an attention on his part due to the union and friend- 
ship subsisting between the two crowns, and in case circum- 
stances should admit of the delay. His Majesty will be 
extremely desirous of receiving from the Catholic King the 
fullest communication of His sentiments respecting it. His 
Majesty flatters himself that in all events the principles 
manifested in that declaration are such as will be found to 
correspond entirely with those of His Catholic Majesty. I 
feel it unnecessary for me to enter into any detailed dis- 
cussion of these, as the paper itself will naturally suggest to 
your Excellency what is to be said upon it. — You will not 
fail to remark that in any intervention respecting the in- 
1 Record Office. 



72 

terior of France the King looks ratlier at the affording sup- 
port to well disposed persons in that Kingdom than to the 
establishing there by external force any particular gov- 
ernment. In recommending to the French to unite in the 
cause of monarchy His Majesty advises that only, which 
seems essentially necessary to the re-establishment of ex- 
ternal or internal tranquility, but carefully avoids discussing 
the various modifications and limitations of that form. His 
Majesty is persuaded that the entire re-establishment of an 
arbitrary Monarchy there, is neither practicable nor desir- 
able. His Majesty is on the other hand far from approving 
as an ultimate state of things the constitution accepted by ' 
the late King during the constraint which followed His being 
brought back from Varennes. But all the particular details 
of any intermediate system must as it appears be left to the 
discussion of the French themselves and foreign powers have 
no immediate object in looking farther than to the general 
principles stated in the inclosed draught. With respect 
to the principle of indemnification I have before stated to 
your Excellency that His Majesty in asserting His right on 
that subject as resulting from the unprovoked aggression of 
France admits in tlie most express manner the right of 
Spain founded on the same rule of equity and reason. His 
Majesty even authorizes you to assure the court of Madrid 
of his sincere disposition to co-operate with that court as 
far as circumstances will permit in the attainment of such 
objects as His Catholic Majesty may have in view for that 
purpose. And His Majesty will receive with satisfaction and 
return with openness any confidence which the King of 
Spain may be disposed to place in His Majesty on that sub- 
ject. Nothing could be more pleasing to His Majesty than 
to see the union and cordiality which has subsisted between 
the naval and military forces of the two Crowns on the oc- 
casion of the late event of Toulon. His Majesty flatters 
himself that the result of that transaction must lead to 
establishing a still more intimate union between the two 



73 

courts as well as among those who are respectively employed 
by them. — it is obviously to be desired that the combined 
forces of the powers engaged in the war against France 
should be enabled to profit of further openings and to make 
Toulon a center of operations which may extend themselves 
as far as possible in the South of France where so much dis- 
position exists to favour the cause of monarchy". On Oct. 30 
St Helens answered ^"Alcudia has acquainted me verbally 
that His Majesty's intended Declaration to the French Na- 
tion has been read by His Catholic Majesty with much sat- 
isfaction" The Spanish were preparing a similar declaration. 
On Nov. 8 St. Helens wrote further that the declaration of 
Spain was quite satisfactory and corresponded with the Eng- 
lish. As to the indemnification; ^"Your Lordship will 
observe that the Duke de la Alcudia's Letter admits and 
recognizes the justice of that Claim in the fullest and most 
explicite terms so that a discussion of the details of that sub- 
ject may now be brought forward whenever circumstances 
may render such a measure advisable." The following is an 
extract from Alcudia's Letter. ^ "With respect to the point 
of indemnity it appears to the King to be just that England 
should demand it for the expenses of the war which the 
French themselves have declared and His Majesty would 
contribute so far as he may be able to its being realized, 
at the same time that His Majesty claims the rights which 
in like manner belong to him upon the self-same ground, 
being well assured that both sovereigns will co-operate 
with mutual good faith in forwarding the just views 
which each of them may propose to himself on the point 
in question." 

Alcuda stated also that the Spanish King was quite satis- 
fied with the declaration. On Nov. 30 Grenville wrote to 
St. Helens^ "Monsieur del Campo having communicated to 
me the draughts of the'proposed declaration to be published, 

1 Record Office. 



74 

by the court of Madrid I assured him in general terms of 
the King's approbation of that paper and your Excellency 
will not fail to express the same sentiments to the Duke of 
Alcudia. It has however not escaped the attention of this 
court that while in a letter written to you as well as in 
other communications between the two governments the 
principle of indemnity is not only recognized by the court 
of Madrid but it is even insisted upon as applicable to the 
situation of Spain no notice is taken of any views of this 
nature in the declaration which is to be addressed to the 
people of France. Whatever may be the real views of Spain 
in this respect it seems very desirable that the Spanish Gov- 
ernment should if possible be brought' to enter into some ex- 
planation of this kind on that important and delicate point. 
— With respect to the indemnity of Spain, your Excellency 
will take an early opportunity to enter into some explana- 
tion with tiie Duke of Alcudia on this subject and you will 
endeavor to convey to him in a general manner such as may 
not excite jealously Ilis Majesty's wish that in the result of 
the war the Spanish indemnity may be acquired on the 
frontier of France, by which means Spain would obtain a 
great and valuable accession of strength, particularly as to 
means of defense and would no longer be exposed to the in- 
vasion of France and continue thereby in some degree de- 
pendent on that Country. Your Excellency's ability and 
experience will suggest to you the means of placing this 
proposal in its most favorable lights and of supporting 
it by the arguments the most likel}' to make impression. 
In asking this explanation and in urging this proposal it 
will be proper that 3'^our Excellency should avow, on His 
Majesty's part, that the indemnity to this country can be 
found only in the French Possessions out of Europe, and 
you will therefore employ all your attention to convince the 
Spanish minister how little cause of jealousy to the Court of 
Spain arises from such acquisition, the immense territorial 
possessions of Spain in America are such as to furnish ample 



75 

scope for the exertions of all the industry, capital and skill 
which Spain can employ and any acquisitions particularly 
in the Leeward Islands may truly he stated as being much 
less desirable to Her than to any other of the European Na- 
tions. His Majesty conceives therefore and you will urge it 
as a proposal to the Spanish Ministers that both courts may 
with advantage further the views of each other in the points 
above mentioned. His Majesty by exerting His influence at 
the peace as far as circumstances will then admit, for pro- 
curing to Spain a valuable accession of territory on the fron- 
tier of France; and the Court of Spain by favoring in the 
like manner His Majesty's views of acquisition in the Lee- 
ward Islands. With respect to St. Domingo it is conceived 
that the views of Spain may not unreasonably be turned to 
that Quarter, and altho' the small advantage which Spain 
actually derives from the part of that Island now in His 
possession might seem to afford a sufficient reason against 
Her looking to further acquisition there, yet it is probable 
that views of that sort are in fact entertained both by the 
hope of advantage and also as a means of deriving security 
against the dangers with which the Spanish colonies are 
menaced from the establishment of the principles on which 
the French have latel}^ acted in the West Indies, and partic- 
ularly in St. Domingo. You will be aware that His Majes- 
ty's views also are in part directed towards that island, but 
it is by no means conceivable that these projects entertained 
by the two Courts are incompatible with each other. The 
extent of that Island and the distance of the Spanish Quar- 
•ters from the parts nearest to Jamaica leaving full scope for 
arrangements being taken in concert respecting this Island 
such as may be mutually beneficial to both Countries. It is 
not the King's pleasure that you should actually propose 
any precise plan for this purpose or indeed any positive 
agreement with respect to the other objects of indemnifica- 
tion above mentioned, but it is judged to be extreemely im- 
portant for His Majesty's service that your Excellency should 



76 

without dela}'^ enter into explanations on these points with 
the Spanish government, and endeavour to learn to what ex- 
tent the Court of Madrid would be disposed to enter into en- 
gagements with Plis Majesty on the principles already laid 
down, and that you should transmit to me an account of the 
result of your conferences on this subject in oi-der that a 
judgment may be formed of the best manner of bringing 
forward those discussions which the situation of Two Courts 
in the present moment seems to render indispensable". 

In another letter of the same date Grenville wrote : " With 
respect to the political considerations with which this busi- 
ness is connected, I have in my other dispatch of this date 
stated to you at large the sentiments and views of His Maj- 
esty as to the general State of affairs, but I think it right in 
this place to give Your Excellency the fullest authority for 
entering into unreserved Explanations with the Spanish 
Government on the subject of Toulon. His Majesty has in 
no case any view respecting that place different from that 
which has already been avowed in His name: That at the 
Conclusion of Peace that Port should be restored to the 
Crown of France, and that in the Interval it should serve 
in His Majesty's Hands as a means of carrying on the war, 
and as a Pledge of indemnity to Him and His allies, in- 
cluding in that Description the Crown of Spain whose claim 
to Indemnity His Majesty has already distinctly avowed."^ 
Before its publication the declaration had also been com- 
municated to the Sardinian Court, "as additional proof of 
confidence". 

On November 20 the declaration was published at Tou- 
lon. Elliot wrote November 23. In regard to the ships ^" the 
words "out ete rendus " appeared to give a little uneasi- 
ness to one or two members of the deputation as it conveyed 
something mortifying to their national spirit. I therefore 
substituted the word " con fies", which gave entire satisfac- 

^ These lines state clearly England's intentions at Toulon. 

2 Record Office. Commissioners to Toulon 1793. Hood, Elliot, O'Hara. 



77 

tion and is at the same time consonant with the truth ". 

It is hoped that tlie foregoing extracts have given a clear 
idea of the circumstances under which this declaration arose. 
It may be regarded as the official statement of England's in- 
tentions in the beginning of the War of the First Coalition, 
As the fortunate termination of this war was regarded as 
near at hand, this declaration was to form a preliminary 
basis for the peace negotiations. Austria and Spain had 
agreed to it. It was not communicated to Prussia. It was 
Pitt who really framed the declaration, and his idea was to 
treat with any kind of a stable government in France. Her 
internal affairs as long as she remained quiet were a minor 
consideration. The "indemnification" was the main object 
in London as also in Vienna and Madrid. On October 5 
Pitt wrote to Grenville ^ " We can treat with any form of 
regular government if it be solidly established". Austria, 
however, was somewhat concerned as to the internal govern- 
ment of France, and it was out of consideration for her that 
England declared for hereditary monarchy. This difference 
in the drafts of the declaration had been noticed by Elliot, 
who wrote to Secretary Dundas on October 18 : ^" The de- 
claration as at last settled by you and Pitt differs from the 
last draft as to the following words, " Quand la paix sera 
faite (et Sa Majeste declare par la presente qu'elle sera prete a 
la faire aussitot qu'un gouvernement regulier sera 6tabli en 
France)". The words in the draft as last settled are " When- 
ever the Hereditary Monarchy of France shall be restored 
& a Treaty of Peace concluded ". 

The English Government has been reproached for not 
making this declaration agree entirely with the proclama- 
tion of Lord Hood, and with his understanding with the peo- 
ple of Toulon. In the first place, Hood acted without positive 
instructions, and more or less on his own responsibility ; 
again, Toulon was not at that moment in a condition to give 

1 Mss. Fortesque. 

2 Commissioners to Toulon. 



78 

the people a right to expect England, or any nation, to ac- 
cept their terms unconditionally. Hood might possibly have 
avoided the phrase " the Constitution of 89 "; but the fact that 
he did not was not sufficient reason for the English to with- 
draw from the city, rather than commit tliemselves to a form 
of government which might have made a future peace im- 
possible. England's object was to allow such latitude in this 
res[)ect as to win over the greatest number of the inhabitants 
of France. "A stable form of government" was Pitt's idea, 
but it was finally agreed to insist upon " hereditary mon- 
archy ", 

Althougli England had now come to a definite under- 
standing with her allies Austria and Spain, there were still a 
number of questions pending between the different Courts; 
(juestions which excited jealousy and distrust, and thereby 
prevented combined action. Had the Allies put as much 
thought into their military operations as is found in their 
diplomatic negotiations, this vast scheme of indemnification 
might have been realized ; but at Toulon, as elsewhere, the 
reckless Repubhcan army, directed by a few men of genius, 
above all by Napoleon, proved more than equal to the dis- 
united Allies. Three disputed questions preoccupied the 
courts at London and Madrid. First, were the Spanish to be 
on an equality with the English in the Government of Tou- 
lon? Second, what was to become of the French ships in 
case tiie Allies were forced to retire? Third, were the broth- 
ers of the late King to be permitted to enter the city in an 
official capacity, or at all? Finally, the question of the Aus- 
trian reinforcements, which were promised but failed to ar- 
rive, became a serious one between the courts of London and 
Vienna. The first stages of the dispute between England and 
Spain as to the command at Toulon have already been men- 
tioned, and will be further spoken of in connection with the 
questions of the French princes, and of the fleet. 



79 



CHAPTER II. 

Question op the French Princes — End op Dispute as to 

authority at toulon question op the emigrants 

— The Austrian reinforcements. 

Quite early the English government received intimation 
that the French Princes wished to go to Toulon. On October 
2 St. Helens wrote ^ " The Agents of the French Princes are 
extremely desirous to obtain permission for Monsieur to re- 
pair immediately to Toulon, and I am afraid that the Span- 
ish Minister has given but too much encouragement to this 
idea although I have written to engage him to lay it aside, 
at least for the present". On October 18 the Spanish Minis- 
ter in London, Marquis del Campo, wrote to Grenville, and 
speaking of the affair of Toulon as a ^ " nouveau chemin pour 
parvenir au grand but de calmer les troubles qui agitent et 
dechirent la France", and as " ce grand point d'appui pour 
regenererla monarchic francaise", claimed that England and 
Spain "se trouvent dans I'obligation de proportionner tout 
soutien ettoute aide sinon a son captif monarque Louis XVII, 
au moins a celui qui se trouve a meme de representer sa 
Personne". — "Les pretentions de I'Oncle du Roy doivent 
par consequent etre regardees comme justes". — "II faut 
qu'il soit reconnu a Toulon en qualite de Regent de France. 
Ce Prince se trouvant sur le lieu — pourra agir d'une ma- 
ni^re active, augmenter le parti du Roy, s'attirer les esprits 
encore vacillants et contribuer personelle et efhcacement a 
voir realiser les intentions des Puissances. — Par ce moyen 
nos deux souverains auront la gloire d'avoir pose les pre- 
miers fondemens de la Paix dans le Royaume en 6tablissant 
dans la dite ville le plus proche Parent de son monarque 
legitime: celui-ci benira ^ternellement les auteurs de son 
bonheur et les deux puissances allies auront encore la satis- 

1 Record Office. 

2 Record Office. St. Helens' papers. 



80 

faction d'avoir triomplie par sa puissance et sa justice de 
tous les efforts de I'iniquite. — C'est par les ordres express de 
ma Courque j'ai I'honneurdetransmettre a V. Exce. ces con- 
siderations — Le Roy mon maitre se flatto de trouver en elle 
(Sa M. Britannique) la meme man lore de pcnser et les 
memes dispositions a soutenir Monsieur dans Toulon, favor- 
isant de toutes les manieres possibles son etablissement dans 
la dite ville, et ses progres dans cette partie de la France". 
It may be readily seen that del Campo's arguments would 
not appeal to the English government. On October 22 
Gren ville wrote to St. Helens " It is by no means part of 
Ilis Majesty's plan to exclude tiie late King's brother from 
taking such share in the final arrangement of that business 
(the internal affairs of France) as even in the intermediate 
measures leading to it as their situation and events which 
may arise in the interior of France may hereafter point out. 
But when the circumstances which have attended the sur- 
render of Toulon are taken into consideration it must surely 
be felt that the admitting the French Princes into that Port 
is a step leading to the most material and important conse- 
quences, and which cannot be taken without mature delib- 
eration. His Majesty is by no means an advocate of the 
Constitution of 1789 and is on the contrary jjersuaded that 
no persons sincerely wishing the restoration of Monarchy in 
France can ultimately wish that it should rest on so precari- 
ous and insecure a footing. But it must not be forgotten 
that the people of Toulon have declared for Monarchy as 
established by that Constitution, and in consequence of that 
declaration put themselves under the King's protection; 
that under that Constitution as finally settled, the Comte de 
Provence has no absolute claim to the Regency nor can the 
office of Lieutenant-General be conferred on the Comte 
d'Artois. And that in general the situation of the French 
Princes and the conduct, principles and sui:)posed resent- 
ments of the persons by whom Ihey are surrounded cannot 



81 

be considered as likely in the present moment to conciliate 
the minds of the inhabitants of that place. There is besides 
an essential and necessary condition before the King can 
consent to join His measures to those of the French Princes 
to the degree that would be done by admitting them into 
Toulon. It is indispensable that they should enter into pre- 
vious explanation respecting the principle of pacification 
and that they should recognize the justice of the claim of 
His Majesty and His Allies, including the Catholic King to 
a fair indemnification for the risques, expenses and losses of 
a war commenced by the unjust aggression of France. His 
Majesty by no means wishes the Court of Madrid to under- 
stand this communication as meant to operate as a final bar 
to the idea of employing the French Princes in France and 
particularily in the South. But His Majesty expects that no 
step towards this important determination should be taken, 
but in consert, and He thinks it absolutely necessary to ascer- 
tain beforehand, first whether the appearance of the Princes 
at Toulon would in fact be advantageous or prejudicial to 
the common interests in the present moment. Secondly 
whether the Princes themselves are disposed to act reason- 
ably and according to the exigencies of the moment relative 
to the interior of France ; whether they and those who advise 
them are sensible of the necessity of laying aside animosities 
and resentments of waving inadmissable claims, and of sub- 
mitting to be guided in their conduct by those powers whose 
support they ask, and lastly whether they are ready to enter 
into full and unequivocal explanation respecting the princi- 
ples of indemnification above stated ". It is interesting to 
compare this communication, inspired by Pitt, with the 
foregoing sentimental note from Del Campo. 

The English had taken prompt and decided measures to 
prevent the Spaniards from sharing their authority at Tou- 
lon, and they were naturally determined not to allow Mon- 
sieur to procede to that place as regent. On October 22, the 

2192—6 



82 

same day as the foregoing communication was sent to Lord 
St. Helens, instructions' were forwarded to Francis Drake, 
(the English representative at Genoa, where Monsieur was 
supposed to go previous to embarking for Toulon,) to in- 
form Monsieur of the impossibility of his proceeding to 
Toulon; of "the inconvenience which would result, both per- 
sonally to that prince, and also to the general interests from 
any eclat taking place on this subject"; and also of the ques- 
tion of its being "agreeable to the inhabitants of Toulon". 
Further if Monsieur insisted, Drake was to inform the Com- 
missioners at Toulon that they were not authorized to per- 
mit him to enter without having first received instructions 

from His Majesty "but you (Drake) will use every 

endeavour in your [)ower by respectful and conciliatory rep- 
resentations, to prevent recourse being had to this extrem- 
ity, and you will endeavour to persuade the ministers of the 
allied powers at Genoa to support you in these representa- 
tions". Meanwhile Monsieur, being in secret communication 
with Spain, took the matter into his own hands, and in- 
formed the English government through the Due d'Har- 
court, the representative of the Princes in London, of his 
decision to proceed to Toulon to assume the duties of regent. 
The English court was determined to prohibit him. On No- 
vember 30. instructions' were sent to the Commissioners at 
Toulon not to admit him. On the same day orders were 
hurried to John Trevor in Turin to stop Monsieur as he 
passed through the city: to say to His Sardinian Majesty 
that it is impossible for Monsieur to go there without the 
approbation of the King of Great Britain.-^ " If Monsieur 
should have already quitted Turin previous to your receiv- 
ing this despatch you will urge the King of Sardinia to send 
after him some proper person for the purpose of making 
these representations both in the King's name and in that 

1 Record Office. Published by Cottin. 

2 Commissioners to Toulon. Record Office. 
^ Foreign Office, Sardinia. Record Office. 



83 

of the King of Sardinia and in order if possible to prevent 
the eclat which must arise from Monsieurs persisting in His 
project and being exposed to a public refusal on the part of 
His Majesty's officers at Toulon". Long and precise instruc- 
tions were sent to St. Helens, by Grenville. on November 30.' 
"With respect to the great question of a recognition of the 
authority of Monsieur as Regent, it seems to depend in a 
great degree upon the result of discussions of the nature al- 
ready mentioned and also upon the course of events to 
which the war may give rise. His Majesty is by no means 
adverse to this recognition but in order that it should be 
rendered advantageous to the common cause it must be 
combined both with circumstances in the interior of France 
favorable to it, and also with such explanations on the part 
of the Princes as may shew that their views are not in op- 
position to those of the principal Powers of Europe, whose 
aid they seek, and that they are willing rather to listen to 
the advice of those Powers and to yield to the necessity of 
the existing circumstances than to give scope to the passions 
and prejudices of those by whom they are surrounded. Soon 
after the note on this subject was presented to me by Mon- 
sieur Del Campo an application was received from the 
Comted'Artois praying His Majesty's assistance to transport 
himself into Brittany, and to maintain himself there. The 
answer . . . was favourable, tho' not conclusive. We ex- 
pressing an inclination on His Majesty's part to comply with 
the request, but stating the necessity of previous explana- 
tion . .... You will communicate these particulars to the 
Court of Madrid as forming the answer to the proposal made 
by that Government on the subject of Monsieur, and as 
manifesting the King's disposition to concur with His Cath- 
olic Majesty by every means in His Power for the promotion 
of those salutary objects which the two courts have in view." 
In another letter of the same date Gren ville wrote:' 

^ Record Office. 



84 

" In addition to wliat I have already written to 3'our Ex- 
cellency on the suhject of Toulon I am now to mention a 
circumstance respecting that place which his Majesty has 
seen with much concern. A letter for his Majesty from the 
Comte de Provence was yesterday delivered to me by the 
duke d'Harcourt. By the copy which I enclose to your 
Excellency of this letter you will see that in it, the Comte de 
Provence announces to the King, as a resolution already 
taken, His design of going to Toulon, and that he takes upon 
himself to say that he goes there to exercise the Functions 
of Regent, and I am informed that lie is actually set out 
upon this journey. If no other considerations had prevailed, 
the respect due to His Majesty required that no stops should 
be taken by Monsieur with regard to Toulon, without first 
submitting it to His Majesty's consideration & decision. The 
Question whether the Comte de Provence should go thereat 
all, in the present moment, is one worthy of much delibera- 
tion. His going there as regent, while the place is in its 
present situation, is liable to still more question ; but attempt- 
ing to take these steps without the King's previous consent 
wdiile the Port and Town of Toulon are held by His Maj- 
esty and occupied by His Forces, cannot in any manner be 
permitted. It is proper that I should not conceal from Y. 
Exy. the suspicion entertained here that this step has been 
secretly suggested or at least encouraged by the Court of 
Spain, as one, the success of which would tend to increase 
their influence in Toulon. The Possibility of this only in- 
creases the necessity of your holding a firm and decided 
language both as to the absolute command to be exercised 
at Toulon by Governor O'Hara, as also to this particular 
Point of Monsieur's admission there. Information having 
been, some time since, received which seemed to make it 
not improbable that Monsieur would take the step, which 
he has now announced, provisional orders were put to his 
Majesty's Officers at Toulon directing them not to admit of 
Monsieur's coming there, without His Majesty's previous con- 



85 

sent being signified to them, and measures were taken to 
prevent the eclat which a public demand and refusal on 
this subject might produce, by previously apprising Monsieur 
of the embarrassment to which such an event would expose 
him. I have now taken further steps for this purpose, but 
as they may fail in their effect I have received the King's 
orders expressly to instruct Y. Exy. to represent, in the 
strongest terms, to the Spanish government the disrespectful 
conduct of Monsieur toward His Majesty on this occasion, 
and to announce to them the orders which His Majesty has 
thought proper in consequence of it, to send to Gov. O'Hara 
positively prohibiting him from suffering Monsieur to enter 
Toulon. In your communication on this subject you will not 
appear to believe that the Spanish government could be 
in any way a party to this inconsiderate and improper step 
on the part of Monsieur, But you will remark that this 
instance of disrespect towards the King obliges him to sus- 
pend the discussions which he had been willing to open 
with Monsieur, respecting- the recognition of His claim to 
the Regency of France, according to the desire which had 
been expressed by the Court of Madrid. You may however 
add that His Majesty on being informed that Monsieur has 
abandoned his present Project and is sensible of the impro- 
priety of his conduct towards His Majesty, will be ready to 
resume the consideration of that Point on the grounds which 
I have stated to you at large in my other letter of this day." 

Before this time the agents of the Princes were active in 
Toulon also, and apparantly in understanding with the 
Spaniards. On Nov. 23 the Comity de Surveillance and the 
Sections of Toulon announced to Elliot their desire for the 
restoration of the ancient form of government, for the ac- 
knowledgment of Monsieur as Regent, and for the immedi- 
ate exercise of his authority in Toulon. I shall give here the 
original reports relating to this question. The first is a letter 
from Elliot to Henry Dundas; ^ dated Toulon Nov. 24. — "I 

1 Record Ofi&ce. 



86 

have received the enclosed paper from the Comity de Sur- 
veillance and the sections of Toulon, by which 3'ou will 
see how decided the public mind is at Toulon for the res- 
toration of their ancient government. The warmth with 
which they desire the acknowledgment of the Regent and 
the immediate exercise of his authority here, without touch- 
ing at all on the constitution of 1789, confirmes extremely 
the Idea I had formed of their dispositions. It is worthy of 
remark that the sections are the most popular assemblies 
that can be conceived, being composed without distinction 
of all inhabitants who think proper to attend them. — I 
confess that every view I have on the subject inclines me 
strongly to think that the acknowledgment of the Regent 
by all the combined Powers is a measure highly desirable. 
The interests of the monarchy which (tiiough His Majesty 
is not ultimatel}^ pledged to that principle) we have in the 
meanwhile avowedly espoused, and the restoration of which, 
is infinitely the most important object of the war, would 
surely be much promoted by the advantage of an osten- 
sible and legitimate representation of the royal authority. 
I am persuaded it would detacl) from us no support on 
which we can depend, and it would add a greater accession 
of numbers and zeal to the service. It is a measure so likely 
to work on the imagination of Frenchman that one can not 
help considering it as at least possible, that a general and 
sudden turn might be given to the afifairs of France by this 
single change in our system. I am aware that other objects 
may justly, and perhaps must in point of policy, as well as 
of fidelity to our allies, be taken into the consideration of 
this subject and that on these accounts, this resolution can 
not be adopted otherwise than in consequence of a previous 
discusion with the Princes, and by a general concert with 
the combined Powers. I am therefore glad to hear that the 
first steps seem to have been taken, and considering that one 
of our allies, the court of Spain, has already declared its 
sentiments, I flatter myself with the hope of the negotiation 



87 

being brought to an early and favorable conclusion — the 
more I learn of the true nature of the counter-revolutionary 
spirit in France, the more I am inclined to the opinion, I 
have taken the libert}'^ of dehvering, and the more essential 
I think it to our success that the measure should be adopted. 
With regard to the application made to me by the sections 
of Toulon on this subject, I shall be able to prevent their 
carrying any measure into execution until I have the honor 
of receiving His Majesty's commands. I can not say that I 
see any local inconvenience in the admission of the Regent 
into Toulon, and the establishment of his authority here, 
and it might possibly produce a good effect in the adjacent 
countr}^ and even in the besieging Army, at the same time 
it must be observed that by such a condescension His Maj- 
esty would perform his engagements for the redelivery of 
Toulon earlier than can be claimed by the terms of the 
convention : and possibly some advantage might be lost in 
treating for the terms of peace. But if anything were gained 
by it, towards accelerating the settlement of France, I confess, 
I should think all disadvantages on other points sufficiently 
compensated. There is too much reason to fear that Austria 
is more indifferent to the main object of the war, and more 
attached to points of her own, than she professes to be. 
Prussia we know is not to be depended on, and if Great 
Britain does not throw her whole weight into the scale of a 
more enlarged and sounder policy, there is great reason to 
fear for the issue of this contest." 

Elliot enclosed the following: Answer of the Commis- 
sioners at Toulon to the comity de surveillance respecting 
the Regent.^ 27th of Nov. " Nous avons recu avec beau- 
coup d'interet la communication qui nous a 6t6 faite de 
vos deliberations et de celles des sections de Toulon, rela- 
tivement a la Regence. Nous y reconnaissons avec le plus 
grand plaisir des sentiments dignes a la fois du patriotisme 
et de la sagesse de cette ville respectable. Nous partageons 

1 Record Office. 



avec elle non seulement le desir de voir renaitre I'ordre sous 
un gouveriiment fbnd6 sur des bons principes, non seule- 
ment les sentiments de loyaute et d'attachment pour votre 
jeuue et infortun^ mouarche, mais aussi ceux du respect et 
de la veneration, pour la famille de vos rois, et surtout pour 
I'auguste personnage qui est 1' object de vos veux. Nous 
nous trouvons neanmoins dans Timpossibilit^ de concourir 
imm6diatement a I'accomplissement de vous souhaits et 
nous desirous vous I'aire part des obstacles qui s'}'' opposeut. 
La Regence de la France interesse I'Europe entiere et sur- 
tout les Puissances coalis^es, puisque dans le circonstances 
actuelles I'autorite du Regent comme celle du trone merae 
ne pent etre realis6e que par leur secours et par des efforts 
immense de leur part. Get object done doit de toute neces- 
site, comme par toutes les obligations taute de la saine poli- 
tique que des sentiments lionnetes (les seuls qui puissent 
animer ces Princes illustres) etre traito directement avec les 
cours qui combattent les ennemis de votre Roy. Une affaire 
aussi importante et qui embrasse des relations politiques 
aussi etendues et aussi combinees ne peut etre terminee 
avec effet ni peututre meme tentee avec avantage par une 
seule ville respectable a la verite u toutes sortes de titres, 
mais pour le moment non seulement isolee du reste de la 
France, mais ayant contracte pour 1' interet du royaume, 
comme pour son propre salut, des relations recentes et 
sacr^es avec une autre puissance. II est evident dans tous 
les cas que les ministres de sa Majeste Britannique doivent 
etre absolument incompetens u decider sur ces objets sans 
avoir specialement consults leur cour et obtenu des pouvoirs 
directs. Tout ce qu' ils pourront faire pour seconder le z^le 
louable des habitans de Toulon, est de soumettre sans delai 
cette matiere interessante a la sagesse et aux lumieres de 
Sa Majeste et d'attendre ses ordres. Jusqu'alors ne nous 
trouvant point autorises a compromettre sa Majeste sur la 
question de la Regence, nous pouvons encore moins con- 
sentir a la proposition qui a 6t6 faite d'appeller Monsieur le 



89 

Comte de Provence a Toulon, pour y exercer les fonctions 
de Regent parce que ce serait destituer Sa Majeste Britan- 
nique avant I'epoque stipule de 1' autorite qui lui a et6 
derniferement confine h Toulon. Ces raisons ne nous obligent 
cependant point de nous opposer au desir que pourraient 
avoir les habitans de cette ville de parter leurs hommages 
aux pieds de ce Prince et de lui exprimer tous les voeux 
que doivent inspirer ses vertus personelles ou que peuvent 
r^clamer les droits de sa naissance. 

A Toulon ce 27 de Novembre 1793. Sign§; Hood, Elliot, 
O'Hara. 

Elliot commented on this answer in another letter to Henry 
Dundas, on the same day: "We have endeavoured to con- 
form ourselves to the spirit of His Majesty's commands as 
conveyed in your despatch of the 22 of October. . . 
But although we have been careful not to commit His 
Majesty on the question and have positively refused to ad- 
mit the Princes into Toulon, without His Majesty's orders 
we did not think it necessary to prevent the inhabitants 
from paying to him any compliment they thought fit, or 
acknowledging in their own name his right to the Regency. 
We thought it might even be advantageous that they should 
execute that part of their intentions because in the first 
place it will unite great numbers of them in a measure in 
which the constitution of 1789 is not mentioned, and in 
the next place, will afford security for their steadiness, as it 
renders their case more desperate with the convention."^ 

The retreat of the Allies from Toulon brought this ques- 
tion to an end. The English whose main object in the war 
was the " indemnification " regarded a stable form of gov- 
ernment as the necessary condition for the obtaining, as 
well as for the peaceful enjoyment of, this indemnification. 
Toulon they intended to hold as security for it. The in- 
terests of the French monarchy for which England had 
declared principally out of consideration for Austria, and 

1 These three communications just given are all from the Record Office. 



90 

perhaps for her other Allies, were not thought of as suffi- 
ciently important to justify iier sacrificing licr authority at 
Toulon by the admission of Monsieur. Again, the French 
fleet was to be considered. Although nowhere mentioned, it 
is certain that the English were conscious of the fact that 
by the admission of Monsieur, the ships also would be under 
his command and consequently neither come into English 
hands nor even be destroyed. The removal of the fleet 
formed part of England's plan for suprcmac}' in the Medi- 
terranean. Spain, however, beside her natural inclination 
to aid the French princes from dynastic interests, was not 
at all adverse to the idea of the English authority at 
Toulon being superceded, more especially as her own influ- 
ence would be far greater with tlie Regent than with the 
English. The Sardinian Court to which the Princes had also 
applied, was at this time quite subject to the interests of 
England. Neither from Hood's declaration which recognized 
the constitution of 89, nor from the King's declaration 
which declared for hereditary monarchy, was England 
under any binding moral obligation to recognize Monsieur 
as Regent. As a political move it is hard to say what would 
have been the result. In all probability Monsieur would 
have arrived too late to have had any material influence 
upon the affairs of Toulon. 

The dispute as to the division of authority always re- 
mained an unsettled one. In the beginning of November 
St. Helens advised Alcudia to wait until he (St. Helens) re- 
ceived news from England and meanwhile that both Gen- 
erals should command. On November 8 St. Helens wrote to 
Grenville: ^"The Duke de la Alcudia has nominated M, 
Ocarez (who was charge d'affaires in France, at the time of 
the death of the late King) to reside at Toulon as Plenipo- 
tentiary from this court; an appointment which seems to 
have been created in imitation of that of Sir Gilbert Elliot, 
however I do not find that he is invested with any similar 

1 Record Office 



91 

Commission, his instructions being merely to correspond 
regularly with the Department of the first secretary of State." 
On November 13. St. Helens wrote further: ^ that the dis- 
pute between the admirals continued, but that Hood assured 
him that it would not interfere with the cause, " O'Hara and 
Gravina waving entirely the Question relative to the chief 
Command:"— on November 27, that the differences were 
arranged and that O'Hara was to have the chief command 
of the combined forces on shore and Gravina the govern- 
ment of the city. Hood however was not in a very concilia- 
tory mood especially as he had a very low opinion of the 
Spanish. As early as October 11 he wrote to Trevor '" I 
must mention to you in confidence that no dependence can 
be placed in the Spanish or Neopolitians, they cannot be left 
anywhere to themselves." On November 20 Elliot wrote to 
St. Helens, complaining of the quality of the Spanish sol- 
diers; ^" It is his (O'Hara' s) opinion, and I believe Lord 
Hood's, that if you can by any means obtain better troops, 
or if not, if you can even withdraw those that are here you 
will render a service to the Garrison If any dis- 
aster should take place here it will become a very serious 
question, in what manner the French ships should be dis- 
posed of. In that event if Spain in persuance of their present 
notions of equality should set up any claim of participation 
in the possession of those ships our measures will be ex- 
posed to great Embarrassement. I need say no more to satisfy 
your Lordship of the Importance of this matter and we leave 
it with great confidence in your hands". This shows con- 
clusively that even Elliot, who falsely regarded the restora- 
tion of monarchy as the principal object of the war, and who 
was in favor of recognizing Monsieur as Regent, had no in- 
tention of admiting any " equality ", in fact any share, in 
the distribution of the French ships. In such a state of af- 
fairs a more serious turn in the old dispute seem ed inevita- 

1 Record Office. 

2 Foreign Office. Sardinia 1793. R. O, 

3 Commissioners to Toulon 1793. R. O. 



92 

ble; but the position of the Allies liaving become gradually 
quite precarious, the political questions fell into the back- 
ground. Even before November 30, the English more than 
doubted the strength of their liold on the town. On Nov. 
23 Elliot wrote to Dundas ^ " It seems to me that the posses- 
sion of this place is precarious, and that every day is criti- 
cal ": the next day to Lady Elliot, "O.Hara thinks as ill as 
possible of this business as it now stands; but reinforce- 
ments may be expected before the worst may happen. Lord 
Hood is over confident and will never admit the slighest 
doubt of our keeping the place." " 

The English had changed their opinion on another ques- 
tion also. On Oct 19. Mulgrave wrote to Trevor" "You 
must not send us one emigre of any sort; they would be a 
nuisance, they are all so various and so violent in their 
principles of gouvernment whether for despotism, Constitu- 
tion or Republic, that we should be distracted with their 
quarrels and they are so assuming, forward, dictatorial and 
full of complaints, that no business could go on with them. 
Lord Hood is adverse to receiving any of them. You must 
therefore put them off as civilly as you can." A little more 
tlian a month later Elliot informed Dundas'* that they had 
sent to Italy for twenty to eighty emigrant officers, and on 
December 8,'' Hood, Elliot and Dundas informed the emi- 
grants that they might serve under their own officers, but 
subject to the Government of Toulon. Not many were to 
serve as officers, but principally as private soldiers which 
"1' amour de la Pa trie spait coucilier avec I'honneur de la 
noblesse Franpaise". They were also directed to ask the ap- 
probation of the Princes as that would help the cause. On 
Dec. 18. Trevor wrote to Grenville,'^ "The emigrants wait 

^ Commissioners to Toulon. R. O. 

2 Life of Elliot, ]Miuto. 

^ Sardinia, Foreign Office, R. O. 

* Letter Nov. 27tli. Commissioners to Toulon. 

5 Elliot to Trevor. Dec. 8. Foreign Office. Sardinia. R. O. 

" Foreig-n Office. Sardinia. R. O. 



93 

for His Royal Highness orders before they determine upon 
accepting our offers of receiving them at Toulon. I cannot 
doubt but that he will tell them to go." The emigrants were 
still negotiating in Switzerland when Bonaparte's batteries 
had driven the Allies from Toulon. On Dec. 1. Elliot wrote 
to Dundas:^ "Nothing very imjDortant has occured in the 
political affairs of this place and indeed that department is 
naturally rather in the background, while our situation is so 
critical". This marks the end of the dispute between the two 
nations in the city itself. Other thoughts occupy their atten- 
tion. Elliot wrote Dec. 9.^ "I consider our possession of this 
place very precarious, which is not surprising, considering 
that I have heard that opinion from every military man of 
rank since I came here": On Dec. 12 "General Dun- 
das is in very low spirits and seems to dispond more than 
ever". The tone of the two courts, especially of the Spanish, 
was far from being conciliatory. The two following cum- 
munications show that the disputed question bade fair to 
become insoluble. The fall of Toulon rendered a solution 
unnecessary. 

Grenville to St. Helens. Whitehall. Dec. 1. "The original 
tenor as well as the particular expressions of Monsieur Del 
Campo's late notes, are so entirely inconsistent with the rela- 
tions in which the two courts have been placed with respect 
to each other by the late negotiations and by the circum- 
stances which still exist that it is thought absolutely neces- 
sary that Your Excellency should ascertain whether the form 
and language of those notes were prescribed to him by his 
court, or whether they arise solely from ill disposition to- 
wards this country of which he lias given such repeated 
proofs. And if the latter should be found to be the case Your 
Excellency will no doubt judge it absolutely necessary to 
adopt some proper expedient by which the Duke of Alcudia 
may be apprised how little Monsieur Del Campo's conduct 

^ Commissioners to Toulon. R. O. 

2 To Lady Elliot. life of Elliot. Minto. 



94 

appears calculated to promote union and good understand- 
ing between the two countries." 

St. Helens wrote to Grenville on Dec. 25. " But at any rate 
I think it my duty to acquaint your Lordship without Loss 
of time, that this court does not hitherto appear to be dis- 
posed to relinquish voluntarily their pretended Right to the 
perpetual nomination of the Commander in Chief of the 
combined Forces in Toulon unless it be on the evidently in- 
admissable condition, of their being allowed to remove from 
that Port and to retain under their sole Custody, the greater 
part, if not the whole, of the French fleet now lying there: 
. . . . and that they have also rendered the arrange- 
ment of this disputed point still more difficult than before 
by nominating to the command of the Spanish Troops at 
Toulon the celebrated Count O'Reilly who (not to mention 
tiie objections that might be stated against his personal char- 
acter and dispositions) is a Lieutenant General of near 30 
years standing and consequently superior in Point of senior- 
ity to any officer of that Rank in the British Army ". 

One other question which preoccupied the British cabinet 
during the entire siege was that of the Austrian reinforce- 
ments. In the rapprochement between London and Vienna 
which came about in the War of the First Coalition, and 
which had by the publication of the King's Declaration 
taken the form of an explicit policy of "indemnification", 
the Englisli court had expected the assistance of from 12 
to 15,000 Austrian troops for any offensive operations which 
might take place from the Mediterranean. On hearing of 
the surrender of Toulon, Pitt wrote to Grenville telling him 
to press the Emperor to send troops, and on Sep. 14 such 
instructions were sent to Eden. As early as Sep. 11 Eden 
informed Grenville^ that he had demanded troops from 
Thugut, who made excuses saying that they were needed on 
the Rhine, and complaining of the backwardness of Prussia. 
On Sept. 25 Eden wrote that he urged that a force should 
be sent to Toulon and Thugut replied that he would recom- 

1 Austria. Sir Morton Eden. Record Office. 



95 

mend it to His Majesty. But at the same time Eden wrote 
to Trevor telling him that the troops were coming; as if it 
had been already settled. Austria did promise the troops 
however, but under conditions. Eden wrote to Auckland^ 
"This country gives us 5000 men . . . but will not allow 
them to be employed offensively to make conquests for the 
King of Sardinia unless that Sovereign will (if any are made) 
yield them, thougli in a very inferior proportion something 
in return for the share of this court in the Novarese ". 
Tliaon de Revel says in his Memoirs; "Les troupes autrich- 
iennes qui etaient dans les garnisons de I'etat de Milan y 
etaient restees paisiblement au lieu de marcher sur Lyon,ce 
qui en eut empeche la chute et porte un coup mortel a la 
revolution. L'Angleterre demandait que les Autrichiens 
reunis aux Piedmontais chassassent les Francais du comt^ 
de Nice d'une partie de la Provence et que Ton entr'ouvrit 
une communication directe et sure avec Toulon. L'appre- 
hension de la Cour de Vienne que le Roi de Sardaigne n'eut 
des succes, s'opposa dans cette occasion comme dans toutes 
les autres a tout ce que le lien commun de la coalition con- 
seillait si forteraent. EUeesperait que si le Poi de Sardaigne 
se trouvait dans I'embarras il consentirait a lui ceder une 
partie des acquisitions faites anciennement sur I'etat de 
Milan." 

This jealousy of Sardinia, a distrust of England and a 
failing to see any tangible and immediate gain were the 
real reasons why Austria did not send the troops. The 
reasons she put forward were others.^ On Oct. 30 Eden 
wrote: ^ " In a conversation with the Austrian minister he 
repeated with some appearance of alarm the danger of their 
present situation unsupported by Prussia and the Dutch and 
their numbers reduced by repeated losses, particularly in 
the affair before Maubeuge, and asked me if in the case 

1 Correspondence of Auckland. 

2 On Nov. 4. Thugut received information from London "assez propre 
a calmer nos inquietudes sur les intentions des Anglais relativement k 
Dunkerque. " Vertrauliche Briefe von Thugut. von Vivenot, 

3 Bden to Grenville R. O. 



96 

Toulon should be found from the reinforcements already ar- 
rived there not to stand in need of the troops promised from 
hence." 

The troops were looked for at Toulon and Hood dis- 
patched Admiral Goodal to Genoa to bring them but the 
ships returned as empty as the departed. Finally however 
the English Cabinet, impatient at this delay, assumed more 
and more express terms in demanding the troops, as the fol- 
lowing instructions to Eden will show. They are dated 
Nov. 11. '"You will remonstrate in the strongest terms 
against this delay as a positive breach of faith and as likely 
to be in its consequences highly injurious to the common in- 
terests." . . . Nov. 24.' " You will therefore now admit 
of no further excuse but formally claim the immediate 
execution of the engagement and lose no time in apprizing 
me of the result." On Dec. 8 Eden replied '"I called 
on Thugut .... and in obedience to j'^our Lord- 
ship's express directions demanded, in His Majesty's 
name, an order for the immediate march of the reinforce- 
ments promised to His Majesty for the support of Toulon." 
It was not until Dec. 16. that Eden was finally able to 
assure John Trevor that ""every Difficulty is removed " and 
" that His Imperial Majesty has issued his orders for the 
immediate march of the troops for Toulon." This time the 
Austrians were undoubtedly sincere but as is seen, it was 
too late. Before this note could reach Trevor, Toulon was 
lost. The English had been over-confident at Toulon. Al- 
though Dundas, the secretary of war, had been repeatedly 
warned, he could not realize that it was possible to lose the 
place. He counted too much on the bad quality of the Re- 
publicans. As late as Dec. 27. troops were being em- 
barked at Cork for Toulon, ^ and but a few days before Pay- 
master General Lennox was sent from London.* 

1 Record Ofl&ce. 

2 Letters from Dundas. British Museum. Mss. Additional 27, 594. 

3 War Office Letter Books. Commander-in-chief. (1792-94) R. O. 

4 Admiralty Records, War Office. (1782-1794). Dec. 20. R. O. 



97 



CHAPTER III. 

News of the Fall op Toulon in Spain, France and Eng- 
land — Results of the Fall of Toulon — Fate of 
Ships at Toulon — -Role of Bonaparte — Memoires 
of Barras — Influence of the Siege on Bonaparte. 

The news of the fall of Toulon caused in republican 
France and especially in Paris, the wildest joy. On Dec. 24. 
it was announced by Barr^re in the Convention. At the same 
time he made a motion that " L'armee dirig^e contre Toulon 
a bien merits de la Patrie." The entire assembly arose with 
loud shouts of approbation. A few days later Robespierre 
began one of his long speeches with, " laissons I'Europe et 
I'histoire vanter les miracles de Toulon et pr6parons de nou- 
veaux triomphes a la liberte". The Convention decided to 
declare a general holiday and on Dec. 30. the great " fete de 
rejouissance " took place. David was ordered to prepare it. 
The entire Convention took part in the tremendous proces- 
sion. For weeks the Theaters gave popular performances 
" eh rejouissence de la reprise de Toulon," and " La prise de 
Toulon" was often read in the papers of that time as the 
title to a play which was supposed to win popular favor. 
Not only in Paris and in France, but even in America and 
in Constantinople one celebrated the fall of Toulon. As to 
the reception of the news in Spain, St. Helens wrote on Jan- 
uary 8.^ " With regard to the sensations produced here by 
the late abandonment of Toulon it seems to me that if this 
court feel any concern on that account it arises rather from 
certain collateral considerations than from their conceiving 
that event to be in itself prejudicial to the common inter- 
ests they are of the opinion that by the destruc- 
tion of the arsenal and shipping of Toulon we have secured 
all the essential advantages which the surrender of that place 
was ever likely to have afforded without the Burthen and 

1 Record Office. 
2192-7 



98 

Risk of maintaining possession of it, this seems to be like- 
wise the opinion of the public at large". Lord St. Helen's 
opinion was corroborated by the Gazetta de Madrid which 
gave the accounts of the evacuation. But from now on, an 
enmity gradually developed between England and Spain, 
and in the Declaration of War by Spain in 1796 is found 
the following passage " This ill faith became manifest in 
the most critical moment of the 1st. campagne from the 
manner in which Lord Hood treated my fleet at Toulon 
where he attended to nothing but tlie destruction of what he 
could not carry away with him." As the Spaniards were by 
no means an inactive party to the destruction referred to, 
this passage is open to some criticism ; but it shows none 
the less that the differences between the English and Span- 
ish left some impression. Later on it was even stated openly 
in London that the Spanish blew up the ships in the harbor 
of Toulon purposely to destroy the English boats. This state- 
ment is no doubt false, but it shows to what extent the ill 
feeling between the two countries went. 

In England the news was received with surprise but with 
no great amount of disappointment. The Opposition wel- 
comed it however as they hoped to use it against the gov- 
ernment. Nelson's opinion was in general the most preva- 
lent one.^ " For England the getting rid of such a place is 
a most happy event. Our money would have gone very fast. 
The quitting of Toulon by us I am satisfied is a national 
benefit". The Earl of Elgin wrote to Grenvilleon the^ "un- 
fortunate news" but added " the destroying the fleet and 
arsenal and saving the garrison are great palliatives". At 
the opening of Parliament on Jan. 21, 1794. the following 
reference is made to Toulon, in the King's speech: "the 
temporary possession of the town and post of Toulon has 
greatly distressed the operations of my enemies; and in the 
circumstances attending the evacuation of that place an im- 

i Nelson's Dispatches. 

^ Elgin to Grenville. Dec. 29. Fortesque Mss. 



99 

portant and decisive blow has been given to their naval 
power, by the distinguished conduct, abilities and spirit of my 
commanders, officers and forces both by sea and by land ". 
This was to a great extent the opinion in official circles. 
Lord Star in the address of thanks replied "Since the mem- 
orable battle of La Hogue a more brilliant enterprise had 
not been achieved than that at Toulon by Lord Hood. The 
destruction of the Arsenal and naval stores of the second sea- 
port of France was a circumstance that she could not repair 
for years. It must necessarily cripple her navy for the pres- 
ent and for years to come and prove the most fatal blow 
that was struck at the French marine". The Opposition in 
Parliament however used the affair at Toulon as an oppor- 
tunity of condemning the conduct as well as the object of 
the war. Fox was especially bitter in his criticism, while 
Pitt defended the government. On the opening of the session 
in Jan. 94. in his attack upon the government Fox referred 
frequently to Toulon. " When we have been driven from 
Toulon in a manner so afflicting if not disgraceful " . . . . 
He then pointed out the difference between the object of 
gaining "some solid advantage for ourselves, as an indem- 
nification for the expenses of the war and that of giving 
such a government to France as ministers might think it 
safe to treat with" .... "Toulon was taken by the 
British in consequence of certain conditions stipulated by 
the inhabitants. And yet even with the certainty of the 
guillotine before them these inhabitants were so unwilling 
to assist the British, that no other than an ignominious evac- 
uation could be effected. If it was right so to take it, it be- 
came a matter of indespensible duty to defend it. Toulon, 
purchased by compromise you have lost with disgrace; you 
have placed yourselves in a point of view entirely new to 
British character, you have proved yourselves neither use- 
ful as friends, nor respectable as enemies ". On May. 30. in 
speaking of the King's declaration he said ; "A declaration 
in the name of his majesty afterwards came out different 



100 

indeed from this: verbose, obscure and equivocal like the 
production of men who are afraid of saying anytliing dis- 
tinctly, who wish not their meaning to be clearly under- 
stood : that stript of all the elegant rubbish with which it 
was loaded declared only this, that the restoration of mon- 
archy without specifying what kind, was the only condition 
upon which we could treat with France". Pitt replied; "the 
right honorable gentleman proceeded to bring forward a 
charge of inconsistenc}^ from the declaration of Lord Hood 
at Toulon and that afterwards published by His Majesty, 
addressed to the people of France. These decla'-ations, I 
alSirm, are perfectly consistent. That of Lord Hood only 
promises protection to the people of Toulon, as far as he 
could grant it without specifying any particular form of 
government they chose to pledge themselves to the Consti- 
tution of 1789. The declaration of His Majesty offers pro- 
tection to all the people of France, who shall approve of an 
hereditary monarchy". Pitt was not quite honest here as he 
gave rather how he wished Hood's declaration should be 
interpreted, than how it was in reality. It will be remem- 
bered that the English government was not satisfied with it. 
The affair of Toulon remained how^ever a favourite point of 
attack for Fox, and as late as March. 95 he made allusion 
to it. 

From a military stand-point the results of the fall of Tou- 
lon were the following. First. The moral effect of the ex- 
pulsion of the combined forces of four nations from the soil 
of France was great. Second. The large army employed at 
Toulon was now free to swell the ranks of the armies of 
Alpes and of the Pyrenees ; the friends of royalty in the 
south of France had no longer a ''point d'appui" in Toulon, 
and the barbarous punishment of the rebellious city could 
not but have its effect upon other cities with similar inten- 
tions. Third. The occupation of Toulon by the Allies had 
struch a severe blow at the French navy, a very large part 
of w4iich was stationed here. It was of this fact that the 



101 

English most boasted and with which they consoled them- 
selves for the forced evacuation. Of the 31 ships of line in 
the harbor, 11 were burnt, 4 sent away with the French sea- 
men at the begining of the siege (this caused a good deal of 
criticism in England), 3 were carried off by the English and 
the rest saved, thanks to the rapid advance of the Republi- 
cans on the last two days of the siege. Of the 12 frigates, 5 
entered the service of the English, 1 was given to Sardinia, 
3 burnt and the rest saved by the Republicans. There were 
13 corvettes of which 7 went to England, 1 to Spain, 1 to 
Naples, 2 burnt and the rest saved by the Republicans. As 
is seen, the English received about all the ships. They were 
taken to be guarded for the King of France: which meant 
that the English had the use of them until the Restoration, 
20 years afterwards. She then made excuses for keeping 
those of them which were left at that time. Besides the ships, 
the yards and naval stores of all kinds were destroyed at 
Toulon; but the large guns, as well as the fortifications 
erected by the Allies themselves, could not be destroyed for 
want of time. Bonaparte rejoicing over this fact wrote on 
Dec. 24. " Toulon est plus dans le cas de se defendre aujour- 
d'hui que jamais." 

As to the historical significance of the affair of Toulon, its 
fall was one of the most important successes of the Repub- 
licans which rendered the peace of Campo Formio possible; 
its occupation by the Allies was the occasion of England's 
forming a brilliant scheme of indemnification, which ex- 
pressed her intentions during the War of the First Coalition. 
But the siege of Toulon will be known principally as the 
action in which Napoleon first distinguished himself. The 
exact part which he played in this important event has be- 
come a question of dispute, giving rise to various opinions. 
After studying the question I have become convinced and 
hope to be able to prove that those who attribute to Napo- 
leon a great part in the success of the Republican Army are 
quite right. The grounds upon which they base their opin- 



102 

ion may often be false however. It lias frequently been said 
that Napoleon alone, with the e3'e of a genius, discovered 
the one vulnerable point in the outskirts of Toulon, namely 
the Eguillette, and by this one act decided the fate of the 
city. This is false. He choose, as any other well schooled 
oflScer would have done, the Eguillette as a point of attack, 
but he is entitled to no great credit for having done so. 
Again according to his own statement and to that of the 
Representatives, this plan corresponded practicallj'^ with that 
sent on from Paris; and again, the Allies themselves recog- 
nized the importance of this point, and seized and fortified 
it before the Republicans could take advantage of it. This 
was due to the slowness of Carteaux. The great merit of 
Bonaparte lay in the fact that he alone organized and com- 
manded the artillery, which at all sieges and most especially 
at Toulon, played the important part. Bonaparte showed 
the greatest activity in the equi])ing as well as in the direc- 
tion of this arm. Even many of the officers were called to 
Toulon by him personally. He showed excellent judge- 
ment in placing his hatteries; so much so that, as has been 
seen, the shots i'rom the first one erected, after Bonaparte had 
been but a few days at Toulon, announced to the Allies the 
possibility of their being forced to evacuate the place. The 
notes of the Spanish Minster, of the English ambassador at 
Madrid, and of Hood are eloquent proofs of this. Almost 
up to the end the Republican Army was in a most deplor- 
able state. The Artillery was the one redeeming feature, the 
one arm which gave the Allies any concern. All their sallies 
were made in order to destro}' the steadily approaching bat- 
teries. The daring and disasterous sortie in which O'Hara 
was captured, was rendered necessary by the opening of the 
fire of the Convention. The great part which the artillery 
played in the final attack on Eguillette has been seen. The 
shots from the newly erected batteries were what forced the 
Allies to hasten their retreat on the last day, and conse- 
quently made it impossible for them to complete their work 



103 

of burning the ships and yards. In fact the proofs of the 
great activity of the artillery stand out in vivid contrast to 
the inefficiency of the other branches of the army. The ar- 
tillery was entirely the work of Bonaparte ; he had the sole 
command until the arrival of Du Thiel, and the real com- 
mand even then, for Du Theil was old, ailing and could 
not take any active part. The council of war had approved 
all the batteries erected by Bonaparte, and the positions of 
all those erected after Du Theil's arrival had been chosen 
by Napoleon ; and most of them already commenced. Du 
Theil was brave, well instructed and made a good impression 
on Dugommier. He recognised immediately the talent of 
Bonaparte as is shown by the following lines written to the 
Minister of war on the day of the entrance of the Republi- 
cans in Toulon.^ " Je manque d'expression pour te peindre le 
merite de Bonaparte; beaucoup de science, autant d'intelli- 
genee, et trop de bravour, voil^ une faible esquisse des vertus 
de ce rare officier. C'est a toi citoyen rainistre de les con- 
sacrer a la Gloire de la Republique." Victor wrote in his 
Memoirs; " Or ces puissantes moyens (the artillery) etaient 
diriges par Bonaparte ; car le general Dutheil emerveille de 
la justesse et de la superiority de ses vues s'etait complete- 
ment efface devant lui ; noble et rare abnegation ! hommage 
magnifique qui lionore h la fois celui qui le rendait et celui 
qui en fut Fobjet". The Due de Raguse wrote in his Me- 
moirs ; " Duthiel fut venu pour prendre le commandement 
en chef de I'Artillerie. Celui-ci vit le pouvoir en si bonnes 
mains et si bien exerce et les commandements avaient sou- 
vent alors des consequences si graves qu'il laissa faire le 
jeune officier et ne prit aucune part a la direction du siege." 
He made the same statement as Victor, but attributed Du 
Thiel's action to different motives. His implying that Du 
Thiel feared the responsibility of the command is no doubt 
unjust. General Doppet said in his Memoirs, written in 
1797; "Duthiel fit avec moi la visite des batteries etablies 
1 War Archives. These lines have been frequently published. 



104 

avant mon arrive et je vis avec autant d'etounemeiit et de 
satisfaction que cet ancien Artilleur applaudit a toutes les 
mesures qu'avait prit le jeuiie Bonaparte." Many other 
less important proofs are found in the writings of those who 
took part in the siege. Carteaux's final praise of the Artil- 
lery and Dugoannier's and Salicetti's special mention of 
Bonaparte during the siege have already been spoken of 

Barras also wrote in his Memoirs on the siege of Toulon, 
and it is principally upon his writings that those who deny 
the importance of Bonaparte's role, base their opinion. That 
Barras' Memoires are hostile to Napoleon is admitted by all 
who know them. That Barras' account of the siege of Toulon 
is full of mistakes and consequently almost worthless as a 
source, will be seen by everybody who compares it with any 
trustworthy acouut of the siege. And yet he tried to demon- 
strate that Bonaparte's role at Toulon was only secondary. 
It seems to me that he has really proved the contrary. Here 
are a few of his sentences. " Des sa premiere recontre avec 
moi je fut frappe de son activite". . . . "je lui donnai 
devant tout le monde des preuves de ma «bienviellance". 

, . " Bientot admis a ma table il fut toujours place h 
cote de moi". . . . "Dugommier accorda de suite la 
plus grande confiance a celui qu'il appelait " mon petit prot- 
ege ". Bonaparte ne tarda pas a en abuser ; il prit bientot un 
ton absolute et decisif qui deplut au general en chef ". . . . 
" Bonaparte commandait I'artillerieprovisoirement. Ce n'etait 
pas assez pour lui de ce commanderaent important, il fallait 
qu'il se mela de tout et de tout le monde ". These lines 
show that Napoloen made himself everywhere conspicuous. 
The hostile tone of the same may easily be attributed to 
Barras' prejudice. Further he continued. " Bonaparte donna 
quelques prouves de son talent militaire qui commeu9ait k 
se developper; mais il n'agit que secondairement dans cette 
circonstance : je le r^pete le veritable " preneur" de Toulon, 
c'est Dugommier." When one recalls the fact that on the 
13th. Vendemiaire Barras placed his entire fortune in the 



105 

hands of Bonaparte, and a few days later said to the Con- 
vention, "J'attirai I'attention de la Convention nationale 
sur le general Baona Parte, c'est lui, c'est a ses dispositions 
savantes et promptes qu'on doit la defense de cette enciente 
autour de laquelle il avaitdistribue despostes avec beaucoup 
d'habilite ",(he then proposed him for ''general en second de 
I'armee de I'interieur ") and when one remembers that 
Barras was largely instrumental in procuring for Bonaparte 
the command of the army of Italy, one is justified in believ- 
ing that his opinion of Bonaparte at this time was somewhat 
different from that at the time he wrote his Memoires. 
Barras' contempory opinion of Dugommier has been pre- 
served and differs much from that which he gave in his 
Memoires. On Nov. 29. he wrote to the Comite du Salut Pub- 
lic " La situation de I'armee n'est pas satisfaisante. Je suis 
loin d'inculper le general Dugommier. Cependent ce general 
questionne par moi n'a pu me dire le nombre de troupes 
qu'il commando ; il ignore le nom des bataillons arrivees, le 
nom et le nombre de ceux qu'il attend ; il n'avait encore 
fait ni fait faire aucune revue, il ne connaissait pas la situa- 
tion de ses principales batteries ; je I'ai exhorte a s'occuper 
plus serieusement de la grande affaire dont vous I'avez 
charge et de surveiller toutes les parties de I'administration 
qui m'ont paru tres negligees ; il m'a tout promis ; il m'a 
paru tres bien intentione, puisse-t-il tenir parole ". Barras' 
opinion of Dugommier may be of no great value but it seems 
strange to see him write in this tone of him whom he after- 
wards termed the '' veritable preneur de Toulon." Further 
he wrote. "La prise du general O'Hara attribu6 h Bonaparte, 
le vaiseau qu'il aurait coule bas, le plan de campagne auquel 
il aurait participe sont autont d'assertions fausses, imaginees 
par celui qui en a imagine bien d'autres, repetees par ses 
fiatteurs le jour ou il a eu I'argent pour les payer." These 
lines show the style and spirit in which Barras wrote of 
Napoleon. The statements are quite false. It is true that 
Bonaparte did not personally take O'Hara prisoner, and he 



106 

nowhere said that he did. It is however practicall}'' certain 
that he commanded the body of troops wlio found the 
wounded EngHsh General. As for the " vaisseau anglais," 
he sank several shortly after his arrival at Toulon, as has 
been seen. As for the plan of attack, it has been shown how 
he selected it as the proper one from the very first and fol- 
lowed it up to the end. Barras' ideas on the proper manner 
of attacking Toulon I have found in a letter written by him 
at that time, and as it is unpublished I have given it in full, 
(see Appendix II) Reading it one cannot but admit that it 
is merely a mass of phrases put together by one who feels 
he is bound to say something on a subject of which he 
knows little. It shows that Barras is not a military man : 
consequently his opinion of Bonaparte's participation in a 
plan which he himself did not appreciate, is worthless. On 
Nov. 29. he wrote of the plan decided upon by the council of 
war. . . . " Je I'ai trouve tr6s bien ecrit, fort bien redige, 
meme assez bien concu." Again nothing but phrases, where 
Barras' criticises the handwriting and literar}'^ merit of a 
military plan. It must surely be admitted that to judge of Na- 
poleon's role at the siege of Toulon from Barras' memoires 
is quite untrustworthy, in fact worse, as they are incorrect 
and biased. Others ^ who have written on this event, say that 
nothing in the official records shows the great role played 
by Bonaparte. It is true that in the War Archives in Paris 
there is no exact statement, nor is it mathematical!}^ demon- 
strated that Bonaparte played the principal part in the 
siege of Toulon : but indirect proofs abound even here and 
are also to be found in the sources of the English and of the 
other Allies. History is not an exact science; therefore a 
fact which, even through an indirect proof appeals to the 
reason of an unprejudiced person is taken as truth. It is 
quite as wrong to deny a fact which is clear, as to asisert one 
which is false. Toulon was Bonaparte's opportunity and he 
took every advantage of it. 

1 Jung ; Krebs and Morris. 



107 

It is instructive to follow as closely as the material per- 
mits, Bonaparte's actions during these three important 
months: to see how during this time of jealousy, distrust 
and open enmity between the different officers, and between 
the commanding officer and Representatives, Bonaparte 
understood how to remain on excellent terms with them all 
and to continue his part of the undertaking, conscious of his 
aim and uninterrupted in his progress. Napoleon, spured 
on by his restless ambition and armed with an excellent 
technical instruction, needed yet something more to forward 
him in his wonderful career; to keep him on the proper 
path, and from wasting his untiring energy against impos- 
sibilities. He needed a broad knowledge of men and a clear 
insight into the conditions of his day. Without this he might 
have been a Hoche, a Kleber or a Ney, but never a Napoleon 
nor even a Bernadotte. His intuitive genius could not of 
itself have supplanted such knowledge; it made him quick 
in comprehending, arranging and generalizing his experi- 
ence, but the experience itself was necessary. Napoleon may 
have needed less than others, but he needed some. Such an 
experience of the world of his day could not have been ac- 
quired in an artillery school in Brienne, nor in the little 
Island of Corsica, dealing with a unique people, nor had 
Bonaparte obtained it as yet in France. His Souper de Beau- 
caire shows that his views and ideas were still limited. It is 
first at Toulon that he acquired this broader and valuable 
experience. Here he took an active and important part, 
right in the center of an event of European importance. He 
was in touch with revolutionary France, with the represen- 
tatives, and generals; an interested spectator of party strife 
and of the conflict of political and social ideas. He came 
into contact with the European nations, lived in an atmos- 
phere of uncertainty, danger and intrigue. Even from a 
military stand-point he must have learned a great deal. 
Here he witnessed the combined action of the different 
arms, with a preponderance of his own special one. He real- 



108 

ized the importance of that department which provides for 
the provisioning of the arm3^ All this must liave made a 
vivid and lasting impression on the mind of Bonaparte, 
tlien a young man, awaiting an opportunity. How well he 
understood human nature is demonstrated by the tact with 
which he won the confidence of all those with whom he 
came in contact, the Representatives, among them Barras; 
the Generals Dutheil, Doppet and Dugommier. His naming 
an exposed battery in which the gunners hesitated to serve. 
La haiterie des Ilomvies-sans peui\ and in this way so touch- 
ing their pride that everyone strove for the honor of serving 
in it, shows how well he understood his soldiers. One is re- 
minded of his address to his army in Italy two years later. 
Napoleon made many friends at Toulon; among them several 
of his future lieutenants, Junot, Marmont, Victor and others. 
His relations with the younger of the Robespierres nearly 
dragged him down in their fall, and it was undoubtedly 
here that arose the enmity between Napoleon and his coun- 
tryman Arena who was afterwards executed for an attempt 
on the life of the First Consul. But those were exceptions. 
It was certainly not at Toulon that he won the hatred of 
Barras; quite the contrary. Men as well as conditions he 
used to his best advantage. Yet one cannot accuse him of 
ingratitude. All of those who still lived when he was in 
power, and the sons and grandsons of those who did not 
were rewarded; many of them in his will from St. Helena. 
It is a grand sight to see how the dethroned Emperor re- 
calls and rewards those who helped him in his early career. 
All this experience, good luck and self-satisfaction was no 
doubt what made Napoleon feel that his history should 
begin with the siege of Toulon. Yet he seemed to forget 
that his thoughts, sentiments and actions before this period 
were also of great interest to those who wished to study the 
career of one of the world's exceptional men. 



109 
flPPENDIX I. 

[Record Office.] 

Trevor to Grenville. Turin Dec. 14. 

Monsieur is expected here the 16th 

and your Lordship may depend on a faithful Execution of 
the Instructions therein alluded to, the Importance of which 
I see in the strongest sense and the more so because sus- 
picions I have for sometime entertained are more than ever 
confirmed that the Spaniards are at the bottom of a secret 
intrigue of placing Monsieur at Toulon in his Character of 
Regent. Your Lordship heard enough of their Behavior at 
Toulon to conceive what suggestisns and what hopes their 
jealousy and disappointed Pride may have given birth to. 
The Princes of the blood have had some secret agents at 
Toulon and I learn from thence in a private Letter of the 
seventh Instant that His Majesty's commissaries knew noth- 
ing of Monsieur's Journey towards that place that the Span- 
iards had found means to gain a Party amongst the sections 
and that a sort of wish had been expressed by them that 
Monsieur should be called there as regent that this Idea 
had been communicated to Sir Gilbert Elliot and that he did 
not seem to consider it liable to any great inconvenience. 

If it is indeed true the dispositions at Toulon are 

such, a part of our objections would be removed but there 
still remains others which I shall consider as an Insult, till 
I receive from your Lordship positive orders to the Con- 
trary; and first the surreptitious manner in which it appears 
to be conducted and the want of any previous application 
for His Majesty's Permission which was equally necessary 
from a Principle both of Policy and Respect and secondly 
the weighty consideration that it is not enough that this 
measure should be thought politic by the Inhabitants of 
Toulon. It must also be considered so by His Majesty's 
Ministers and as consistent with those Principles which 
constitute the wish for the support of a vigorous govern- 
ment." 



110 



flPPENDIX II. 

[Archives Nationales.] 

Paul Barras d ses <^ollegues ^ Ollioules. 

J'ai reflechi mes cliers collegiies sur le plan d'attaque pro- 
pose par le general et approuve par vous. je crois devoir 
vous reiterer par ecrit et pour I'intcret de la Republique 
une partie de mes observations. Les deux divisions de 
I'ouest et de Test dirigces con t re Toulon doivent attaquer 
dans toute leur etendu tons les postes des ennemis, parmis 
ces attaques il en est d'effective et de fausses. J'ose croire 
d'abord que les i)rincipales de ces attaques doivent etre 
diriger centre Pharon, la chartreuse Faiguillette ou Balag- 
uier et Malbousquet. Deux attaques que je regards com me 
decisives et devant produire subitement la prise de Toulou 
si elles reuississent sont celles de Pliaron et de Malbosquet. 
Je pense done qu'il faut surtout s'attacher plus particulaire- 
ment a la pris de ses deux positions et que les colonnes ou 
les differentes corps destines pour ces deux attaques doivent 
etre nombreuses et bien cboisis. Je pense que les aproches 
doivent etre faites avant le jour et le lendemain d'une grande 
canonade qui aura demonte les canons de I'enemie et de- 
moli ses travaux. Je pense qu'il doit etre defendu de tirer 
un seul coup de fusil, qu'il faut joindre I'ennemi et user de 
I'arme blanche, qu I'impetuosite francaise rend presque tou- 
jours favorables. Je pense qu'il faut aussi prevoir tons les 
cas ; que le resultat des attaques les mieux conbinees est 
quelque fois contrarie et qu'alors des pointes de ralliement 
doivent etre convenues ; des lignes ou retranchements Aleves 
pour y recevoir les troupes repousses ou poursuivis ainsi que 
des pieces de position placees dans ces retranchements. Je 
pense qu'il faut cboisir les travailleurs et preparer en ab- 
bondance tout ce qui sera necessaire pour se loger et se 
retrancher aussitot qu'on sera maitre de quelque poste en- 
nemie. Si des postes et Pharon surtout sont pris le general 
doit s' attendre a de grands efforts de la parte des ennemis 



Ill 

pour reprendre ces positions d'ou depend leur.salut; il doit 
en consequence s'y fortifier sur le champ y caserner des 
troupes sures et nombreuses, en longer meme sur les derri- 
eres pour les appeller au besoin. Pour attaquer a la fois une 
lingue aussi etendue que celle de la droite de la rade de 
Toulon a sa gauche il faut de bonnes troupes, je suis d'avis 
d'attaquer sans retard mais je tiens a ce que 6000 soient sur 
le champ detaches de I'armee d'ltalie et envoye sur Toulon 
alors je ne considere plus le succes de 1' attaque projettee 
comme incertaine, alors je n'hesite plus d'assurer que les 
infames brigands renferes dans Toulon n'auront autre parti 
que la fuite et la mort qui les poursuivera. Quelles sont les 
forces effectives de I'armee de la Republique sous les murs 
de Toulon ? quelest le nombre des bataillons qui les compo- 
sent? je n'ai pu avoir a cet egard qu'une donnee aproxiraa- 
tive qui la porte a 30,000 hommes et parmi laquelle on 
pent compter moitie de p. requisition. Si I'ennemi a 15, 18 
ou vingt mille hommes, car je n'ai encore a cet egard aucune 
certitude vous hasardez peut^tre en attaquant de cette ma- 
niere non seulement le sort de I'armee francaise mais celui 
du'midi; vous perdez au moins I'espoir d' entreprendre de 
nouvelles attaques et vous etes obliges d'attendre les forces 
et I'attirail immense, mais necessaire pour faire un siege 
auquel I'ennemi aura tout le temps de se preparer, observez 
encore que par la distance et la nature de vos positions il 
est impossible qu'elles se soutienent et se protegent mutuelle- 
ment. L'arraee d'ltalie est fermee par les neiges, le tableau 
que nous en a fait Dugomier est tr^s rassurant. 6000 
hommes de troupes experimentees et agueries en seroient 
detachees pour I'attaque de Toulon, cela nous donnerait 
alors une masse de force une preponderance une confiance 
meme a nos troupes qui nous assure du succes. Ces 6000 
hommes seroient remplaces a I'armee d'ltalie par des batail- 
lons de premiere requisition, ainsi nul inconvenient d'exe- 
cuter de suite cete mesure. Je vous sourais de nouveau toutes 
ces observations peser les dans votre sagesse communiquez 



112 



Ics an general, ne perdez pas de vue que la destruction "de 
Toulon tient au salut du midi qu'il n'est aucun sacrifice 
aucune consideration qui doivent vous arreter lorsque il est 
question de chasser I'ennemi de ce post important observez 
aussi qu'alors vous pourrez disposer d'une armee victorieuse 
et sauvcr la Republique en admettant tons les moyens que 
je vous ai demontre. Au resteil fa ut que Toulon soitattaque 
et qu'il le soit vigoreusement si mes observations sont rejet- 
tees je me rendrai a I'armee et avec nos propres moyens 
nous executerons le plan propose. 

A Marseille le 8 frimaire Fan 2 de la Republique. 

Paul Barras. 




113 



Contents. 



Page 
Contemporary Accounts and Bibliography iii 

Preface iv 

PART I. 

Conditions Under "Which Toulon Surrendered to the Eng- 
lish and Siege of the Town viii 

Chapter I. 

France in 1 793 — Topographical description of Toulon — Negotiations 
preceding Surrender — Proclamation of Hood — Hood's Entrance 
— Arrival of News in London — Political situation of Allies at 
time of Siege — Opinions on Hood's Declarations — English idea 
as to Retention of Toulon 1 

Chapter II. 

Arrival of Carteaux in Marseilles — First Engagement— Arrival of 
Bonaparte — Representants du Peuple — Effect of First Batteries — 
Attack on Heights of Grasse — Attack on Mont Faron- — Misun- 
derstanding between Carteaux and Lapoype — Attack on Sab- 
lettes — Attack on Cap Brun — Departure of Carteaux — Bonaparte 
during absence of Generals — Arrival of Doppet — Engagements 
on Nov. 15 14 

Chapter III. 

Dugommier — Marescot — Council of War — Bonaparte's Plan — Mare- 
scot's influence upon the Siege — Attack on Convention — Artil- 
lery before Final Attack — Attack on Eguillette — Council of War 
— Departure of Allies — Destruction of the Ships — Entrance of 
Republicans — Bonaparte and the Massacres 38 

PART II. 

Diplomatic Correspondence of the Allies and Results of 
tile Pall of Toulon 



Chapter I. 
Dispute between Hood and Langara — Connnissioners at Toulon — In- 
structions to Commissioners — Declaration published at Toulon 
— Correspondence with Austria as to Declaration — Correspond- 
ence with Spain as to Declaration — England's object in holding 
Toulon — Publication of Declaration 58 

Chapter II. 
Question of the l-Vench Princes — End of Dispute as to authorit)' at 
Toulon — Question of the P^niigrants — The Austrian reinforce- 
ments 79 

Chapter III. 
News of the fall of Toulon in France, Spain, and England — Results 
of the I'all of Toulon — Fate of the Ships at Toulon — Role of 
Bonaparte — IVIemoirts of Rarras — Influence of the Siege on 
Bonaparte 97 

Appendix I. Letter from Trevor to trrenville Dec. 14 109 

Appendix II. Letter from Barras to his Collegues at Toulon 110 



H 172 85 








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